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1 Introduction
In this thesis, I provide several essays in support to answering the question about
the interaction of different fiscal instruments, macro aggregates, and financial assets.
To discover the impact of fiscal policy and other shocks on macro aggregates,
I present five essays on financial assets, fiscal policy and the macroeconomy while
estimating empirical models using U.S. data and building theoretical economies.
The second chapter of this thesis contributes to existing literature by estimat-
ing the fiscal spending multiplier using stock returns of military contractors in an
expectation-augmented vector autoregression (EVAR) setup.
Two main issues need consideration when estimating the impact of fiscal spending
on output and other aggregates. First, aggregated spending contains endogenous
components, which are adjusted to local and state needs and also in reaction to
structural changes, for instance, the demographic structure, and are therefore cor-
related with the state of the economy. Using such a combination of endogenous and
exogenous spending would, therefore, dilute the structural estimate for the fiscal
multiplier. To cope with this problem, I instead incorporate defense spending in my
estimation, as suggested by Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Fisher and Peters (2010)
and Ramey (2011b). This type of measure is likely to be exogenous while reacting
to international military challenges rather than to local needs.
Second, agents in the economy have expectations on future fiscal policy. Forward-
looking rational agents learn of changes to the fiscal budget beforehand and adjust
their economic choices before actual changes appear in the data. Therefore, datasets
of the researcher and the one of the agents do not align, which biases the estimate of
the impact of fiscal spending shocks on output. Different solutions to this problem
have been suggested. Ramey (2011a) creates a narrative series of discounted changes
to military spending, whereas Fisher and Peters (2010) use stock portfolio returns
of military-focused firms, exceeding the market return.
To address the foresight problem, I follow Fisher and Peters (2010). The au-
thors suggest portfolio returns of military contractors as a proxy for future defense
spending increases since financial markets react instantaneously to news in the econ-
omy causing higher stock returns of receivers of additional funds. However, the way
Fisher and Peters (2010) capture this shock has drawbacks, as they only use the
difference of military firms stock returns and the market return, ignoring certain
dynamics.
Instead of calculating portfolio returns in excess of the market return, I estimate
a measure for abnormal and hence unexpected returns. In a Sharpe (1964), Lintner
(1965) and Black (1972) (SLB) type market model regression, I define an anticipated
10
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fiscal spending shock as the residual of the regression, as also suggested by DellaVi-
gna and La Ferrara (2010) for detecting illegal arms trades. Furthermore, Fama and
French (1993) and Fama and French (2012) suggest that persistent covariates exist
that help to explain stock market returns. Fama and French (1993) suggestions have
become known as the “three-factor-model” and include a measure for the size and
book-to-market value of firms. Ignoring these factors may overestimate the impact
of fiscal spending on output.
When ordering military spending first in an EVAR estimation and incorporat-
ing the refined anticipation shock series, the spending multiplier takes a value of
1.2. Therefore, Fisher and Peters (2010), who suggest a multiplier of 1.5, tend to
overestimate the true multiplier by relying on their stock market measure.
Extending the sample to include financial crises data yields a decrease in impor-
tance of the anticipated military spending shock since the last observations add a
period of non-defense spending changes.
The third chapter continues to investigate the impact of fiscal policy on main
aggregates and financial measures. In contrast to the paper on fiscal spending shocks
and the fiscal multiplier, chapter 3 takes a look at the other side of fiscal policy, taxes.
In “The procyclicality of consumer credit” the interaction between tax cuts, TFP
shocks and consumer credit is investigated. The former shock is incorporated since
it is of importance for the policy-maker, whereas TFP shocks are seen as one of the
major drivers of the business cycle.
Recently, consumer credit has more than doubled, also because the Financial
Liberalization has led to an easier access to unsecured credit. So far, both shocks
were mainly used to quantify their dynamic effects on variables like output, con-
sumption or hours,1 whereas this paper takes a closer look at how private credit
evolves to conditional changes in both measures.
In order to proceed, the exogeneity of the Romer and Romer (2010) tax measure
and the Basu et al. (2006) TFP shock is investigated since this is of importance
for the choice of the estimation method. Granger causality tests suggest that both
shocks can partly be predicted by past observations of the other variables included
in the VARs. This paper, therefore, compares impulse responses from exogenous
VARs with those estimated with VARs for quarterly U.S. data. The paper suggests
that due to the results of the Granger causality tests, the less restrictive method, a
VAR, should be estimated when including either shock measure. In such a setup,
the shocks are contemporaneously exogenous, rather then strictly exogenous as in
1For the TFP shock, see, among others, Basu et al. (2006) and Christiano et al. (2004) and for
the tax shock, some prominent examples are Romer and Romer (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2011)
and Favero and Giavazzi (2012).
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the case of the exogenous VAR. Results are then compared to identify the bias from
estimating exogenous VARs.
The variables in the estimation include either shock measure, output, non-
durable and durable private consumption, hours, the real interest rate and consumer
credit. The fiscal policy shock in the form of tax cuts and the TFP innovation cre-
ate a persistent expansion in the economy. The findings are in line with Ludvigson
(1999), who provides descriptive evidence for the TFP shock, and Nakajima and
Ríos-Rull (2014), who gives unconditional correlations between consumer credit and
output. This paper, however, provides conditional evidence that credit, consump-
tion and output co-move based on structural VAR estimates. As a result, the boom
that is initiated in the economy is partly credit-financed. Therefore, in good times,
consumers choose to borrow and consume more rather than to save and buffer future
adverse shocks.
The bias arising when estimating exogenous VARs is rather small for tax cuts
compared to TFP shocks. When using the TFP measure, the exogenous VAR
significantly underestimates the impact on the other variables. Responses lie outside
the confidence bands so that they statistically differ.
Since there is an empirically documented positive comovement of unsecured con-
sumer credit with other aggregates after tax cuts and TFP shocks, this analysis is
extended to investigate the impact of these two shocks on total private debt, which
also includes collateralized loans.
In chapter 4, it is shown, how total private debt reacts to tax cuts and TFP
shocks. Since both shocks are contemporaneously exogenous and Granger-caused
by the other variables, this paper estimates the impact of the fiscal and TFP shock
also in a structural VAR approach. We find that tax cuts and innovations in TFP,
induce an expansion in the economy, which causes output, durable and non-durable
consumption to increase in a humped-shaped manner. Interestingly, it is found that
total private debt increases as well, which refutes traditional consumption smoothing
arguments, as is observed for unsecured credit as well.
The empirically observed comovement is robust to a number of modifications.
Therefore, a theoretical DSGE model is built and brought to the data. The model
economy is closely related to the ones in Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2009).
It is populated by two types of household who differ in their willingness to post-
pone consumption into the future, creating lenders and borrowers. Both consume
a basket of non-durable and durable consumption goods. In contrast to the lender,
the borrowing capacity of the impatient households is limited to a fraction of their
non-depreciated stock of durables.
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To match theoretical impulse responses with the empirical data, deep model
parameters are estimated following Cogley and Nason (1995) and Mertens and Ravn
(2013), estimating VARs with actual and model generated data. The results suggest
that the model can successfully account for the sizes and the hump-shaped patterns
of the empirical dynamics in all variables. In line with the empirical findings, the
model produces persistent increases in total private debt, which last for more than
20 quarters. Moreover, the debt responses almost perfectly match the empirical
counterparts. The point estimates of deep model parameters are in line with findings
in previous studies (Mertens and Ravn, 2013; Iacoviello, 2005).
Because the model finds that a part of the population is borrowing-constrained
and hence faces a limit on the ability to borrow, I investigate the impact of shocks
to the fraction of collateral that borrowers can use to accumulate new debt as de-
valuation shocks. Such a shock can be used as a proxy for house price shocks to
model the sharp decline in prices at the beginning of the financial crisis.
In chapter 5, I, therefore, investigate the effects of devaluation shocks on lenders,
borrowers, and especially on output. I extend the housing DSGE model of Iacoviello
(2005) by a fiscal sector and investigate the interaction of fiscal policy and devalu-
ation shocks.
The model economy is similar to the one in chapter 4 and comprises of an
extended fiscal sector. The government levies distortionary taxes on borrowers and
lenders and consumes a fraction of total output. In contrast to the former model,
the economy includes entrepreneurs, who produce intermediate goods by combining
labor and capital inputs with housing services.
I model the starting point of the financial crises as a devaluation shock to house-
holds’ ability to borrow, as suggested by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Ia-
coviello and Guerrieri (2015). As a consequence, indebted households are forced
to deleverage quickly and also to sell their property, which causes house prices to
decrease. Since borrowing households feel poorer, they reduce consumption, which
causes a recession, while entrepreneurs are hit the hardest due to real estate in their
production function.
Governments around the world responded to the financial crises with large stim-
ulus packages which caused government debt to surge, while the nominal interest
rate hit zero in the U.S. In response, policy makers suggested reducing public debt.
In my model economy, the fiscal authority has two instruments to do so: cut spend-
ing or increase taxes. I demonstrate that the choice of the fiscal rule does not matter
in times when the economy is sufficiently far away from the Zero Lower Bound on
interest rates (ZLB). However, once at the ZLB, the monetary authority is incapable
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of reducing the nominal interest rate to help stimulate the economy. I can show that
the ZLB greatly amplifies the effects of valuation shocks. Therefore, it is revealed
that cutting government spending at the ZLB has a more negative impact on out-
put, as the hands of the monetary authority are tied. Cutting spending compared
to increasing taxes leads to a four to five-fold negative effect compared to when the
economy is distant to the ZLB.
In conclusion, the devaluation shock has asymmetric effects. Lenders profit from
lower house prices while borrowers are severely hit. In the current situation, the
results in this model suggest that lowering spending to stabilize debt causes a more
severe recession in the economy, compared to raising taxes.
As the financial crisis has shown, financial markets have a crucial impact on the
macro economy, which is also found in chapter 2 and 5. In the former, I capture
anticipated fiscal spending with stock market measures. However, the validity of
such measure crucially depends on the liquidity and hence the efficiency of the
market. In chapter 6 I investigate the interaction of financial assets with short and
long maturity when markets are illiquid instead. Here, I take a look at the pre-crisis
shipping sector asset market as a special case of illiquid markets with good data
quality and data availability.
This paper then summarizes the current literature on financial assets in the
shipping sector and investigates market efficiency. In contrast to the stock market
measures in the second chapter, the market for shipping goods across oceans is
characterized by thin trading and the inability to short-sell assets.
Markets are efficient if the best forecast for future spot rates is the current
forward price so that the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis (UEH) holds. Using
cointegration tests, the UEH is rejected for shipping rates so that forward prices at
maturity do not have to equal spot prices. Then, the term structure of shipping
rates matters so that market participants face a risk premia.
In such illiquid markets, forecasts for future financial assets can be generated us-
ing the information embedded in forward prices. The paper, therefore, lets different
forecasting models compete for their forecastability of future spot rates and com-
pares forecast errors generated from random walks to those obtained from ARIMA
processes, VARs and error correction models. It is found that forward rates can ex-
plain future spot rates, with only a weak vice versa relationship. Finally, the model
with the lowest forecast error (VAR) is used to generate a trading scheme which
outperforms the market, even after controlling for transactions costs.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives an estimate
for the fiscal multiplier based on stock market measures. In chapter 3 (4) the impact
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of tax cuts and TFP shocks on consumer credit (total household debt) is investigated.
Chapter 5 shows that cutting spending to stabilize debt at the ZLB can potentially
create larger output gap compared to increasing taxes. Then, chapter 6 uses forward
shipping rates to forecast spot rates. The last chapter concludes this thesis.
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2 Abnormal stock returns of military firms and
the fiscal multiplier
2.1 Introduction
Economic literature remains divided about the quantitative and qualitative impact
of fiscal spending on macro aggregates and about the size of the fiscal multiplier.
However, estimates of the fiscal multiplier are crucial for policy makers when deciding
on the fiscal spending budget.
The main contribution of this paper is to find a correctly specified proxy for
fiscal spending shocks, based on a stock market measure as originally suggested by
Fisher and Peters (2010), to estimate the fiscal multiplier for the U.S.
I extend recent attempts to identify fiscal spending shocks by statistical inno-
vations in defense contractors’ stock returns, controlling for firm size and leverage
effects in a Fama and French (1993) type of setup. The estimated cumulative mul-
tiplier estimated from anticipated spending shocks takes a value of 1.2.
Empirical research provides evidence for a broad range of fiscal multipliers, de-
pending on the dataset, identification strategies, the type of government spend-
ing and its persistence (Ramey, 2012). Identification of fiscal spending shocks is
necessary, which can be done by Cholesky decomposition to the residual variance-
covariance matrix with spending ordered first as suggested by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and followed by Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Perotti (2002).
However, when estimating fiscal multipliers, two issues must be considered. The
endogeneity of government spending and fiscal foresight.
First, a major part of public expenditure decisions are endogenously adapted to
local and state needs and likely to bias estimates for the fiscal multiplier (Pappa,
2007). Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011a) propose the usage of defense
spending rather than total expenditures since it is adjusted to meet international
conflicts that are exogenous.
Second, Ramey (2011a), Leeper et al. (2012) and Leeper et al. (2013), show
that forward-looking agents react quickly to announcements of policy changes by
adjusting their economic choices before actual budget changes take place, causing
movements in consumption, investment, and output to be earlier than documented
by the data. Such misalignment of researchers’ and agents’ information set causes
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fiscal multipliers to be biased, and structural spending shocks may not be recover-
able (Perotti, 2011; Ramey, 2011a; Leeper et al., 2013). Different solutions to the
foresight issue have been suggested. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) dummy out four war
dates for which spending increases were anticipated. In contrast, Ramey (2011a)
suggests amending the VAR estimation by a narrative series capturing expectations
on future military spending, also called the EVAR approach.
A narrative measure as suggested by Ramey (2011a), however, has the drawback
of being subjective since it is based on newspaper articles. In contrast, Fisher and
Peters (2010) propose a proxy for anticipated military spending changes based on
financial market data. A reaction of rational agents who learn of a possible military
intervention would instantly appear in the stock returns of the likely beneficiary of
additional military funds. Fisher and Peters (2010) define their proxy for anticipated
military spending as the different between the returns of a portfolio consisting of
stocks from companies specialized in producing military equipment and the market
return, called excess returns.
These returns, however, ignore critical stock market reactions, for instance, the
negative market reactions when political tensions increase as documented by Shapiro
and Switzer (2011) and hence tend so overestimate anticipated spending increases.
Also, excess returns implicitly assume that defense stocks react to market return
movements one-for-one. In contrast, Fama and French (1998) show that the reaction
of defense firms stocks to market movements is sluggish since these firms mostly
receive contracts from the government and are hence relatively immune to stock
index movements.
I, therefore, modify the existing Fisher and Peters (2010) stock return series by
estimating the proxy for anticipation shocks as abnormal returns of stocks of military
firms. These returns cannot be explained by reactions to markets movements and
are the residuals of a Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) (SLB) market
model and are hence exogenous. I then include two additional covariates in the
stock return regressions as suggested by Fama and French (1993) that are known to
explain stock returns.
Both, the abnormal return approach, and the inclusion of the Fama and French
(1993) covariates result in a purification of the proxy for future military spending
changes and reduce its volatility compared to the Fisher and Peters (2010) measure.
When ordering military spending first and the stock market abnormal returns last
in an EVAR, the spending multiplier resulting from a shock to the abnormal returns
series is 1.2 which compares to an estimate of 1.5 using the original Fisher and Peters
(2010) series.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes
recent literature, followed by an introduction of the data. Section 3 describes the
creation of the abnormal returns shock series augmented by the Fama and French
(1993) factors, followed by a brief summary of VAR methods and estimation results
in section 4, while chapter 5 presents robustness checks and a discussion. Finally,
chapter 6 summarizes the paper and offers a conclusion.
2.2 Time series evidence for fiscal multipliers
Empirical work contributes to finding the fiscal multiplier by frequently relying on
some version of a vector autoregression originally proposed by Sims (1981). Such
estimations include different sets of variables, some with total spending, some with
military spending along with tax measures, output, hours or wages while treating
all variables as being endogenous.
Identification of fiscal spending shocks is necessary since reduced form systems
are merely capable of summarizing the data, and shocks are not orthogonal. Identifi-
cation can, for instance, be achieved through exclusion restrictions from institutional
knowledge, economic theory, or Cholesky decompositions of the residual variance-
covariance matrix. Such restrictions limit the in-period feedback of variables because
of information processing lags or data inertia.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identify spending and tax shocks in a VAR includ-
ing tax revenues, government spending, and output by breaking up the respective
components to find their shock-feedback elasticities. They find output and taxes to
increase in a hump-shaped manner following spending shocks resulting in a fiscal
multiplier of 1.29.
The Blanchard and Perotti (2002) paper has triggered additional fiscal VAR
research, for instance, Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Perotti (2002) et al. Multiplier
estimates vary between 0.6 and 1.8, with the within range of the multipliers being
almost as large as the across-study-range, as Ramey (2011a) notes.
Sign restrictions can alternatively be used in contrast to exclusion restrictions
since the ex-ante assumption of zero-feedback can be too restrictive. This estima-
tion method produces a set of impulse responses with an a priory specified sign.
As Uhlig (2005), Pappa (2007) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) demonstrate, sign
restrictions give a feedback tendency that can sometimes be derived more credibly
from theory than zero restrictions. Sign restrictions use an orthogonal decomposition
P of the residual covariance matrix Σu while allowing for numerous orthogonaliza-
tions. Structural innovations are constructed as t = P−1ut in which ut are the
reduced form residuals and  are structural shocks. Then, sign restrictions and ac-
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tual responses are examined. If no structural shock matching the feedback profile
can be detected, eigenvalue/eigenvector matrices are rotated until impulse responses
coincide with the expected signs, forming a bandwidth of possible responses rather
than point estimates (Pappa, 2007). Sign restrictions and exclusion restrictions can
be combined, as in Dungey and Fry (2009), for further flexibility. Uhlig (2005)
concludes the sign-restrictions-derived fiscal multipliers to be between 0.5 (deficit
financed spending) and two if a surprise deficit-financed tax shock occurs.
Recent papers like Kirchner et al. (2010) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) question the symmetry of responses of output after spending shocks in re-
cessions and expansions. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) implement regime
switching models to determine time-varying multipliers over the business cycle, with
smooth transition VARs using Blanchard and Perotti (2002) data. The multiplier
for total spending is estimated to be 2.5 in a recession and 0.6 in expansions sup-
porting the Keynesian argument of government consumption being less likely to
crowd out private consumption if the economy is slack. In contrast, Owyang et al.
(2013) demonstrate that there is no significant difference between U.S. multipliers
in recessions and booms, whereas for Canada the difference is significantly different
from zero.
Most of the previously described studies have focused on aggregated spending.
However, this measure contains non-defense spending components, which are pri-
marily managed on state and local levels rather than by the federal government and
include decisions on education, infrastructure, and community spending (Ramey,
2011a). Non-defense expenditures are adjusted to the demographic change and
are therefore endogenously determined. It is doubtful whether non-defense spend-
ing components can contribute to the multiplier question due to their endogeneity
(Pappa, 2007). Military spending decisions, in contrast, are made on the federal
level and are determined in response to external events and are hence independent
of business cycle developments.2
Moreover, as Figure 1 suggests, military spending is the major source of volatility
of total spending, as also documented by Perotti (2011) and Ramey (2012).3
The annualized standard deviation of military spending is around 7.5% and thus
approximately double the standard deviation of total fiscal expenditures. Sharp
spending spikes during the Korean and Vietnam War and a misalignment of fiscal
expansions and the actual beginning of a war is visible. For the first war, military
2Neglecting possible causality between economic conditions and the probability of military
interventions.
3Additionally, Figure 10 on page 46 depicts changes in military spending and non-military
spending, spelling out the importance of military spending decisions for total volatility.
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Figure 1: Defense and total fiscal spending
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Notes: The red line denotes the log of real per defense spending. The blue line is the log of
real per total government expenditures. Vertical lines are the Korean War, Vietnam War, the
Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the 2001 WTC attacks, according to Ramey and Shapiro
(1998). Series are rescaled (zero mean and unit standard deviation) for comparability. See
data section for sources.
expenditures more than doubled and remained persistently higher than previously.
Policymakers, however, are mostly interested in multipliers from temporary spending
boosts, often leading to an exclusion of the Korean War, which I follow (Fisher and
Peters, 2010; Ramey, 2011a). Research on fiscal multipliers, incorporating military
spending are for instance Ramey and Shapiro (1998); Barro and Redlick (2011);
Fisher and Peters (2010) and Ramey (2011a), leading to multipliers between 0.6
and 1.5.
Except for the two latter studies, most papers abstract from fiscal foresight, that
is individuals have superior knowledge on future spending changes compared to the
econometrician analyzing the data, as is also visible in Figure 1 by a trailing of
actual governments expenditures compared to the vertical war dates. It takes time
for policy makers to discuss potential spending changes and sign them into law and
signing and implementation do most likely not line up. Agents, however, learn of
the consultations beforehand, adjust their economic choices, causing a discrepancy
between their information and the information contained in the time series (Uhlig,
2005). If announcement effects of military build-ups are ignored, a missing state
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variable problem causes VARs to be non-invertible, with the non-existence of a
finite order moving average representation (Watson, 1986).
Disregarding the foresight issue generates estimates in which statistical shocks
do not span the true information set of the agents and recovering structural shocks
becomes impossible as documented by Leeper et al. (2012, 2013) and Perotti (2011).
Such VAR innovations then dilute the actual fiscal spending shock and are a linear
combination of past, and current innovations, which invalidate inference on the
transition mechanism of fiscal spending shocks (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011).
Foresight on military spending needs to be taken into account, which has been
twofold in literature.
First, the dummy variable approach controls for foresight by dummying out
certain dates. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) create four war dates4 for unusual increases
in the defense budget. As shortcoming, responses to negative and positive spending
shocks are treated equally, ignoring their magnitude, since each of the episodes is
characterized by the same dummy with a limited number of observations for shock
dates. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) conclude the fiscal multiplier estimated when
controlling for war dates to be slightly larger than unity.
The second approach to control for foresight is to incorporate an additional
series capturing news on future macro fundamentals, the expectation augmented
VAR (EVAR), since implementation lags cannot directly be observed in the macro
aggregates. By imposing structure upon the data, identification under foresight
is achieved, and defense spending in VARs is regarded as an instrument for total
government spending (Ramey, 2011a). Ramey (2009, 2011a) estimates defense news
EVARs including a series of present discounted values of expected military budget
changes. Her series is based on Business Week articles reporting on events leading
to changes in the military budget.5 She finds a stronger increase in output after an
anticipated spending shock compared to results when ignoring foresight, concluding
the multiplier to be between 1.1 and 1.2. Anticipation shocks crowd out private
consumption, whereas if foresight is ignored, consumption tends to increase. Perotti
(2011) estimates the multiplier in EVARs to be slightly smaller than unity.
In contrast to Ramey’s narrative approach, Fisher and Peters (2010) define an
anticipation shock as a shock to excess returns of military contractors’ stock prices.
In efficient markets, these have the advantage of instantaneously processing expec-
tations appearing in stock returns. Their approach leads to a multiplier of 1.5. In
4The North Korean invasion of South Korea (1950q3), the beginning of American attacks in
Vietnam (1965q1), the Russian invasion of Afghanistan (1980q1) and the WTC attacks (2001q3),
which was amended later. Dates and the corresponding military budget are depicted in Figure 1.
5Figure 15 on page 51 displays the fit between the news series and actual changes to the budget.
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the remainder of this paper, I extend the Fisher and Peters (2010) methodology to
cope with structural patterns in returns, described in detail in the next section.
2.3 Stock returns & data definitions
In this section, I derive a novel measure to capture foresight on military spending.
Afterward, I describe the remaining data utilized in the VAR estimation and to
derive the fiscal multiplier.
Fiscal spending shock identification with stock prices is useful if the informa-
tion contained in stock prices is a valid instrument for capturing agents’ perception
on future changes in fundamentals (Beaudry and Portier, 2006). Market efficiency
suggests that the stock price today reflects the perception of probability-weighted
discounted future profits of the agents. When investors assign a higher probabil-
ity weight to military interventions with a greater defense spending need, they will
correct their expectations of profits of receivers of additional government funds,
purchase the respective stocks and cause instantaneous upward price shifts, as doc-
umented by Shapiro and Switzer (2011).6 Likely spending cuts, in contrast, lead to
lower expected profits, a defense stock sell-off and lower stock returns.
My approach is to improve the Fisher and Peters (2010) shock by controlling
for anomalies in asset pricing models, as suggested by Fama and French (1993).
Such a measure for expectations of prospective defense contractors’ profits needs to
be free of market movements and only express expectations on future profits from
additional defense contracts, as derived in the following subsections.
2.3.1 Anticipation shocks & excess return
Fisher and Peters (2010) construct cumulative excess returns (CER) from military
contractors’ stock returns,7 of firms ever ranked among top three receivers of the
highest amount of government defense funds. Stock returns of any company with
a military focus that has received one of the three largest dollar volumes of De-
partment of Defense contracts in a fiscal year are reported. The authors aggregate
market-value-weighted mean returns as top three portfolio return rt3t . Although such
aggregation is not immune to criticism since military firms’ order books consist of
6The assumption of higher profits due to higher revenue is plausible because of a lack of com-
petition in the defense sector.
7Specializing in munitions and related equipment according to SIC (Standard Industry Classi-
fication) codes. See Fisher and Peters (2010, p 417) for details.
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a variety of public and private contracts from home and abroad8, it proxies well for
future military spending, compared to similar aggregations.9 A regression of total
government spending on the lags of cumulative abnormal returns yields significant
coefficients on the second and third lags, suggesting an anticipation horizon between
half a year and three-quarters, in line with Ramey (2011a). Consequently, the infor-
mation embedded in the aggregated top three portfolio returns is useful as a proxy
for anticipated military spending to find the fiscal multiplier.
Finally, the technological progress and the markups of all defense firms are as-
sumed to be identical to the rest of the economy.10
The Fisher and Peters (2010) anticipation shocks are then calculated as excess
returns rert given by
rert = rt3t − rmt , (1)
in which rt3t is the defense portfolio return and rmt is the market return. Calculating
the proxy for future changes to the military budget, however, has drawbacks, as
shown below. My contribution to the question of the size of the fiscal multiplier is
twofold:
1. Find unexpected increases in the military budget by using abnormal rather
than excess returns of firms specialized in ammunitions and arms.
2. Estimate abnormal returns while controlling for covariates that have been
known to be persistent when explaining stock returns.
Abnormal stock returns in the market model. A stock return measure for
anticipated fiscal spending needs to be free of stock market movements that are
unrelated to military expenditures. Excess returns as in Fisher and Peters (2010),
do not capture true spending shocks but include all factors that have an impact
on stock prices except the market return. Consider the onset of a US military
intervention. While learning about additional future military funds dedicated to
arms and ammunition manufacturers, forward-looking investors purchase relevant
stocks and cause upward price shifts. Excess returns as suggested by Fisher and
Peters (2010) can point in three directions, depending on the reaction of the market
as also depicted in Figure 2 to 4.
8Defense contractors’ stock prices should primarily be driven by home sales to be meaningful
for US spending shocks identification. Home sales (2010), according to balance sheets: Lockheed
Martin: 83,8%; General Dynamics: 71,7%; Raytheon: 88.0%; Grumman: 92%.
9Outperforming the Fama and French (1992, 1993) guns portfolio, which includes all companies
with military focus.
10Controlled for by including a deterministic trend, see p [419], [426] in Fisher and Peters (2010)
for a discussion of critical issues.
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1. The market does not respond. Excess returns would correctly capture antici-
pated fiscal spending shocks resulting from military interventions.
2. A negative market reaction due to global uncertainty arising from geopolitical
tension may cause investors to shift funds into safe assets, which results in an
overestimation of the true anticipation shock.
3. A positive market reaction and a positive but weaker response of military
contractors’ stocks together with only the jump in stock prices based on higher
expected sales. Excess returns would underestimate the true shock.
Figure 2: Correctly measured excess return (case 1)
Figure 3: Overestimated excess return (case 2).
It is likely that the first case, as the excess returns in Fisher and Peters (2010),
implicitly assume, does not hold. Shapiro and Switzer (2011), for instance, document
adverse market reactions following war news, while military contractors experience
a positive price shift. In this case, excess returns as a proxy for anticipation shocks
would be misleading. A second bias can occur, because excess returns assume the
impact of interest rate changes on the market to be identical to the reaction of the
stock prices of military firms.
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Figure 4: Underestimated excess return (case 3)
The bias arising from the usage of excess returns can be shown in Equation 2
known as the Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) (SLB) market model
for asset pricing
rt3t − rft = α + β[rmt − rft ] + t, (2)
where rt3t is the top three portfolio return, r
f
t is the risk free rate, rmt is the market
return and α identifies market independent top three portfolio-specific returns. β
denotes the sensitivity to market movements for which each additional unit of risk is
compensated by β. t is a stochastic, abnormal return incorporating all unexplained
factors, including those attributed to fiscal spending boosts. The information con-
tained in t is of interest to capture military spending increases rather than relying
on ex-post realized excess returns.
Abnormal returns derived from Equation 2 are well founded in empirical finance.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) propose shocks from regressing military spending
on its lags and military employment and DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010) propose
a method to detect illegal arms trades based on unexpected stock returns of defense
contractors around weapons embargoes. In DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010), ab-
normal returns are also the residuals of Equation 2 and are hence the part of the
SLB market model that cannot be explained by the regression equation. Addition-
ally, Corsetti et al. (2012) estimates fiscal spending rules and also uses the residuals
of the regression as spending shock.
t is uncorrelated with portfolio returns, representing exogenous shocks, whenever
surprise changes in military spending can neither be explained by the difference in
the market return and the risk-free rate, with the shock being equal to
t = (rt3t − rft )− α− β[rmt − rft ]. (3)
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An excess return innovation as measured by Fisher and Peters (2010) is described by
rt3t −rmt . From Equation 2 the true shock and the excess returns shock only coincide
if defense returns move one-for-one with the market (β = 1) and the portfolio specific
α is zero. However, the β of defense firms tends to be smaller than unity, and α to be
significantly larger than zero (Fama and French, 1998).11 Military firms primarily
receive contracts from the federal government so that their stock returns are largely
driven by shocks and less by a reaction to market movements. The tendency of the
bias from excess returns shocks rather than using abnormal returns is given by
true ≷ FP
rt3t − βtrmt + rft (βt − 1)− αtrue ≷ rt3t − βFP rmt + rft (βFP − 1)− αFP ,
and when assuming βFP = 1 and αFP = 0
(rmt − rft )(1− βt)− αt ≷ 0,
in which the superscript true denotes the true α and β and FP refers to the Fisher
and Peters (2010) estimate.12 The direction of the bias depends on time-varying
differences between market and risk-free returns. Abnormal returns, in contrast,
correctly proxy for the anticipation shock in all market phases and every β and α.
The Fama and French (1993) three-actor model. Fama and French (1993)
show that explanatory power of SLB model is weak. Banz (1981), Fama and French
(1992), Fama and French (1993) and Fama and French (1998) suggest extending the
original SLB model by controlling for persistent structural effects when explaining
stock returns. Fama and French (1993) suggest two factors that proxy for common
underlying risk factors in stock returns while increasing the explanatory power of
the SLB model.
First, Banz (1981) claims the existence of a size effect in stock returns embedded
in market equity, ME.13 Low ME values (i.e. small companies) were shown to
have too high a return given their market β for several years and vice versa. If stock
portfolios are formed on size, investors rate small firms as riskier compared to large
companies, compensated for by higher returns. Fama and French (1998) document
the return difference, a size premium, between small and large stocks to be around
7.7 percent per annum.
11Fama and French (1998) estimate the average β of military contractors (guns portfolio) to be
around 0.9 and the respective α to be 6.3.
12See appendix for details on the derivation of the bias.
13Product of outstanding shares and current stock price.
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Second, as Fama and French (1992) demonstrate, a book-to-market equity value
(BE/ME) also contributes in explaining stock returns. Firms with relative high
BE/ME values tend to have persistently higher returns compared to firms with
low BE/ME values. Large BE/ME values can be seen as investors’ punishment
because they believe in lower future earnings, sell the respective stocks, and caus-
ing a decline in ME. Lower expected earnings proxy for financial distress making
the individual stock position riskier. Consequently, investors demand a higher risk
premium. According to Fama and French (1993), stock portfolios demonstrated a
premium of approximately five percent between 1963 and 1991 due to higher per-
ceived financial distress, called value premium.
The size and value premium persist in the SLB market model regressions, even
when competing with other factors so that small firms and companies with a high
BE/ME tend to be riskier with higher demanded risk premia (Fama and French,
2012).
Taking these two covariates into account, an anticipated spending shock needs
to be free of such known structural anomalies because they can contribute to also
explaining top three portfolio returns. Fama and French (1992, 1993) extend the
SLB model to a three-factor model, which leaves the anticipated spending shock free
of movements in the relevant factors:
1. A size factor, determined by ordering stocks into three groups according to
ME each year. Small stocks are those in the bottom 10%, large stocks those
in the top 10% value of market capitalization.
2. Stocks are assigned to three portfolios according to book-to-market equity.
Breakpoints are in the lowest and highest 30%. Stocks in the upper portfolio
are referred to as value stocks, those in the lowest 30% as growth stocks.
The return difference between the first Fama and French factor, SMB (Small
Minus Big), is captured as the equally weighted average of three small stock portfolio
combinations and the returns of three big stock portfolios combinations: SMBt =
1/3(Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth)t−1/3(Big Value + Big Neutral +
Big Growth)t. Secondly, HMLt (High Minus Low), is the equally weighted average
of return differences of the value portfolios (high BE/ME) and the growth portfolio
(low BE/ME) so that HMLt = 1/2(Small Value + Big Value)t−1/2(Small Growth
+ Big Growth)t. The third factor is the market-specific reaction as in the standard
SLB regression, making up the Fama and French three-factor model.14
14Factors are from mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html and
continuously updated.
27
Financial assets, fiscal policy, and the macroeconomy
rt3t − rft = α + β[rmt − rft ] + hHMLt + sSMBt + t (4)
In this equation, the first two factors are defined as above and h and s are the
two regression coefficients of the two additional Fama and French (1993) factors.
The estimation leaves the anticipation shock t to be free of movements in the three
factors and thus pure compared to the Fisher and Peters (2010) excess returns shock.
Having captured the innovation as t, I create cumulative abnormal returns, with
1957q3 = 1. Figure 5 depicts cumulative abnormal returns and the Fisher and Peters
(2010) series, with a comovement of both series until the onset of the Vietnam War.
Figure 5: Abnormal returns and Fisher and Peters (2010) returns
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Notes: Cumulative abnormal returns (solid line, estimated) and cumulative excess return
(dashed line, Fisher and Peters (2010)) of the top three receivers of government military
funding, 1957q3 to 2010q4. Vertical lines denote the Ramey and Shapiro (1998) war dates.
Abnormal returns experience a mean of zero with a standard deviation of σar =
17.4% whereas excess returns exhibited an annualized mean return of µar = 2.4%
with higher standard deviation of σer = 18.6% for the excess return series.15 On
15An Augmented Dicky Fuller test on the stationarity of the abnormal returns series is borderline
significance on the 10% significance level while it can be rejected for the Fisher and Peters (2010)
excess returns series.
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average, however, expected changes in defense expenditures are zero for the sample
since wars and spending cuts are exogenous, ruling out ever-increasing military
spending. The new shock measure enters fiscal VARs, together with the variables
described in the next subsection and is placed last.
2.3.2 Data definitions and sources
I include quarterly U.S. FRED and Ramey (2011a) data from 1947q1 to 2013q4,
upper limited by the availability of the Fisher and Peters (2010) series.
Output, its components, the three month t-bill, the Barro and Redlick average
marginal tax rate, total population, wages, and hours are obtained from Ramey
(2011a),16 and FRED17.
I denote the variables as gdp, the log of real per capita GDP;18 gm, the log of real
per capita military expenditures; g, the log of total per capita government spending;
tb3, the nominal three-month treasury-bill rate; w, the log of real wages; c, the log of
real private per capita consumption expenditures; h, the log of total hours worked;
mtr, the Barro-Redlick average marginal tax rate and t the log of real per capita
government revenues.
Francis and Ramey (2009) note that the reaction of hours depends on the way
they enter the VAR system. If hours are to be included in first differences, hours
may fall after a spending shock. In contrast, hours are naturally bounded, which is
why I include hours in levels.
Finally, CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Returns) are then formed as described
above, whereas CER (Cumulative Excess Returns) denotes the original Fisher and
Peters (2010) series. Additional information on the data can be found in the ap-
pendix in section 2.7.
16Available as GDP (GDP) total nominal defense spending (rdef), total government consump-
tion (rgov), nominal three-month treasury-bill rate (tb3), total household based hours worked
(tothours), the Barro-Redlick marginal tax (amtbr), total population (pop) and cumulative abnor-
mal military contractors’ returns (top3xsret) at weber.ucsd.edu/vramey/research.html.
17Private consumption expenditures (pcecc96), nonfarm business per hour compensation (com-
prnfb), total government current receipts (fgrecpt) and GDP Implicit Price Deflator in $2005
(gdpdef) available at research.stlouisfed.org/
18Deflated with GDP implicit deflator and CPI respectively in $2005. Ramey (2011a) uses
a weighted average of CPI inflation and manufacturing inflation based on ratios of the nominal
values of defense and investment to GDP, and the component series weights on each type of inflation
for GDP, consumption and spending (Ramey, 2011a). Nevertheless, my results remain robust if
Ramey’s aggregation is used.
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2.4 Estimation results
I estimate impulse responses from fiscal VARs conditional on innovations in abnor-
mal returns and then compare impulse responses to the Fisher and Peters (2010)
excess return shocks. I conclude the fiscal multiplier derived from abnormal return
shocks to be 1.2, lower compared to a multiplier using innovations in excess returns
shocks. To compare my results with the ones previously found, I initially estimate
VARs from 1957q3 to 2007q4, before extending the sample to include financial crisis
data to check for influential data points.
My results are qualitatively in line with Ramey and Shapiro (1998); Fisher and
Peters (2010) and Ramey (2011a), but differ quantitatively. An anticipation shock,
constructed as abnormal returns and controlling for the Fama and French (1993)
factors embedded in stock prices, raises output more profoundly and crowds out
private consumption by more compared to the Fisher and Peters (2010) shock for
six-quarter before rising, compared to impulse responses estimated using Fisher and
Peters (2010) returns.
2.4.1 Identification and estimation
The benchmark VAR estimation includes a column vector X ′t of endogenous vari-
ables, ordered as military spending, output, t-bill, aggregated spending and either
the original Fisher and Peters (2010) series or the abnormal return series. Total
spending is then substituted for additional variables of interest like hours, wages,
consumption and tax measures as also done in Fisher and Peters (2010). The re-
duced form VAR can be expressed as
Xt = B(L)Xt−1 + ut, (5)
in which B(L) is an autoregressive lag polynomial, L is the lag operator and ut are
reduced form innovations. The VARs include six lags,19 a constant and also a linear
deterministic time trend and is estimated using ordinary least squares.
Since only the reduced form innovations ut with limited economic meaning can
directly be observed, structural shocks need to be recovered.
The system is identified by Cholesky decomposition to Σu, the reduced form
variance-covariance matrix, with defense spending ordered first and one of the two
return measures last. Innovations are then orthogonal to variables representing the
state of the economy. This ordering implies defense spending to be contemporane-
19Suggested by AIC and SC and qualitatively robust to estimations with two up to five lags.
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ously exogenous to the remaining variables. Additionally, I allow the return series
to react contemporaneously upon all other variables acknowledging stock returns’
instantaneous information processing nature. The ordering of variables in Xt in this
setup can be essential for the outcome of the impulse responses, which I address
in the section on robustness. Results remain similar, however, if I order the return
series, ecart and ecert , first, as also noted by Fisher and Peters (2010).
I also substitute wages, hours, private consumption, tax revenue and the Barro-
Redlick marginal tax rate for total fiscal expenditures, since they are of relevance
for the policy maker, as also suggested in Fisher and Peters (2010).
2.4.2 Estimation results from abnormal and excess return innovations
Fisher and Peters (2010) find that their constructed cumulative excess returns, ini-
tiate an expansion in the economy with an increase in output, hours, wages and a
crowding in of private and government consumption with a resulting five-year multi-
plier of 1.5, which compares to my estimate of 1.220. Private consumption is initially
crowded out before it increases in a hump-shaped manner.
Figure 6 represents structural impulse responses of military and total government
expenditures, output, consumption, hours and wages recovered after a one standard
deviation increase in the return indices. Figure 13 in the appendix displays cumu-
lative IR. Red lines denote responses to an innovation in abnormal returns, with
respective 68% bootstrapped confidence bands (thin dashed line).21 Blue lines are
point estimates of the responses to the excess return innovations.
20 0.0267
0.2943 ×1/0.0736 = 1.2% with 0.0267 being the cumulative effect of the CAR shock on output,
0.2943 the effect after five years on gm and 0.0736 is the average ratio of military spending to gdp.
21If 90% confidence bands are used, the reaction of the respective variables are all non-zero as
well, except the impulse response of the three-month t-bill, which would not be different from zero.
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Figure 6: IR for abnormal and excess return shocks I
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Notes: red: IRs of the logs of real capita a) military spending; b) GDP; c) total gov-
ernment spending; d) personal consumption, and e) total hours and f) real per hour
wages, to a one std deviation shock to CAR. Black: respective 68% confidence inter-
vals (10.000 replications). Blue: point estimates IR given CER shocks, 1957q3-2007q4.
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A shock to accumulated returns displays a hump-shaped response pattern in all
six variables, whereas the strength of the impact depends on the choice of return
series.
Output, private consumption and hours remain statistically not different from
zero for six quarters. As visible, the response of output after the Fisher and Peters
(2010) shock lies outside the confidence bands of the abnormal returns shock that
I construct in this paper. Total and military spending exhibit an instantaneous
increase, whereas the reaction of defense spending is quantitatively more than twice
as large in the peak as the one of total fiscal expenditures. Military spending peaks
at ten quarters. The cumulative difference after 20 quarters is approximately 1.5
percentage points, as shown in the appendix in Figure 13.
The impulse response of output suggests a three to four quarters delayed hump-
shaped response, consistent with Ramey (2011a). Figure 6b also indicates that
output reacts 20% stronger after the shock to abnormal returns compared to a
shock to excess returns.22 The discrepancy between responses after both shocks
takes a 20 quarter value of 1.2 percentage points, as Figure 13 suggests. For the
9/11 spending increase, the difference accumulates to approximately to USD 1.3bn
over 20 quarters, whereas the difference for the Korean War spending growth would
have been roughly USD 5bn.
IRs of private consumption reveal a quantitative difference of both impulse re-
sponses, by initially being crowded out twice as strong following the CER shock.
Five to six quarters later, consumption rises more profoundly in the case of the CAR
innovation. The gap after 20 quarters takes a value of 1.2 percentage points, as also
depicted by cumulative impulse responses in Figure 13.
Impulse responses of hours worked are similar for both shocks, with a period of
inactivity followed by an expansion after five quarters consistent with, for instance,
in Ramey (2011b).
Impulse responses of wages demonstrate a significant decline after the two shocks.
After an impulse to CAR, real wages respond positively five quarters after the shock,
whereas the deviation from pre-shock states after CER shock is persistently nega-
tive for the post-shock periods. The impulse after the CAR shock exhibits a hump-
shaped pattern, with a maximum increase after 14 quarters, taking a value of ap-
proximately 1%. The cumulative difference between the two shocks after 20 quarters
is 2.6 percentage points.
220.35% compared to 0.25% at the peak of the response.
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In conclusion, the reaction of consumption to CER shocks demonstrates stronger
effects, whereas CAR shocks have a higher impact on output and wages. The reac-
tions of total spending, military spending, and hours are similar.
Figure 7 summarizes the response of the policy instruments to analyze whether
the response of output is based on interest rate effects. I also add the Barro-Redlick
average marginal tax rate to the system.23
Figure 7: IR for abnormal and excess return shocks II
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Notes: red: IRs of a) nominal three-month t-bill b) Barrow-Redlick average
marginal tax rate c) logs of tax revenues d) cumulative returns, to one std devi-
ation CAR shock. black: respective 68% bootstrapped confidence bands (10.000
reps). Blue: point estimates IR to one standard deviation CER shock, 1957q3-1907q4.
IRs of the t-bill show the period of inactivity, but with a high degree of uncer-
tainty, expressed in wider confidence bands. The policy instrument initially drops
23The Barro-Redlick average marginal tax is available on an annual base.
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by 2 percentage points after the CAR innovation and by only 1% after the CER
shock before rebounding. After four quarters, the t-bill starts to rise, peaking at 1%
after 11 quarters following a CAR shock and 3.8% following the CER shock after
eight quarters.
A non-zero response of the t-bill might, in contrast to Fisher and Peters (2010),
has an impact on the other variables. When looking at conditional responses after
abnormal returns shocks, output or consumption may react upon the instrument
directly. However, taking the variance decomposition of GDP into account, the
interest rate effect accounts for only five percent of the variance in output.
The marginal tax rate increases for approximately four years, before declining
as indicated by Figure 7b. As is evident from Figure 7c, tax revenues rise by 1.5
percentage points more after a shock to abnormal returns when comparing with the
Fisher and Peters (2010) shock. Such an increase is a combination of higher revenues
owing greater economic activity and higher tax rates, as Figure 7b suggests so that
additional spending seems taxed-financed.
Variance decompositions can be used to check how relevant the difference in
impulse responses between the two shocks is. CAR and CER both take a value of
28% of explained variance of gm after 20 periods. However, the fraction of explained
variance is higher when using the CAR shock for GDP (5% for CER vs. 8%, total
spending g (14% and 19%), consumption (3% and 4%) and hours worked (4% and
5%). Thus, CAR innovations drive the macroeconomic variables in the system and
explain additional of their variances compared to CER shocks.
2.5 Robustness of results & limitations
This section discusses main findings and limitations.
Results are robust to ordering the abnormal returns variable first and also to
extending the sample.
When substituting the log of the three-month t-bill for the levels variables which
leads to an elasticity representation, the results remain similar, as suggested in
Figure 12 in the appendix.
2.5.1 Robustness I: extending the sample
Because the financial crisis might substantially have an impact on the estimated
coefficients of government spending on output, I extend the sample to incorporate
recent data. Hence, I estimate two different sub-samples, displayed in Figure 8, the
original one with 1957q3-2007q4 data and one sample with data from 1957q3 to
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Figure 8: IR baseline and extended sample I
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Notes: red: IRs the logs of a) real per capita military spending b) real per capita GDP
c) real per capita total government spending d) real private per capita consumption, e) to-
tal hours worked and f) real per hour wage, to a one std deviation shock to CAR, base-
line (57-07). Blue: point estimates after one std deviation CAR shock for subsample 1957q3-
2013q4, with respective 68% bootstrapped confidence interval (10.000 replications), black lines.
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2013q4 (blue lines). The extended sample is of interest since large amounts of funds
were injected into the economy as part of fiscal stimulus packages, and interest rates
reached the Zero Lower Bound. Therefore, extending the sample by six years adds
interesting observation points. I compare impulse responses conditional on CAR
shocks for both subsamples.
Figure 8 depicts differences for the two subsamples in which blue line denotes the
extended sample (up to 2013q4) and the red lines indicate the responses estimated
with data up to 2007q4, both for the shock resulting from the estimation in this
paper.
An extension of the sample leads to a less profound increase in output. Quan-
titatively, the peak response of output of 1.9% compares to a 3.5% response for
the pre-financial crisis sample. This result stands in contrast with Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) who estimate a stronger reaction of output to fiscal policy
shocks if the economy is slack. However, the full sample is a blend of both sub-
samples. During the financial crisis, non-defense spending was increased in contrast
to earlier periods which reduces the importance for anticipated military spending
shocks. Therefore, the effect of the CAR shock is not as important a driver as in
times of war. The fraction of explained variance of CAR shocks for output after 20
quarters falls from 7% to only 3% if the sample is extended.
When extending the sample, hours only increase half as strong compared to
the shorter baseline. Finally, Figure 8d suggests that including financial crisis data
causes the peak of the IRs to be almost twice as high, compared with the original
sample. The remaining IRs are displayed in Figure 9.
A CAR innovation, for the baseline dataset, causes the t-bill to decrease initially,
converging to zero deviation after 30 quarters. The last added observations between
2008 and 2013 introduce higher uncertainty, visible in the upper left corner of Figure
9 and given by wider confidence bands compared to the shorter subsample. In the
full sample, the impulse response after the shock is significantly negative.
The marginal tax rate shows an earlier decline, almost two years earlier compared
to the full sample. A similar effect is present when looking at the impulse responses
of tax revenues. The peak of the response of tax revenue in the dataset including
the financial crisis is two-thirds of the peak of the subsample.
The qualitative estimation results are also robust to substituting the tax variable
with the fraction of taxes revenues over GDP. The impulse responses remain almost
identical.
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Figure 9: IR baseline and extended sample II
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line (57-07). Blue: point estimates after one standard deviation CAR shock for subsample
1957q3-2013q4 with respective 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals (10.000 reps), black lines.
2.5.2 Robustness II: five-factor and momentum-model
Fama and French (2015) extend the three-factor-model and find two additional co-
variates. These factors capture profitability and the investment patterns of firms
and explain stock returns as do the previously described factors. The authors argue
that some variation in stock returns, related to profitability and investment deci-
sions cannot be explained by the three-factor-model. The authors hence amend the
three-factor model for profitability and for the degree of investment appetite of firms.
Fama and French (2008) and Novy-Marx (2013) show that profitable companies, as
well as firms with conservative investment decisions, realize too high stock returns
given their market beta.
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Hence, I extend the baseline estimation and include these two additional factors
in the estimation of the SLB regression for abnormal returns series as
rt3t − rft = α + β[rmt − rft ] + hHMLt + sSMBt + rRMWt + cCMAt + t, (6)
in which the first ([rmt − rft ]), second (HML) and third factor (SMB) are the ones
from the data section of this paper. RMWt denotes a portfolio of firms, generated
from robust-minus-weak profitability firms,24 and CMAt is the difference between
stocks of conservative and aggressive investment firms.25 The respective regression
coefficients are r and c.
Estimation results of abnormal stock returns as a proxy for future military spend-
ing changes, however, are similar to the previously found results. If all the factor
exposures, HML, SMB and [rmt − rft ] explained all variations in stock returns, α
would be zero. In the estimation in Equation 6, this is the case since the constant is
not statistically different from zero. The explained variance of the model slightly in-
creases compared to the three-factor-model. However, impulse responses estimated
after anticipation shocks remain similar, with the cumulative multiplier being close
to the one estimated using the three-factor-model.
Additionally, Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (2012) argue that regression
betas are time-varying, also expressed by a momentum effect so that well-performing
stocks remain well-performing for a particular time and vice versa. However, Fama
and French (2015) show that the regression slope of such is zero in the five-factor-
model26. Moreover, amending the three-factor-model with the ”momentum effect”
in the estimation of my abnormal returns series does not have an impact on the size
of the fiscal multiplier either.
Figure 16 in the appendix depicts the proxy for changes in military spending
using the three-factor, five-factor, and momentum model. Quantitatively, the series
only marginally differ so that the multiplier estimated with either of the models is
24Measured with accounting data of the previous year, as the difference between annual revenues
minus the cost of goods sold, interests, administrative expenses and sorted from high to low, called
”operating profitability”. Low profitability is defined as the bottom quintile, high profitability as
the upper quintile of all firms since the three middle quintiles are very similar according to Fama
and French (2015). RMW is the calculated as RMW= 12 (small robust + big robust)-
1
2 (small
weak + big weak), as also done for the size factor.
25Investment is defined as growth of total assets for each year, divided by total assets that year.
Then again, conservative investment is defined as firms in the bottom quintile, whereas aggressive
investment is defined as firms in the upper quintile. CMAt then calculated as shown above as
CMA= 12 (small conservative+big conservative)-
1
2 (small aggressive + big aggressive).26All data on CMAt, RMWt and MOMt is obtained from Kenneth French’s homepage at
mba.tuck.dartmough.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data Library.
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almost identical. Therefore, the estimate for the multiplier is robust to changing the
underlying factor model.
2.5.3 Limitations and discussion
A fiscal multiplier derived from abnormal returns shocks is smaller when adding
financial crisis data. If multipliers are estimated to be higher than true multipli-
ers, they are misleading, and a larger spending increase is needed to overcome a
slump. As Ramey (2011a) notes, VAR multiplier estimates can be time-varying and
decreasing as government expenditure hits its peak, which can potentially explain
why the response of output in the extended sample is weaker.
The financial crisis caused non-defense components to increase substantially,
while introducing the first observations with such an increase in non-military spend-
ing, ever. Endogenously determined spending decisions create biased estimates for
the fiscal multiplier as shown above.
Perotti (2011) criticizes VAR approaches with military expenditure to produce
multipliers smaller than one if World War 2 and the Korean War are included.27
Hence, I check the results if the Korean War is included with 1947 onwards data.
The reactions of total spending, the t-bill, and private consumption remain sim-
ilar and the response of output changes in the same manner as if financial crisis
data is included. The response of output becomes negative after several quarters.
Since the series begins in 1947, spending cuts as a consequence of World War 2
causes military spending to fall after the anticipation shock. Wages increase more
profoundly, without a quick convergence as in the original sample. The reaction of
total hours becomes negative and stays below zero before converging back to zero
in a hump-shaped manner.
Finally, Barro and Redlick (2011) criticize that spending multipliers derived from
military expenditures shocks can be misleading if command and control techniques
like rationing private expenditures on goods and services or drafting the population
to serve are present. Spending multipliers then can be lower than in peace times.
However, this effect could be offset by a mandated increase in production and labor,
which in turn would raise the multipliers. In conclusion, the direction of the bias
from both effects connected with military spending is ambiguous. Therefore, using
military spending seems more appropriate compared to using total spending to avoid
the endogeneity problem.
27He suggests, in contrast, to Ramey to dummy out two quarters of World War 2 and the Korean
War, which would be enough to control for announcement effects.
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2.6 Conclusion
The estimated size of the fiscal multiplier using stock prices in an EVAR approach
depends on how anticipated spending shocks are measured. Two common problems
when estimating fiscal multipliers are solved in this paper. I address the endogeneity
problem by ordering defense spending first in an orthogonal VAR since this measure
is likely to be exogenous.
Also, fiscal foresight needs to be taken into account. I do so by relying on a proxy
for future military spending changes based on stock returns of military contractors
as suggested by Fisher and Peters (2010). However, as I can show, excess returns
do not capture the true anticipated spending increase.
I, therefore, introduce a novel measure of anticipated spending changes by re-
defining the externally created measure by Fisher and Peters (2010). Instead of cal-
culating excess returns, as the authors do, I suggest estimating spending increases
by regression the Fisher and Peters (2010) on a number of factors that are known
to explain stock returns as indicated by Fama and French (1993) in an SLB market
model regression. The resulting anticipation shock is then captured as abnormal
returns, that is, everything that cannot be explained by the regression model.
I include the novel measure as a proxy for anticipation shocks to answer the
question of how the U.S. economy responds to government spending shocks.
Estimation results from Cholesky-decomposed reduced form residuals variance-
covariance matrix with defense spending ordered first, and the return series last,
are qualitatively in line with Fisher and Peters (2010) and their measure of excess
returns. Impulse responses recovered conditional on abnormal returns, however,
show that there is a significant difference in impulse responses compared to a shock
to the original Fisher and Peters (2010) excess returns series. After an anticipation
shock, output and consumption, total hours and private consumption react with a
delay after a shock to cumulative abnormal returns instead of excess returns.
Results are important for researchers and policymakers alike since I create a
purer shock to control for foresight and give an improved estimate for the multiplier,
taking a value of 1.2. However, I cannot rule out interdependency of a reaction of
the t-bill since the impact is stronger in my sample compared to the original Fisher
and Peters (2010) series.
I also extend the Fisher and Peters (2010) sample and check for robustness
by adding financial crisis data, resulting in significant lower impulse responses of
output. The relationship between the anticipation shocks and military spending
becomes weaker since non-defense spending measure increased during the current
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crisis. Extending the sample with post-Great Recession data, once it becomes avail-
able, may add additional insight on the multiplier question.
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2.7 Appendix
Bias from using excess returns. This subsection isolates the shock in the SLB
model and compares the Fisher and Peters (2010) excess return shock (FP) with
the new anticipation shock from abnormal stock returns.
Fisher and Peters (2010) imply that the difference between the defense portfolio
and the market to be the anticipation shock. However, this difference assumes the
elasticity of the defense portfolio with respect to the risk-free rate to be identical to
the interest rate elasticity of the market. The following relation holds.
rt = α + rft + β[rmt − rft ] + t
rt − rft − rmt − rft β = α + t
[rt − β × rmt ] + rft (β − 1)− α = t,
where α is the firm-specific return, and  is the spending shock, defined by Fisher
and Peters (2010). For  = rt − rmt to hold, β has to be equal to unity and α = 0
or β × rmt + rft (β − 1)− α = rmt . Both is questionable to hold since the returns are
highly time-varying and not only depending on the risk-free rate. Additionally, if
shocks are exogenous, the stock returns of defense contractors are mainly driven by
fiscal spending and not by a reaction to market movements. Since β compensates
for bearing additional units of risks, if shocks were truly exogenous, β is smaller
than one and close to zero. Excess returns, however, imply a β of unity. Thus, from
the equation above follows
true ≷ FP
rt − βtruermt + rft (βtrue − 1)− α ≷ rt − βFP rmt + rft (βFP − 1)− αFP
rt − βtruermt + rft (βtrue − 1) ≷ rt − rmt
−βtrue × rmt + rft (βtrue − 1) ≷ −rmt
rmt (1− βtrue)− rft (1− βtrue)− αtrue ≷ 0
(rmt − rft )(1− βtrue)− αtrue ≷ 0
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Data description. pcecc96: This variable denotes real (in terms of billions
chained 2005 USD) personal consumption expenditures and is available from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Research at research.stlouisfed.org/
fred2/ series / PCECC96 with identifier BEA Account Code DPCERX1, based
on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Quarterly data is available from
1947q1 onwards and is the annualized seasonal adjusted rate. All data is in logs. It
is intended to be used in fiscal VARs in chapter 2.4.1 to proxy for the reaction of
households spending behavior after an anticipation shock. I denote this series as c.
comprnfb: This variable denotes Nonfarm Business Sector Real Compensation
Per Hour and hence proxies for wages, while excluding farm business sector dynam-
ics. It is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Research
at research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/COMPRNFB/. Data is available as an index
with 2009 being equal to 100 as the seasonally adjusted rate. All data is in logs. It
is intended to be used in fiscal VARs in chapter 2.4.1 as a proxy for the reaction of
real wages after an anticipation shock. I denote this series as w.
fgrecpt: This variable denotes Federal Government Current Receipts ( in terms
of billions chained 2005 USD) and is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Economic Research at research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ fgrecpt with BEA
Account Code W005RC1. Quarterly data is available from 1947q1 onwards and is
the annualized seasonal adjusted rate. All data is in logs. It is intended to be used
in fiscal VARs in chapter 2.4.1 to proxy for the reaction government revenues to
changes after an anticipation shock. I denote this series as t.
gdpdef : This variable denotes the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price De-
flator in 2005 USD, available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Eco-
nomic Research at research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/gdpdef with BEA Account
Code A191RD3. Quarterly data is available from 1947q1 onwards and is seasonally
adjusted. It is intended to deflate Ramey data for use in fiscal VARs in chapter
2.4.1. This series only indirectly appears in the estimation and does therefore not
receive an identifier.
tb3ms: This variable denotes the three-month t-bill: Secondary Market Rate,
available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Research at re-
search.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/tb3ms. Quarterly data is created from monthly
data with the end of period data, available from 1934m1 onwards and is not season-
ally adjusted. It is intended for use in fiscal VARs in chapter 2.4.1 to capture issues
related to monetary policy. I denote this series as tb3.
rgdp: This variable denotes real (in terms of billions chained 2005 USD) gross
domestic product and is available for download at Valery Ramey’s website at econ-
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web.ucsd.edu/vramey/research.html data and based on Ramey (2011a). Quarterly
data is available from 1947q1 and seasonally adjusted. All data is in logs. It is
intended to be used in fiscal VARs in chapter 2.4.1 to proxy for the reaction of real
gross domestic product to changes after an anticipation shock. I denote this series
as gdp.
rdef : This variable denotes real (in terms of billions chained 2005 USD) govern-
ment military spending and is available for download at Valery Ramey’s website at
econweb.ucsd.edu/vramey/research.html data and based on Ramey (2011a). Quar-
terly data is available from 1947q1 and seasonally adjusted. All data is in logs. It is
intended to be used in fiscal VARs in chapter 2.4.1 to proxy for the reaction of real
defense spending to changes after an anticipation shock. I denote this series as gm.
rgov: This variable denotes real (in terms of billions chained 2005 USD) gov-
ernment total consumption expenditures and is available for download at Valery
Ramey’s website at econweb.ucsd.edu/ vramey/research.html data and based on
Ramey (2011a). Quarterly data is available from 1947q1 and seasonally adjusted.
All data is in logs. It is intended to be used in fiscal VARs in chapter 2.4.1 to proxy
for the reaction of defense spending to changes after an anticipation shock. I denote
this series as g.
tothours: This variable denotes total household based hours worked and is
available for download at Valery Ramey’s website at econweb.ucsd.edu/vramey/ re-
search.html data and based on Ramey (2011a). Quarterly data is available from
1947q1 and it is a Household based measure and intended to be used in fiscal VARs
in chapter 2.4.1 to proxy for the reaction of hours worked to changes after an antic-
ipation shock. I denote this series as h.
amtbr: This variable denotes Barro - Redlick Average Marginal Tax Rate and
is available for download at Valery Ramey’s website at econweb.ucsd.edu/ vramey.
Quarterly data is available from 1947q1 and seasonally adjusted. It is intended to
be used in fiscal VARs in chapter 2.4.1 to proxy for the reaction of the Marginal
Tax Rate to changes after an anticipation shock. I denote this series as mtr.
totpop: This variable denotes total population and is available for download at
Valery Ramey’s website at econweb.ucsd.edu/vramey/research.html data and based
on Ramey (2011a). Quarterly data is available from 1947q1 and seasonally adjusted.
It is intended to be used to create per capita series for some of the variables in chapter
2.4.1. This variable does not receive an identifier.
top3xsret: This variable denotes cumulative abnormal military contractors’
returns, available for download at Valery Ramey’s website at econweb.ucsd.edu/
vramey/research.html data and based on Ramey (2011a). Quarterly data is available
45
Financial assets, fiscal policy, and the macroeconomy
from 1947q1. This measure is the exact series, used in Fisher and Peters (2010) and
constructed as described in the data section of my paper. I create a cumulative
returns series for the reasons described in the data section as well. It is intended to
be used as anticipation shock in chapter 2.4.1. This variable is denoted as CER.
Figure 10: Defense and non-defense spending
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Notes: The solid line denotes log changes in real military per capita spending, whereas the
dotted line is the log change in real non-military per capita spending with the respective box
plots. All data 1947q1 to 2010q4. Vertical lines are the Korean War, Vietnam War, Russian
invasion of Afghanistan and the 2001 WTC attacks, according to Ramey and Shapiro (1998).
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Figure 11: IR t-bill in levels I
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Notes: Solid: IRs the logs of real per capita; a) military spending; b) GDP; c) total government
spending; d) personal consumption, and e) total hours and f) real per hour wages, to a one std de-
viation shock to CAR. Short dashed: respective 68% Hall CI (10000 reps), both t-bill in logs. Bold
dashed: point estimates after one std deviation CAR shock, t-bill in levels. All 1957q3-2007q4
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Figure 12: IR t-bill in levels II
(a) Response of tb
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Notes: Solid: IRs of the a) nominal three month t-bill b) Barrow-Redlick average
marginal tax rate c) logs of tax revenues d) cumulative returns, to a one std devia-
tion shock to CAR. Short dashed: respective 68% Hall CI (10.000 reps). Bold dashed:
point estimates after one std deviation CAR shock, t-bill in levels. All 1957q3-2007q4
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Figure 13: Cumulative IR for abnormal and excess returns I
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Notes: Solid: Cumulative IRs the logs of real per capita a) military spending; b) GDP;
c)total government spending; d) personal consumption, and e) total hours and f) real per
hour wages, to a one std deviation shock to CAR. Short dashed: respective 68% Hall CI
(10000 reps). Bold dashed: point estimates after one std deviation CER shock, 1957q3-2007q4.
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Figure 14: Cumulative IR for abnormal and excess returns II
(a) Response of tb
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Notes: Solid: Cumulative IRs of the a) nominal three month t-bill b) Barrow-Redlick
average marginal tax rate c) logs of tax revenues d) cumulative returns, to a one std
deviation shock to CAR. Short dashed: respective 68% Hall CI (10000 reps). Bold
dashed: point estimates of to a one std deviation shock to CER, 1957q3-2007q4.
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Figure 15: Ramey news and abnormal returns
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Notes: Ramey’s news variable and abnormal returns shock, sepa-
rated in six periods. The dotted line denotes denotes the Ramey de-
fense news variable, whereas the solid line denotes abnormal returns.
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Figure 16: Factor models as proxy for future military spending
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Notes: This figure compares abnormal returns shocks derived from the three-factor model
used in the paper to a five-factor and momentum model as suggested by Fama and French
(2012). The blue line denotes abnormal returns estimating in a three-factor model, the red in
a five-factor, and the black line in a momentum model regression.
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3 The procyclicality of consumer credit
Coauthor: Mathias Klein
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the business cycle properties of unsecured consumer credit
conditional on tax cuts as defined by Romer and Romer (2010) and on total factor
productivity shocks, as suggested by Basu et al. (2006).
The financial liberalization starting in the 1980s led to easier access to financial
markets for U.S. consumers and the demand for unsecured consumer credit strongly
increased thereafter. Between 1980 and 2015, the ratio of total consumer credit-
to-output increased from 12% to 18%, as Figure 17 illustrates and also more than
doubled as a ratio to consumption.
Figure 17: Unsecured consumer credit as a ratio to output
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Notes: Real private consumer credit over real GDP for U.S. data from 1950 to 2015.
This financial integration prompted researchers to investigate the interactions
between indebtedness of households and its effect on consumer expenditures and
other macroeconomic variables (Andrés et al., 2015; Mian and Sufi, 2010).
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Surprisingly, the business cycle properties of consumer credit are widely ignored
as empirical, and theoretical models studying the relation between financial mar-
kets and the macroeconomy mainly focus on the dynamic effects of mortgages (e.g.
Iacoviello (2005) or corporate debt e.g. (Bernanke et al. (1999).
Household theory suggests that easier access to credit allows households to buffer
against business cycle fluctuations and to keep their stream of consumption constant
by saving in good times and borrowing in bad times. Consumption smoothing ar-
guments hence suggest countercyclical credit movements after distortions. However,
Ludvigson (1999) provides evidence using U.S. data that consumption growth is pos-
itively correlated with consumer credit growth. In addition to this descriptive view,
Nakajima and Ríos-Rull (2014) find evidence that the unconditional correlation be-
tween credit, output and consumption is significantly positive. Their findings hence
suggest that households use unsecured credit to finance additional consumption in
expansions and do not save.
While these studies take unconditional correlations between credit and aggre-
gates as empirical motivation, this paper focuses on responses conditional on two
types of shocks having occurred, which is more informative. One reason is that
unconditional correlations can result from the simultaneous interaction of several
shocks. An unconditional correlation could be close to zero because two shocks hit
the economy, one of which produces a positive and the other one, a negative cor-
relation. Second, correlations, conditioned on a certain shock having occurred are
more helpful in making inferences about the economic structure.
Analyzing conditional correlations, therefore, requires identification of shocks.
We rely on the narrative tax measure taken from Romer and Romer (2010) and also
on a measure of total factor productivity (TFP), identified by Basu et al. (2006).
The choice for the first shock is motivated by its importance for the policy-making
process, whereas the latter is one of the main drivers of the business cycle.
Given these measures of economic shocks, the question then arises how they
should be econometrically treated to analyze the behavior of consumer credit. This
paper compares two types of specifications, a standard VAR, and an exogenous VAR
(VARX). Studies incorporating the TFP and the narrative tax measure often use a
single equations approach or VARX method. However, in this paper we argue that
a VAR, identified by Cholesky decomposition to the residual variance-covariance
matrix and ordering either of the two shocks first to be more appropriate for the
two shocks since Granger causality tests suggest neither of the shocks to be strictly
exogenous. In a VAR setup, however, both shocks are treated as contemporaneously
exogenous so that the system can consistently be estimated with OLS.
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We find a conditional comovement of consumer credit, output, and consumption,
given the two innovations. This suggests that agents finance additional consump-
tion by borrowing via unsecured credit, which refutes the consumption smoothing
argument.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section introduces
our data, describes estimation methods and presents the properties of the main
macro aggregates, and consumer credit. We then discuss Granger causality of the
two externally specified shocks. The following section then shows our results and
includes a brief discussion. A final chapter concludes.
3.2 Data, Granger causality and estimation
This section presents our data and estimation approach to finding the conditional
response of consumer credit on tax and TFP innovations.
3.2.1 Data
We use quarterly U.S. data from 1966q1 to 2014q4 for the TFP shock and up to
2007q4 for the tax shock, limited by data availability of the tax series. Our sample
hence contains 168 data points for the tax shock and 196 observations in total for
the TFP innovation.
The choice of variables and their ordering is based on Mertens and Ravn (2011),
extended to control for monetary policy. The vector of variables includes, in this
particular ordering, real per capita output (yt), total personal per capita consump-
tion expenditures on non-durables (cnt ) and durables (cdt ), hours worked (ht), the
real interest rate (rt) and real per capita unsecured consumer credit (cct). Except
for the real interest rate, all data is seasonally adjusted and in logs.
Actual tax changes are a linear combination of exogenous and endogenous tax
changes that co-move with the business cycle which biases the estimation of the
conditional response of consumer credit given tax changes or TFP shocks. To cope
with this issue, we use the Romer and Romer (2010) measure for present discounted
values of exogenous tax liability changes, denoted as τt. The authors take a narrative
approach by reviewing the economic reports of the president and reports of congres-
sional committees to record the timing and the size of major tax policy changes.
The authors incorporate only those events that are motivated by past actions, be-
liefs about fairness or philosophy and that are unlikely to be correlated with other
factors that co-move with the business cycle. Romer and Romer (2010) scale the
tax shock by dividing the present discounted value of tax changes by output.
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To obtain the conditional response of consumer credit, given TFP innovations
we incorporate the Basu et al. (2006) TFP measure, which we denote as zt. The
authors base their estimation on weighted, industry specific Solow residuals, control-
ling for utilization, non-constant returns and attaching a weight to industry-specific
technology, in an IV estimation approach.This procedure ensures the shock to be
contemporaneously uncorrelated with other shocks in the economy.
We then create an index with 1966q1=100 of the TFP measure and use the log
of this series.
Data, except the shocks and hours, can be obtained from FRED database. Data
definitions and sources are given in Table 1, and further information can be found
in the appendix in Table 3.
Table 1: Data sources & definitions
y output Log of per capita nominal gross domestic product di-
vided by the GDP deflator
cn non durable consumption Log of per capita (personal consumption expenditures
on non durables plus personal expenditures on ser-
vices) divided by each individual price deflator
cd durable cons purchases Log of per capita personal purchases of durable con-
sumption goods divided by its deflator
r real interest rate Difference between three-month month t-bill and an-
nualized CPI quarter to quarter inflation
cc consumer credit Log of per capita total unsecured consumer debt, di-
vided by the consumer price index
N population Total population aged 16 and over, used to create per
capita values
h hours Product of hours per worker and civilian non-farm em-
ployment divided by population
τ tax Shock Romer and Romer (2010) exogenous tax shock
z technology shock Basu et al. (2006) exogenous technology shock
Notes: Sources and definition of variables for estimation in VARs and exogenous VARs.
Full time series-specific information and sources can be found in the appendix in Table 3.
The first column denotes the code for the respective variable. FRED data available at re-
search.stlouisfed.org.
3.2.2 Identification, choice of model and estimation
The estimation method depends on the nature of the externally identified shock
measures. Estimating VARs or VARX are possible. The VARX takes the following
form
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 +B(L)st + ut, (7)
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in which Xt = [yt, cnt , cdt , ht, rt, cct]′ with the shock being either the tax shock or the
TFP innovation so that st ∈ [τt, zt]. A(L) is a lag polynomial of order four and
B(L) a lag polynomial of order five (suggested by Schwarz information criterion,
Schwarz (1978)). ut denotes all other shocks that are uncorrelated with either the
tax shock or the TFP measure. The VARX estimation includes a constant term and
deterministic trend and is estimated with OLS.
Estimating VARXs assumes that the two shock series are strictly exogenous so
that they are not influenced by past observations in X.
Furthermore, the VAR takes the following form and is closely related to the
VARX estimation
Xt = C(L)Xt−1 + ut, (8)
where variable definitions are identical to the ones given for Equation 7, and Xt =
[st, yt, cnt , cdt , ht, rt, cct]′, st is the respective shock and C(L) is a lag polynomial of
order four. The residual variance-covariance is identified by Cholesky decomposition.
The VAR and VARX can consistently be estimating with OLS.
In the estimation in Equation 8, the shock which is ordered first is contempo-
raneously unaffected by the other variables, but not vice versa so that the VAR is
recursive. After the parameters are estimated, impulse responses can be created to
find the impact of the two shocks on consumer credit.
The crucial requirement when estimating both methods by OLS is that the
Romer and Romer (2010) tax measure and the Basu et al. (2006) TFP series are
contemporaneously uncorrelated with other shocks in the economy. By construction
via the IV approach for the Basu et al. (2006) series, this is the case.28
Contemporaneous exogeneity holds true for both estimation methods, either in
the VARX by restricting the feedback, or due to the recursivity of the VAR estima-
tion.
Which method should be preferred when including the two externally specified
shocks? Since both estimation methods are economically possible, we prefer the one
which impose less restriction on the estimation. We, therefore, chose to estimate
the VAR and test whether both shocks are not only contemporaneously, but also
strictly exogenous. If the latter is the case, estimating a VARX and VAR should
lead to the same results.
Granger causality. Basu et al. (2006) report that their measure of technology
is not Granger caused by past observations in macroaggregates, so it cannot be
predicted using a sample ranging from 1949 to 1996. Following these authors would
28We do not question the validity of the IV approach taken by Basu et al. (2006) here.
57
Financial assets, fiscal policy, and the macroeconomy
suggest estimating VARX rather than VARs since the TFP measure would be strictly
exogenous.
Concerning the tax measure, Romer and Romer (2010) together with Mertens
and Ravn (2011) provide evidence on the strict exogeneity of the tax measure. The
latter study provides evidence for this by recoding the original series measuring
tax revenue changes over GDP, by assigning these changes to three groups: A -1
is assigned to negative tax innovations, a 1 is assigned to positive innovations and
periods without any tax changes receive a zero. Mertens and Ravn (2011) show that
when rescaling the tax innovation like this, it is not Granger-caused by the lags of
macroeconomic variables, visible in the last two columns in the Table 2. This would
suggest taxes to be strictly exogenous as well and therefore to estimate a VARX.
To check if the series are strictly exogenous in our sample, we test for Granger
causality of the original Romer and Romer (2010) measure. We then compare the
results, with the findings of Mertens and Ravn (2011) for the tax shock and in Basu
et al. (2006) for the TFP measure. Our results of this test are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Results of Granger causality test
Index TFP RR10 MR11 recoded
sample obs F-stat p-value sample obs F-stat p-value F-stat p-value
y 66−14 191 2.395 0.042 66−07 164 1.386 0.870 1.041 0.387
cn 66−14 191 1.723 0.146 66−07 164 1.858 0.073 1.078 0.368
cd 66−14 191 3.673 0.006 66−07 164 1.243 0.292 0.280 0.890
h 66−14 191 1.661 0.160 66−07 164 1.151 0.189 1.354 0.252
r 66−14 191 0.967 0.426 66−07 164 2.148 0.062 0.186 0.945
cc 66−14 191 2.395 0.042 66−07 164 1.386 0.870 1.041 0.387
Notes: Null hypothesis: The variable does not Granger cause the technology / tax measure.
Specification: four lags, linearly detrended data for output (y), non durable consumption (cn),
durable consumption (cd), hours worked (h), real interest rate (r), consumer credit (cc) and
TFP index as used in VARs. RR10 denotes the tax series created by Romer and Romer (2010)
and Mertens and Ravn (2011) is the redefined Mertens and Ravn (2011) taxes series.
The results in Table 2 suggest that the strict exogeneity of the two shock series is
not given. The lags of output and durable consumption have a significant impact on
the TFP series. Additionally, the tax measure is Granger caused by the real interest
rate and non-durable consumption. These estimates are contradictory to the results
reported in Basu et al. (2006) and the Mertens and Ravn (2011) transformation. As
we are interested in the actual size of the tax changes and not simply the direction
of the tax innovation, as redefined by Mertens and Ravn (2011), using the original
Romer and Romer (2010) tax series seems appropriate for our set-up.
Given these results, treating both shock measures as strictly exogenous, impulse
responses recovered from and the inference drawn from estimating VARXs may
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be misleading. We take this fact into account by ordering the shocks first in two
separate VARs (one for taxes, ones for the TFP measure) and by applying a Cholesky
decomposition to the reduced form residual variance-covariance matrix. In this
case, the tax and the TFP measure are contemporaneously uncorrelated with other
variables. To quantify the bias when treating both shocks as strictly exogenous, we
also estimate VARXs and compare impulse responses to the ones obtained from the
VARs estimation.
3.3 Estimation results
We produce impulse responses conditional on the two shocks for the VARs and also
for the VARXs. The size of the technology shock is equivalent to an increase of
one percent in the Basu et al. (2006) Solow residual. The Romer and Romer (2010)
structural tax shock is equivalent to a reduction of discounted total tax revenues
over GDP of one percentage point. We report impulse responses together with 68
percent confidence bands. The dotted blue lines denote responses estimated with
VAR, whereas triangled red responses result from the estimation of the VARX.
The response to a one percentage point decrease in discounted tax revenues
over GDP are given in Figure 18, and the responses to a one percent increase in
technology are reported in Figure 19.
Figure 18 shows that a tax cut induces an expansion in the economy. The
economic expansion is persistent, lasting for roughly four years, with a peak increase
of 1% of output before the economy returns to pre-shock equilibrium. Output, non-
durable and durable consumption, as well as consumer credit significantly, increase in
a hump-shaped manner, peaking around ten quarters after the shock. The strongest
reactions are visible in the response of durable consumption and consumer credit so
that credit increases between four and five percent, similar to the increase in durable
consumption. The comovement of consumer credit with the real variables refutes
consumption smoothing so that households choose to finance additional consumption
by accumulating more credit. Therefore, a significant part of the boom is credit-
financed.
The smallest reaction is visible in non-durable consumption and the real interest
rate, the latter with a decrease of around 0.5% percentage points. In contrast to the
significant increase of all variables, hours drop slightly on impact before rising in a
hump-shaped manner as well.
Impulse responses estimated from VARs and VARXs conditional on the tax shock
are similar. However, reactions triggered by the shock in VARXs are slightly higher,
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Figure 18: Impulse responses conditional on tax cuts
Notes: This figure depicts VAR and VARX impulse responses for a one percentage point
decrease in discounted change in tax revenues over GDP, as measured by Romer and Romer
(2010) Xt = [τt, yt, cnt , cdt , ht, rt, cct]′. Dotted blue lines denote responses estimated with VAR,
whereas triangled red responses result from the estimation of the VARX. Reduced form residual
variance-covariance matrices are Cholesky decomposed. Red and blue shaded areas are 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals with 10.000 replications, and the dark area denotes the
overlapping of both confidence bands.
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Figure 19: Impulse responses conditional on TFP shocks
Notes: This figure depicts VAR and VARX impulse responses for a one percent increase in TFP,
as measured by the Basu et al. (2006). Xt = [zt, yt, cnt , cdt , ht, rt, cct]′. Dotted blue lines denote
responses estimated with VARs, whereas triangled red responses result from the estimation
of the VARX. Reduced form residual variance-covariance matrices are Cholesky decomposed.
Red and blue shaded areas are 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals with 10.000 replications,
and the dark area denotes the overlapping of both confidence bands.
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but within each others confidence bands. Therefore, the choice of VAR method does
not seem critical as confidence bands overlap in almost all post-shock periods.
Figure 19 depicts impulse responses for an increase in TFP. The shock induces a
similar pattern of comovement between the variables as for the tax shock, inducing
a temporary economic expansion. All variables, except hours, increase in a hump-
shaped manner and peak around ten quarters after the shock. The strongest reaction
can be seen for durable consumption with a rise of 2% percent and consumer credit
with an increase between 0.5% and 1%. Following the TFP shock, households
significantly decrease hours worked on impact and increase them after that for 8
quarters before returning to pre-shock values.
The choice of VAR estimation method here, however, is crucial, since confidence
bands do not overlap for more than half of the periods. Estimating VARXs hence
significantly underestimate the impact of TFP shocks on the other variables. When
estimating impulse responses from VARXs, output only increases half as strong
with a peak of 0.2% compared to the VAR estimation. Both types of consumption
increase four and five times stronger, when estimating VARs, so that confidence
bands of the VAR and VARX generated impulse responses do not overlap.
The initiated expansion, however, still causes consumer credit to increase be-
tween 0.6% and 1%, depending on the choice of VAR. The reaction is 1/3 lower
when estimating VARXs compared to the VAR. The response of the real interest
rate is not significantly different from zero.
In conclusion, both shocks initiate a boom that causes a significant increase in
all variables, except hours. Impulse responses estimated from VARX and VARS are
similar for tax shocks while deviating significantly for the TFP measure. Therefore
the dynamic lag structure should not be ignored and hence estimating VARs seem
more suitable using the two externally specified shock series.
3.3.1 Robustness
This subsection shows that our results are robust to a number of modifications.
First, the number of lags in our estimation does not have an impact on the
qualitative responses of the variables, so that the results remain similar as visible in
Figure 24 and Figure 25 in the appendix. The comovement of consumer credit and
the other variables remains intact so that impulse responses when incorporating
3 and 5 lags are within the confidence bands of the baseline estimation. Using
additional lags in the estimation causes impulse responses to be slightly higher.
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Second, we include wages29 ordered after consumption in our estimations. Re-
sults for both shocks can be found in Figure 20 and 21. Tax reductions cause wages
to increase persistently for more than 20 quarters, peaking at 0.6 % increase, before
converging to the pre-shock level. The responses of the other variables are robust
to including wages in the estimation so that the results are slightly larger, but close
to our baseline results.
The TFP shock causes wages to increase on impact while hours show a sig-
nificantly negative effect, as can be seen in Figure 21. However, the qualitative
comovement between the variables and the strong increase in consumer credit re-
mains.
Third, we substitute wages for investment.30 These results can be found in
Figure 22 and Figure 23. After the tax cut, investment drops on impact, before
increasing and peaking at 2.1%. Including investment in the estimation causes
impulse responses to be slightly lower. Nevertheless, responses are still within the
confidence bands of the baseline estimation.
Finally, we check whether the economic expansion is characterized by lower un-
employment. We, therefore, include unemployment in our estimation ordered before
the interest rate. As a result, unemployment decreases after both shocks. Conse-
quently, unemployment is lower conditional on tax cuts and TFP innovations.
Changing the order of the system for the variables described does not alter our
results so that the comovement of all variables remains obvious.
In conclusion, the result of a positive response of consumer credit conditional on
tax cuts and TFP shocks is robust to a number of modifications. A comovement
with output and consumption is visible when including wages or investment in the
estimation or extending or shortening the number of lags in the estimation.
3.4 Discussion of the results
Our result of a strong conditional positive comovement between output, consump-
tion, and credit stands in contrast with consumption smoothing. Although the
financial liberalization led to an easier access to consumer credit, our results suggest
that consumers do not use consumer credit to insure against adverse shocks.
In order to use credit as an instrument to insure, households’ need to have
unlimited access to these credit instruments. Yet, in reality, some households are
borrowing constrained.
29Compensation of employees, per capita values. FRED data: W209RC1Q027SBEA.
30Sum of Gross Private Domestic Investment and Gross government investment, seasonally ad-
justed, per capita values, deflated with individual deflators. Source: FRED GPDI and A782RC
1Q027SBEA.
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An explanation for our results, therefore, could be the presence of borrowing
constrained households as shown by Iacoviello (2005) and also in the next chapter.
Borrowing then would be limited by the amount of households’ stock of collateral.
The same could hold true for unsecured borrowing when households use their in-
come to secure credit as shown by Ludvigson (1999). Thus, borrowing in terms of
consumer credit does not lead to consumption smoothing one would expect if access
to credit is constrained.
Conditional impulse responses after TFP shocks, estimated from VAR estima-
tion are significantly larger than those obtained from the VARX estimation. Both
confidence bands do not overlap for most of the periods. The TFP measure is
Granger-caused by the other variables in our system, and thus we suggest to esti-
mate VARs since the two measure are not strictly exogenous. Therefore, one would
ignore dynamics and the impact of the other variables, when assuming TFP to be
strictly exogenous.
Finally, our estimation could suffer from fiscal foresight when using taxes in the
VAR estimation. Since our sample contains quarterly data, observing actual tax
changes only in the period when they are implemented, would result in a misalign-
ment of the movements in macroeconomic variables due to agents’ prior knowledge.
In this case, the information set would be smaller than the one of the agents. A
regression of total private debt on tax income could then suffer from an omitted
variable bias, and the resulting structural coefficient would be inconsistent. How-
ever, Romer and Romer (2010) discount all future tax changes to the date, when
the bill was passed, so that the issue of fiscal foresight is reduced to a minimum.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the conditional impact of tax cuts, as measured by
Romer and Romer (2010) and TFP innovations, suggested by Basu et al. (2006),
on unsecured consumer credit. Instead of investigating unconditional correlations
between consumer credit and aggregates only, we proceed by estimating VARXs and
VARs given the two shocks.
We find impulse responses conditional on tax innovations are similar for both
estimation methods. However, when looking at the impact of TFP shocks, the
VARX estimations underestimates impulse responses.
As we can show, the TFP measure and the tax innovation are Granger-caused
by the other variables so that both shocks are not strictly exogenous. We, therefore,
believe that VARs are the more general way to estimate the impact of TFP shocks
and tax shocks, when using the Basu et al. (2006) and Romer and Romer (2010)
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series. In such a recursive estimation, both shocks are contemporaneously exogenous
so that estimating the system with OLS is consistent.
A consumption smoothing argument would suggest households to prefer a con-
stant stream of consumption and to save in good times to insure against a drop in
consumption in bad times. From our results, however, it is obvious that given TFP
innovations and tax cuts, agents do not use consumer credit to smooth consumption
and to insure against negative shocks. We show that a conditional comovement of
all variables after the two shocks exist, and a boom in the economy is initiated as
consumer credit, Output, durable purchases and non-durable consumption increase
and seem to co-move after both shocks. Therefore, the increase in GDP is partly
credit financed, given tax cuts and TFP shocks.
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3.6 Appendix
Figure 20: IR for tax cuts, controlling for including wages
Notes: This figure depicts VAR impulse responses to a one percentage point decrease in dis-
counted change in tax revenues over GDP, as measured by the Romer and Romer (2010) and
Xt = [τt, yt, cnt , cdt , wt, ht, rt, cct]′. The dashed line denotes our baseline estimation resulting
from VARS along with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals with 10.000 replications. Dotted
lines denote responses estimated with the VAR when wages is included after the two consump-
tion measures. For all estimations, reduced form residual variance-covariance matrices are
Cholesky decomposed.
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Figure 21: IR for TFP shocks, controlling for wages
Notes: This figure depicts VAR impulse responses to a one percent increase in TFP, as mea-
sured by Basu et al. (2006) and Xt = [τt, yt, cnt , cdt , wt, ht, rt, cct]. The dashed line denotes our
baseline estimation resulting from VARS along with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals
with 10.000 replications. Dotted lines denote responses estimated with the VAR when wages
is included wages after the two consumption measures. For all estimations, reduced form
residual variance-covariance matrices are Cholesky decomposed.
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Figure 22: IR for tax cuts, controlling for investment
Notes: This figure depicts VAR impulse responses to a one percent decrease in discounted
change in tax revenues over GDP, as measured by the Romer and Romer (2010) and xt =
[τt, yt, cnt , cdt , ht, It, rt, cct]′. The dashed line denotes our baseline estimation resulting from
VARS along with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals with 10.000 replications. Dotted
lines denote responses estimated with the VAR when investment is included after hours. For
all estimations, reduced form residual variance-covariance matrices are Cholesky decomposed.
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Figure 23: TFP shock estimation including investment
This figure depicts VAR impulse responses to a one percent increase in TFP, as measured by
Basu et al. (2006) and Xt = [τt, yt, cnt , It, cdt , ht, rt, cct]′. The dashed line denotes our baseline
estimation resulting from VARS along with 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals with 10.000
replications. Dotted lines denote responses estimated with the VAR when investment is in-
cluded after hours. For all estimations, reduced form residual variance-covariance matrices are
Cholesky decomposed.
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Figure 24: IRs comparing lag lengths (Tax shock)
Notes: This figure depicts VAR impulse responses for a one percent decrease in discounted
change in tax revenues over GDP, as measured by the Romer and Romer (2010) and Xt =
[zt, yt, cnt , cdt , ht, rt, cct]′. Reduced form residuals’ variance-covariance matrices are Cholesky
decomposed. The shaded areas are 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals with 10.000 repli-
cations belonging to the baseline estimation with four lags.
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Figure 25: IRs comparing lag lengths (TFP shock)
Notes: This figure depicts VAR impulse responses for a a one percent increase in TFP, as
measured by Basu et al. (2006) and Xt = [zt, yt, cnt , cdt , ht, rt, cct]′. Reduced form residu-
als’ variance-covariance matrices are Cholesky decomposed. The shaded areas are 68% boot-
strapped confidence intervals with 10.000 replications belonging to the baseline estimation with
four lags.
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4 Technology shocks, tax cuts and their impact
on household debt: Empirical evidence & the-
oretical explanation
Coauthors: Christopher Krause and Mathias Klein
4.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1980s, total household debt increased substantially and
almost doubled relative to GDP or private personal income in the US economy. This
significant rise in household leveraging has led to a strand of literature studying
the interaction between financial markets and the macroeconomy. 31 This study
empirically investigates the impact of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks and
tax innovations on household debt for the US economy and proposes a model with
financial frictions that is capable of explaining the empirical observations.
It is widely agreed that introducing financial frictions into stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) models changes the economic dynamics to shocks not just quantita-
tively but also qualitatively. Monacelli (2009) demonstrates that financial frictions
are needed to account for the non-durable and durable consumption responses to
a monetary policy shock as observed in the data. Based on vector autoregressions
(VARs), Andrés et al. (2015) find that an expansionary government spending shock
is followed by a significant and persistent increase in household debt. The authors
propose a model in which private borrowing is limited to the value of the households’
collateral.32 Based on these findings, this paper empirically shows that household
debt moves procyclically in response to TFP shocks and tax innovations. Addi-
tionally, it is demonstrated that a DSGE model in which borrowing is limited by a
collateral constraint can successfully account for these empirical results.
To study the impact on household debt, (i) the TFP series from Basu et al. (2006)
and (ii) the Romer and Romer (2010) tax measure is incorporated into recursive
SVARs. We select the TFP shock because technology improvements are one, among
others, of the major drivers of the business cycle (e.g. Fisher (2006), Justiniano et al.
31Some influential studies are Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), and Iacoviello
(2005).
32In a similar vein, Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) theoretical show that the size of the gov-
ernment spending multiplier crucially depends on the degree of financial market imperfections.
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(2010)). Moreover, Mertens and Ravn (2013) empirically show that tax changes
induce important impulses to U.S. output fluctuations. Also, tax changes represent
an important instrument for the fiscal authority to stimulate the economy.
So far, both of these shock series are mainly used to quantify their dynamic
effects on variables like output, consumption or hours worked33 whereas this paper
takes a closer look at how household debt evolves to changes in both measures.
Our empirical results suggest that increases in total factor productivity, as well
as tax cuts, lead to a significant and persistent increase in household debt. More-
over, this paper finds that both shocks have expansionary effects on output, durable
and non-durable consumption. These findings indicate that the rise in economic
activity in response to both shocks is partly financed by an increase in private bor-
rowing. From a theoretical perspective, a positive debt response refutes consumption
smoothing which assumes households to save in good times and borrow in bad. How-
ever, it is demonstrated that a theoretical model in which borrowing is limited by a
collateral constraint as suggested by Monacelli (2009) produces such positive debt
responses following both shocks. By applying impulse response matching it is then
shown that this approach is capable of successfully explaining the empirical results.
Our proposed DSGE model is closely related to those used in the housing litera-
ture Iacoviello (2005) and in the literature on durable goods Monacelli (2009). The
model economy is populated by two types of households, different in their willingness
to postpone consumption into the future, which creates borrowers and lenders. Both
agents earn after-tax labor income and receive utility from leisure and consuming a
basket of durable and non-durable goods. The government purchases a stream of
goods which is financed by distortionary labor income taxes and balances its budget
every period by paying out lump-sum transfers. As the central building block of
the model, borrowers face a collateral constraint so that the amount of newly issued
private debt is restricted to a fraction of the value of their durable stock following
Monacelli (2009). Both innovations lead to an expansion in the modeled economy
characterized by increases in output, non-durable consumption, and durable con-
sumption. By assuming that the borrowing constraint holds with equality in the
neighborhood of the steady-state, discount factors of the two types of households
have to differ, as Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2009) show.
To bring theoretical impulse responses as close as possible to the empirical data,
deep model parameters are estimated. Instead of comparing the impulse responses
from structural VARs to the theoretical responses from a model, this approach
33For the TFP shock see, among others, Basu et al. (2006), Christiano et al. (2004) and for
the tax shock some prominent examples are Romer and Romer (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2013),
Favero and Giavazzi (2012).
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minimizes the distance between structural VAR responses run on the data and
identical VAR responses run on simulated model data. Thus, the U.S. data and
the model simulations are treated equally so that problems like small-sample biases
or lag-truncation biases are avoided as Cogley and Nason (1995) and Kehoe (2006)
show.
Our results from the matching procedure suggest that the model can successfully
account for the sizes and the hump-shaped patterns of the empirical dynamics in
all four variables. In line with the empirical findings, the model produces persistent
increases in household debt which last for more than 20 quarters. Moreover, the
models’ debt responses almost perfectly match the empirical counterparts. The
point estimates of deep model parameters are in line with findings by previous
studies (Mertens and Ravn, 2013; Iacoviello, 2005). We find that almost 50% of
households are faced with a collateral constraint so that their ability to borrow to
finance consumption is limited.
This study is a contribution to the existing literature in two dimensions. It
is the first study giving a estimate for households’ debt responses to technology
improvements and tax cuts based on SVARs. Additionally, this paper contributes
to the literature by showing that an estimated DSGE model with financial frictions
matches the empirical responses of the major variable of interest, household debt,
but also output, non-durable consumption, durable consumption, to these shocks
quantitatively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the re-
sults from the SVAR estimation. section 3 lays out the theoretical model. Section
4 describes the models’ calibration and estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the
results of the impulse response matching approach. Finally, the last section con-
cludes.
4.2 Empirical evidence
In this section, we present our data, estimation method and SVAR results on the
impact of technology shocks and tax cuts on total household debt and other main
aggregates of interest.
4.2.1 Data and identification
Our benchmark VAR consists of five variables. Apart from the main variable of in-
terest, total household debt (dt), we include output (yt), non-durable consumption
(cnt ), consumption expenditures on durables (cdt ), as well as one of the two shock
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measures, technology (zt) or the tax innovation (τt). All variables are linearly de-
trended before estimation and enter the VAR in logs of real per capita, seasonally
adjusted values.
Precise definitions and data sources are summarized in Table 4. We measure the
Table 4: Data sources
Variable Definition
y Output Log of per capita Nominal gross domestic product di-
vided by the GDP deflator
cn Non-durable consumption Log of per capita (personal consumption expenditures
on non durables plus personal expenditures on ser-
vices) divided by each individual price deflator
cd Durable purchases Log of per capita personal purchases of durable con-
sumption goods divided by its deflator
d Total private debt Log of per capita total private debt, divided by the
consumer price index
τ Tax Shock Romer and Romer (2010) exogenous tax shock
z Technology Shock Basu et al. (2006) exogenous technology Shock
Notes: All data are linearly detrended and logs of real per capita, seasonally adjusted values
and are obtained from FRED database. Full time series specific information and sources can
be found in the appendix.
impact of technology shocks using the TFP series computed in Basu et al. (2006).
This series is a Solow residual-based measure of technology corrected for labor and
capital utilization, non-constant returns to scale and imperfect competition.
To cope with the issue of endogenous and exogenous tax changes, we utilize the
Romer and Romer (2010) tax measure.34 The authors take a narrative approach to
disentangling exogenous and endogenous tax change effects by analyzing presidential
speeches, the Economic Reports of the President and reports of Congressional com-
mittees. Their resulting shock series is measured in changes in tax revenues relative
to GDP, discounted to the day when the bill was signed to avoid a misalignment of
the data set and agents’ economic choices, also called fiscal foresight.
Since the identification of the empirical model depends on the nature of the two
shock series, i.e. if they are (strictly) exogenous, we perform Granger causality tests,
as also done in the former chapter, but with a different set of variables. In particular,
we use these tests to find the suited VAR estimation method.
34Actual changes in tax rates or tax revenues are a linear combination of exogenous and endoge-
nous tax changes, which would dilute the structural effect of tax innovations on total private debt.
We hence seek to use a measure for exogenous tax changes only, rather than including automatic
tax adjustments that co-move with the business cycle.
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The results are summarized in Table 5. We find that the lags of output and
durable consumption Granger cause TFP at the 95% significant level, which is in
contrast to results reported in Basu et al. (2006)35. When testing whether the Romer
and Romer (2010) tax measure can be predicted by past observations of our main
aggregates, Granger causality cannot be rejected either. Lagged values of output
and durable consumption, include information which predicts the specific size of
future tax changes.
Table 5: Granger causality test results
Basu et al. TFP series Romer & Romer tax series
Sample Obs F-stat p-value Sample Obs F-stat p-value
Output 1966−2014 191 2.395 0.042 1966−2007 164 2.487 0.025
Non-durable consumption 1966−2014 191 1.723 0.146 1966−2007 164 1.486 0.186
Durable expenses 1966−2014 191 3.673 0.006 1966−2007 164 2.871 0.011
Household debt 1966−2014 191 0.967 0.426 1966−2007 164 1.121 0.303
Notes: Null hypothesis: The variable does not Granger cause the TFP / tax measure. Spec-
ification: six lags, linearly detrended data for output, non-durable consumption, durable con-
sumption, hours worked, household debt (d) and TFP index as used in VARs. The Romer and
Romer tax series is recoded as in chapter 3 and in Mertens and Ravn (2013)
Given these results, treating both measures as strictly exogenous series seems
misleading and estimating exogenous VARs, as done in Basu et al. (2006) and
Mertens and Ravn (2013), will not reveal the true impact of technology shocks
and tax innovations on the variables of interest.
We acknowledge the fact of contemporaneous exogeneity of the two shock series
by estimating VARs, in which the specific shock is ordered first. This identification
approach implies, that the TFP and the tax measure are contemporaneously unaf-
fected by the other variables in the system while the subsequent variables have an
impact through the lag structures.36 Our baseline SVAR takes the following form
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + ut, (9)
in which Xt = [st, yt, cnt , cdt , dt]′, st ∈ {zt, τt}. A(L) is a lag polynomial of order 4 and
the estimation includes a constant term. Finally, ut denotes reduced form residuals,
and their variance-covariance matrix is orthogonalized by Cholesky decomposition,
and the VAR is estimating using ordinary least squares.
35One explanation for the different results may be the different and shorter period considered
by Basu et al. (2006), as also suggested in chapter 3.
36Note that estimating VARX systems does not have an impact on the qualitative results,
whereas the strength of the impact of the two shocks is quantitatively larger for the tax shock
and smaller for the TFP shock, while still being for the majority of the periods within 68% confi-
dence bands, and always within 90% confidence intervals.
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Both shocks enter our SVARs along with quarterly US data from 1966q1 to
2007q4 for the tax shock and 1966q1 to 2014q4 for the TFP shock. Due to data
limitations of the tax measure the two samples have different lengths.
4.2.2 VAR results
We produce one set of impulse responses for the TFP shock and one for the tax cut.
The size of the technology shock is the equivalent to an increase of one percent in
the Basu et al. (2006) measure for total factor productivity. The Romer and Romer
(2010) structural tax shock is equivalent to a reduction of total tax revenues relative
to GDP of one percentage point. We report impulse responses together with 68%
(dark gray), and 90% (light gray) bootstrapped confidence bands, computed with
10.000 bootstrap replications. Figure 26 (a) depicts the results for the TFP shock
and Figure 26 (b) those for the tax cut.
Both, the tax reduction and the increase in technological progress initiate an ex-
pansion characterized by hump-shaped dynamics in output, non-durable consump-
tion, and durable expenditures. This boom is persistent, lasting for more than five
years before the economy returns to its pre-shock level. While most of the vari-
ables do not change on impact when the economy faces a tax cut, the TFP shock
influences the aggregates already on impact.
With respect to our primary variable of interest, household debt, we find that
both shocks lead to a significant and persistent increase in private borrowing. This
result indicates that the expansion in the economy is partly financed by a rise in
household debt. For the TFP shock, household debt peaks after around 5 quarters,
while for the tax cuts it converges back to pre-shock levels later. From a theoretical
perspective, a sharp rise in household debt following both shocks is in contrast to
consumption smoothing of households. This assumption predicts a fall in private
borrowing in expansionary times as a buffer against future negative shocks.37
Concerning the volatility of our endogenous variables, we can detect a clear pat-
tern in responses to both exogenous innovations. Durable purchases and household
debt react the strongest following both shocks.38
Non-durable consumption shows the smallest increases of all endogenous vari-
ables included in our VAR estimations.
37If we include the unemployment rate in our estimation, we find that unemployment is reduced
after the two shocks. Thus, the rise in household debt is not caused by a decrease in household
income.
38We interpret this strong comovement between durable purchases and household debt as justi-
fication for the borrowing constraint in our model which we describe in the next section.
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Figure 26: Impulse responses SVAR estimation
(a) TFP Shock (b) Tax Shock
Notes: SVAR impulse responses to a one percent increase in TFP (a) and a one percentage
point decrease in tax revenues over GDP along with 68% (dark gray) and 90% (light gray) boot-
strapped centered confidence intervals with 10.000 bootstrapped replications. Reduced form resid-
ual variance-covariance matrices are Cholesky decomposed.
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These empirical findings are robust to the specification of alternative orderings,
less or additional lags, including hours in the estimation and to the introduction of
alternative variables. We find that the initially observed comovement of the variables
remains intact. Figures for robustness checks can be found in the appendix.
4.3 Model
This section presents a DSGE model with financial frictions that we use to explain
our empirical findings. The model consists of two types of households, a representa-
tive final goods firm, a monopolistically competitive intermediate goods sector, and
a government sector.
4.3.1 Households
Our model is based on the ones in Mertens and Ravn (2011), for the durable con-
sumption sector, government structure and utility function and also on Monacelli
(2009) for the borrowing constraint.
The model economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households
that are heterogeneous in terms of their desire to save. Hence, a fraction χ of
households becomes lenders (subscript l), while the remaining fraction 1−χ becomes
borrowers (subscript b). Borrowing households face a collateral constraint which
ensures that private borrowing is restricted to a certain amount of their stock of
durables.
Lenders. Lending households’ preferences are given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtl
Υ 1−σll,t − 1
1− σl − γl
n1+ηll,t
1 + ηl
 , (10)
where E0 denotes the expectation operator conditional on all information available
at time 0. 0 < βl < 1 is the lenders’ specific discount factor, σl > 0 is a curvature
parameter, γl > 0 is the preference weight that measures disutility of labor, nl,t, and
ηl ≥ 0 is the lenders’ specific inverse Frisch elasticity.
Υl,t denotes a consumption basket defined as
Υl,t = cϑll,tv
1−ϑl
l,t−1 − ψlcϑll,t−1v1−ϑll,t−2, (11)
where cl,t is consumption of non-durable goods and vl,t−1 denotes the stock of durable
goods held at the beginning of period t. ϑl ∈ [0, 1] measures the elasticity of sub-
stitution between non-durable and durable consumption of lending households, and
80
Financial assets, fiscal policy, and the macroeconomy
ψl ∈ [0, 1] governs the lenders’ degree of habit persistence. We follow Mertens and
Ravn (2011) by assuming that non-durable and durable consumption are comple-
mentary goods for households, which is assured by the specific functional form of
(11).
Lending households maximize (10) with respect to their budget constraint given
by
cl,t + xl,t + bl,t + dl,t ≤ (1− τt)wtnl,t + (1 + rg,t−1)bl,t−1
pit
+ (1 + rd,t−1)
dl,t−1
pit
+ Πt
χ
+ trt,
(12)
where pit = pt/pt−1 is the gross inflation rate and bl,t are the lender’s holdings of one-
period government bonds with interest rg,t. Lenders receive after-tax labor income,
(1−τt)wtnl,t, where τt is the labor income tax rate and wt is the real wage rate which
households take as given. xl,t represents purchases of new durable goods. In addition,
lending households earn financial income, (1 + rd,t−1)dl,t−1, from offering one-period
private debt to borrowers at interest rd,t−1 which is guaranteed to be repaid in the
next period. trt denotes lump-sum transfers paid by the fiscal authority and Πt/χ
are the individual profits from owning intermediate goods firms.
The law of motion for the durable stock is given by
vl,t =
1− φv2
(
xl,t
xl,t−1
− 1
)2xl,t + (1− δv)vl,t−1, (13)
in which δv denotes a constant depreciation rate and the parameter φv captures
costs of adjusting the stock of durable goods. We choose this quadratic and convex
functional form since it satisfies the properties generally imposed on adjustment
costs (see, for example, Christiano et al., 2005).39
Letting λl,t be the lenders’ Lagrange multiplier corresponding to their budget
constraint, the first-order conditions (FOCs) for non-durable consumption, govern-
39Let Φ(xt/xt−1) be the general adjustment cost function. Then, convexity implies Φ(1) =
Φ′(1) = 0 and Φ′′(1) = φv > 0 which is assured by the functional form in (13).
81
Financial assets, fiscal policy, and the macroeconomy
ment bond holdings, hours worked, durable consumption, debt supply and durable
purchases are given by
cl,t : λl,t = ϑl
(
Υ−σll,t − ψlβlEtΥ−σll,t+1
)(vl,t−1
cl,t
)1−ϑl
, (14)
bl,t : λl,t = βlEt
{
λl,t+1
1 + rg,t
pit+1
}
, (15)
nl,t : λl,t(1− τt)wt = γlnηll,t, (16)
vl,t : λl,tqv,t = βlEt
{
λl,t+1
[(
1− ϑl
ϑl
)
cl,t+1
vl,t
+ qv,t+1(1− δv)
]}
, (17)
dl,t : λl,t = βlEt
{
λl,t+1
1 + rd,t
pit+1
}
, (18)
xl,t : 1− qv,t
1− φv2
(
xl,t
xl,t−1
− 1
)2
− φv
(
xl,t
xl,t−1
− 1
)
xl,t
xl,t−1

= βlEt
λl,t+1λl,t qv,t+1φv
(
xl,t+1
xl,t
− 1
)(
xl,t+1
xl,t
)2 ,
(19)
where qv,t denotes the lenders’ shadow value of new consumer durables. Equation
(14) states that λl,t equals the marginal utility of non-durable consumption. Equa-
tion (15) is the standard Euler equation for government bond holdings. Equation
(16) sets the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equal
to the after-tax real wage rate. Equation (17) shows that the shadow value of new
consumer durables is equal to the expected discounted utility stream received from
the durable stock (net of depreciation). Equation (18) sets λl,t equal to the expected
discounted utility stream of future debt interest rate payments. Equation (19) states
that the change in consumer durables is related to the expected discounted value of
current and future levels of qv,t.
Borrowers. Preferences of borrowing households are defined as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
Υ 1−σbb,t − 1
1− σb − γb
n1+ηbb,t
1 + ηb
 , (20)
in which 0 < βb < 1 is the specific discount factor of borrowers, σb > 0 is a curvature
parameter, γb > 0 is a scaling parameter measuring the borrowers disutility of labor,
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nb,t, and ηb ≥ 0 is their specific inverse Frisch elasticity. Again, Υb,t denotes a
consumption basket defined as
Υb,t = cϑbb,tv
1−ϑb
b,t−1 − ψbcϑbb,t−1v1−ϑbb,t−2. (21)
Here, cb,t denotes borrowers’ consumption of non-durable goods and vb,t−1 is the stock
of durable goods held at the beginning of period t. ϑb ∈ [0, 1] measures borrowers’
substitution elasticity between non-durable and durable consumption and ψb ∈ [0, 1]
measures the degree of habit persistence.
The budget constraint of borrowing households is given by
cb,t + xb,t + (1 + rd,t−1)
db,t−1
pit
≤ (1− τt)wtnb,t + db,t + trt. (22)
xb,t denotes borrowers’ purchases of new consumer durables and db,t is the amount
of one-period-debt received from lenders which has to be repaid plus interest rd,t−1
in the subsequent period. (1− τt)wtnb,t denotes borrowers’ after-tax labor income.
The borrowers’ stock of durables accumulates according to
vb,t =
1− φv2
(
xb,t
xb,t−1
− 1
)2xb,t + (1− δv)vb,t−1. (23)
As a central building block of our model, borrowing is endogenously determined by
a collateral constraint, similar to the one used in Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli
(2009). The amount of debt that has to be repaid by borrowers in the following
period, db,t, is the net-of-depreciation durable stock
db,t ≤ κ(1− δv)vb,t, (24)
where κ > 0 denotes the share of borrowers’ durable stock that can be used as
collateral. This borrowing constraint implies two noteworthy points. First, by
assuming that (24) holds with equality, βb has to be smaller than βl, and thus,
borrowers hold a positive steady state amount of debt. Second, changes in the stock
of durable goods affect borrowing but also spending (of constrained households).
The magnitude of this effect crucially depends on the size of κ.
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The borrowers FOCs take the following expressions
cb,t : λl,t = ϑb
(
Υ−σbb,t − ψbβbEtΥ−σbb,t+1
)(vb,t−1
cb,t
)1−ϑb
, (25)
nb,t : λb,t(1− τt)wt = γbnηbb,t, (26)
vb,t : λb,tqx,t = βbEt
{
λb,t+1
[(
1− ϑb
ϑb
)
cb,t+1
vb,t
+ qx,t+1(1− δv)
]}
+ µt(1− δv)κ,
(27)
db,t : λb,t = βbEt
{
λb,t+1
1 + rd,t
pit+1
}
+ µt, (28)
xb,t : 1− qx,t
1− φv2
(
xb,t
xb,t−1
− 1
)2
− φv
(
xb,t
xb,t−1
− 1
)
xb,t
xb,t−1

= βbEt
λb,t+1λb,t qx,t+1φv
(
xb,t+1
xb,t
− 1
)(
xb,t+1
xb,t
)2 ,
(29)
where λb,t is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowers budget constraint, µt denotes
the Lagrange multiplier of collateral constraint (24), and qx,t denotes the borrowers
shadow value of new consumer durable purchases. Interpretations of equations (25),
(26), and (29) are identical to those of the lending households. The last term of
(27) governs that the shadow value of new consumer durables is related to the
marginal utility of relaxing the collateral constrained measured though the time-
varying Lagrange multiplier µt. (28) shows that for positive values of µt the marginal
utility of current consumption is larger than the marginal value of shifting one unit of
consumption intertemporally. A higher value for µt induces a larger marginal benefit
of increasing the stock of durable consumption goods which leads to a loosening of
the collateral constraint to purchase additional current consumption.
4.3.2 Firms
The firm sector consists of a perfectly competitive final goods firm and a contin-
uum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms. Each intermediate
goods firm i ∈ [0, 1] produces a differentiated good yt(i) according to the production
function
yt(i) = ztnt(i), (30)
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where nt(i) denotes the quantity of labor services used by firm i. The technology
level zt is common across all operating firms and is assumed to follow an AR(1)
process around its non-stochastic steady state value z¯,
log(zt) = (1− ρz) log(z¯) + ρz log(zt−1) + εz,t, (31)
in which εz,t is i.i.d and |ρz| < 1. The representative final goods firm produces the
final consumption good yt, combining yt(i) units of each intermediate good, using
the technology
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ξ−1
ξ di
) ξ
ξ−1
, (32)
where ξ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different intermediate goods.
Profit maximization subject to (32) yields the demand function for intermediate
good i,
yt(i) = yt
(
pt(i)
pt
)−ξ
, (33)
where
pt =
(∫ 1
0
pt(i)1−ξdi
) 1
1−ξ
(34)
is the price index of the final good.
Each firm in the intermediate goods sector chooses its price level pt(i) to maxi-
mize the expected present value of real profits. Following Rotemberg (1982), each
firm faces quadratic adjustment costs which are assumed to take the functional form
of Ireland (1997). Thus, real profits of firm i are given by
Πt(i) =
(pt(i)
pt
)1−ξ
− wt
zt
(
pt(i)
pt
)−ξ
− ϕ2
(
pt(i)
p¯ipt−1(i)
− 1
)2 yt, (35)
where ϕ > 0 determines the adjustment costs and p¯i is the steady state inflation
rate.
Assuming symmetry in equilibrium, the optimality condition becomes
ϕ
(
pit
p¯i
− 1
)
pit
p¯i
= (1− ξ) + ξwt
zt
+ Et
[
β
λl,t+1
λl,t
(
pit+1
p¯i
− 1
)
pit+1
p¯i
yt+1
yt
]
. (36)
In case of fully flexible prices, i.e. ϕ = 0, real marginal costs equal (ξ − 1)/ξ, which
is the inverse of the firm’s price markup.
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4.3.3 Government
The government collects distortionary labor income taxes and issues new bonds to
finance public spending, to service debt from last period and to pay out lump-sum
transfers to households. Hence, the government’s budget constraint reads
gt + trt + (1 + rg,t−1)
bt−1
pit
= τtwtnt + bt, (37)
where government spending gt is a fixed fraction of aggregate output, and transfers
trt adjust to balance the budget in every period. We estimate an AR(2) process
for the tax rate around its non-stochastic steady-state value τ¯ which gives the best
empirical fit as also shown in Mertens and Ravn (2011). The process is given by
log(τt) = (1− ρτ,1 − ρτ,2) log(τ¯) + ρτ,1 log(τt−1) + ρτ,2 log(τt−2)− ετ,t, (38)
where ετ,t is i.i.d., and |ρτ,1 + ρτ,2| < 1.
Monetary policy is determined by a Taylor-type rule of the form
rg,t = r¯g
(
pit
pi∗
)φpi
, (39)
where pi∗ = p¯i is the inflation rate target and φpi is the policy response to inflation
deviations from its target.
4.3.4 Aggregation and market clearing
Aggregate variables are defined as the weighted average of the respective measures
for each household type. Thus, we get
ct = χcl,t + (1− χ)cb,t, (40)
vt = χvl,t + (1− χ)vb,t, (41)
xt = χxl,t + (1− χ)xb,t, (42)
nt = χnl,t + (1− χ)nb,t. (43)
Credit and bond market clearing requires
χdl,t = (1− χ)db,t, (44)
bt = χbl,t (45)
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while the aggregate resource constraint is given by
ct + xt + gt =
[
1− ϕ2
(
pit
p¯i
− 1
)2]
yt. (46)
4.3.5 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is given by the sequence of endogenous variables {yt, ct, cl,t,
cb,t, vt, vl,t, vb,t, xt, xl,t, xb,t, Υl,t, Υb,t, nt, nl,t, nb,t, dl,t, db,t, bt, bl,t, pit, trt, gt, λl,t, λb,t, qv,t,
qx,t, µt, wt, rd,t, rg,t}∞t=0 that satisfy the households’ first-order conditions, the firms’
optimality conditions, the production function, the government budget constraint,
the monetary policy rule, the stochastic processes, credit and bond market clearing,
the aggregation identities and the aggregate resource constraint, given the exogenous
realizations of {zt, τt}∞t=0.
To solve the model by a log-linear approximation around its deterministic steady
state, we assume that all inequalities hold with equality in equilibrium.
4.4 Parametrization
To study whether our proposed model can account for the empirical findings, we es-
timate deep model parameters by applying an impulse-response matching approach
as suggested by Cogley and Nason (1995). The set of parameters is partitioned into
two subsets, Θ ≡ [θ1, θ2], where θ2 contains the parameters to be estimated and
θ1 contains the parameters that are calibrated prior to estimation. The elements
of the latter subset are fixed because they are either difficult to identify in model
estimation procedures or are chosen to match certain steady-state targets observed
in the data.
4.4.1 Calibration
One model period is set to be a quarter. We choose the lenders’ discount factor to be
0.993 implying an annual steady-state interest rate of 3% and follow Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) by setting the borrowers’ discount factor to 0.97 to induce a significant
degree of impatience. We include this parameter in θ1 because our set of moments
is not able to jointly identify σl, σb and the inverse Frisch elasticities ηl and ηb.
The preference parameters determining disutility of work, γl and γb, are calibrated
so that steady state hours worked equal 33% of individual time endowment. ϑl
and ϑb equal 0.75 which implies an aggregate steady state durable-to-non-durable-
consumption ratio of 20%, in line with the corresponding number in the US during
our sample period. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, ξ,
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equals 11 implying a steady-state markup of ξ/(ξ − 1) = 1.1. For the debt-to-
value ratio, κ, we again follow Iacoviello (2010) and choose 0.85 so that borrowing
households can use 85% of their durable stock as collateral. Following Mertens and
Ravn (2011), the depreciation rate of durable goods is set to 0.025 implying a steady
state annual depreciation of 10%. We set the policy parameter in the Taylor rule,
φpi, to 1.5 as in Monacelli (2009). The steady state government-bonds-to-GDP and
government-spending-to-GDP ratios and the labor income tax rate equal 0.60, 0.18,
and 0.28, respectively, as found by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Table 6 summarizes
the calibration of θ1.
Table 6: Model calibration
Param Value Description Target
βl 0.99 Discount factor lenders Ann. interest rate 3%
βb 0.97 Discount factor borrowers Small degree of impatience
γl Preference parameter SS hours of lenders to 0.33
γb Preference parameter SS hours of borrowers to 0.33
xi 11 Elasticity of substitution SS markup of 11
δv 0.025 Depreciation rate durable goods Mertens and Ravn (2011)
κ 0.85 Debt-to-value ratio Andrés et al. (2013)
ϑ 0.85 Preference parameter X¯/(C¯ + X¯) = 0.20
φpi 1.5 Taylor rule parameter Monacelli (2009)
B¯/Y¯ 0.60 Government debt to GDP
G¯/Y¯ 0.18 Government spending to GDP Trabandt/Uhlig (2011)
τ¯n 0.28 SS tax rate Trabandt/Uhlig (2011)
4.4.2 Estimation
We estimate θ2 = [η, σ, ψl, ψb, φv, χ, ρz, ϕ, ρτ,1, ρτ,2], by matching the impulse re-
sponses generated by the model to the empirical responses derived in section 2.
Estimating these parameters does not have an impact on the set of calibrated pa-
rameters in θ1, expect on the Frisch elasticity η. We target n¯l = n¯b = 0.33 so that
γl and γb are endogenously determined.40 We follow Cogley and Nason (1995) and
Mertens and Ravn (2011), and treat model and data symmetrically. This implies
that we use our model to simulate artificial samples and estimate impulse responses
in exactly the same way as the empirical ones are obtained.41
40The two habit parameters have an impact on the steady-state value of Υ and λ, but not on
the first set of calibrated parameters θ1.
41Using this approach avoids certain pitfalls of the theoretical impulse responses to the empirical
ones, applied by e.g. Christiano et al. (2005) or Altig et al. (2011) as argued by Kehoe (2006) and
Dupaigne et al. (2007).
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In particular, the model-generated impulse responses are constructed according
to the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 (Construction of model-generated IRFs) For each of the two
shocks, we take three steps:
1. Draw 100 sequences of innovations from the original shock series (with re-
placement) with a length of 168 periods for the tax shock and 195 for the TFP
shock. Simulate the model for each draw so that there are 100 artificial sam-
ples. Each of these simulated datasets consists of the model counterparts to
the SVAR time series.
2. Add a small (1e-6) white noise measurement error to each artificial time series
to avoid stochastic singularity.
3. Estimate IRFs and take mean responses over all 100 replications for each
artificial dataset by estimating (9).
Let Ω̂d be the vector of empirical moments and let Ω̂m(θ2|θ1) be the vector of
simulated moments estimated from the same SVAR as their empirical counterparts
conditioned on θ1. Vector θ2 then solves the following minimization problem,
θ̂2 = arg min
θ2
[(
Ω̂d − Ω̂m(θ2|θ1)
)′
W−1
(
Ω̂d − Ω̂m(θ2|θ1)
)]
, (47)
where W is a positive-definite weighting matrix which we find by the following
procedure. First, we approximate the covariance matrix of the empirical IRFs by
bootstrapping. Instead of the full matrix, we only use its diagonal which displays
the variances of the IRFs and set all off-diagonal elements to zero. Hence, we only
put weight on moments that are observed in the data and force the estimation to
exclude moments that are off-diagonal (see Cochrane, 2005, chap. 11). Finally, we
use an estimate of the weighting matrix’s asymptotic covariance matrix as proposed
by Hall et al. (2012) to compute standard errors for θ2.
4.5 Results
Table 7 shows the parameter estimates of our model estimation. We observe values
for the inverse Frisch elasticities, η 0.227. These estimates are lower than those
typically assumed in the macroeconomic literature, whereas Iacoviello (2010) es-
timate similar values in a similar model set-up. Our point estimates imply that
labor supply of both agents reacts quite elastically to changes in the real wage rate.
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Table 7: Estimated model parameters
Parameter Estimated Value Standard Error Description
σ 0.6664 Utility curvature
η 0.2269 Inverse Frisch elasticity
ψl 0.5672 Habit parameter lenders
ψb 0.8394 Habit parameter borrowers
φv 0.0921 Durables adjustment cost
χ 0.5398 Share of lending households
ρτ,1 1.8611 AR coefficient tax shock
ρτ,2 −0.8745 AR coefficient tax shock
ρz 0.9415 AR coefficient tfp shock
ϕ 8.1276 Rotenberg price adjustment
Notes: Standard errors of vector θ are computed from an estimate of its asymptotic covariance
matrix following Hall et al. (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2011).
The degree of habit formation is larger for borrowing households than for lending,
where the specific point estimates are in the range of values typically estimated (e.g.
Christiano et al., 2005).
The estimate of the durable adjustment cost parameter of 0.092 is lower, com-
pared to other studies (e.g. Mertens and Ravn, 2011). The estimated Rotemberg
price adjustment coefficient, AC(rot), takes a value of 8.128. Our estimate suggests
that roughly 80% of firms do not adjust their prices in a given quarter, in line with
Gavin et al. (2015). The share of lending households in the economy is estimated
to be 54%, consistent with estimates of the proportion of unconstrained consumers
by Jappelli (1990), Kiley (2010), and Hall et al. (2012).
Our estimates for the autoregressive parameters of the TFP process, ρz = 0.9415,
and the tax process, ρτ,1 = 1.8611, ρτ,2 = −0.8745, which sum up to 0.987 indicate
a higher degree of persistence for the tax process. The degree of persistence of the
tax process is similar to the one obtained by Mertens and Ravn (2011).
Figure 27 depicts the model dynamics to a one percent increase in total factor
productivity (left panel) and to a one percentage point decrease in total tax revenues
over output (right column) given the parameter estimates reported in Table 7 (dotted
lines) along with the empirical estimates and its confidence bands from section 4.2.2.
As visible, the model can successfully account for the sizes and hump-shaped
responses of the empirical counterparts. For almost all periods, the theoretical
responses lie within the empirical confidence intervals. In line with the data, the
strongest model responses can be observed for durable purchases and household debt,
whereas nondurable consumption shows the smallest relative deviations following
both innovations.
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Figure 27: Empirical and matched impulse responses
(a) TFP shock
.
(b) Tax shock
Notes: This figure depicts VAR estimated impulse responses with actual data (solid line) along
with 68% bootstrapped confidence bands (dark grey) and 90% confidence bands (light grey). The
dotted lines denote matched impulse responses using our model.
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In panel (a) we observe that the model produces impact responses close to the
empirical ones for the TFP innovation. The technology improvement leads to an
expansion in the theoretical economy lasting for almost 20 quarters. The model’s
output, non-durable and durable consumption responses reach its peaks slightly
before the empirical counterparts. As durable consumption rise, the collateral con-
straint becomes less binding, such that borrowing households increase their private
debt holdings. The model is able to capture the persistent increase in household
debt as found in the data while the response lies within 90% confidence bands for
all periods. However, the model to some extent overestimates the debt response for
the quarters 3-14.
In line with our empirical findings, the model does not show any impact re-
sponse for most of the variables after a tax reduction as can be observed in panel
(b). The limited model responses can be explained by the estimated strong habits in
consumption and positive durable adjustment cost which reduce the impact effects.
For non-durable consumption, the model implied response reaches its peak after
around seven periods, similar to the maximum empirical response. The specific
maximum of the theoretical responses for output and durable consumption peak
some quarters later than found for the empirical counterparts. The model underes-
timates the effect of tax cuts on durable purchases. Similar to the TFP shock, the
model matches the households’ empirical debt response quite well. The theoretical
response falls within the empirical 68% confidence bands for most of the 20 periods.
The increase in private borrowing following a tax reduction can be explained by
the similar mechanism as described for the TFP shock. The expansionary effects of
the tax innovation rise the stock of durables held by constrained agents such that
though the collateral constraint private borrowing rises in response.
Our analysis suggests, that an estimated version of the model as described in
section 4.3 is able to explain the empirical dynamics following technology improve-
ments and tax reductions. When studying in more detail how private borrowing
reacts, we find that the differences between theoretical and empirical responses are
almost negligible.
4.6 Conclusion
The interrelation between financial market imperfections and macroeconomic out-
comes is at the core of recent research. In this paper, we study the effects of TFP
shocks and tax cuts on main aggregates for the US economy while taking a closer
look at how households’ borrowing decisions are affected by both innovations. We
select these specific shocks because of their importance for business cycle fluctuations
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and as an important instrument for the fiscal authority to stimulate the economy in
the short run.
By estimating SVARs, we find that both shocks lead to an expansion in the
economy, characterized by significant increases in output, non-durable consumption,
and durable consumption. Moreover, our results suggest that household debt rises
substantially and in a hump-shaped manner in response to technology improvements
and tax reductions.
In order to account for the empirically estimated comovement between economic
activity and private borrowing, we propose a theoretically model with financial
frictions similar to the one in Monacelli (2009). The model economy is populated
by two household types, savers, and borrowers, which differ in their willingness to
postpone consumption into the future. Borrowers face a collateral constraint so that
the amount of newly issued private debt is restricted to a fraction of their stock of
durables.
We estimate deep model parameters by matching the theoretically implied im-
pulse response function to the empirical ones in response to both shocks. Our find-
ings suggest that the proposed model successfully accounts for the sizes and hump-
shaped patterns of the empirical dynamics. With respect to our major variable of
interest, household debt, the estimated model matches the empirical responses al-
most perfectly. Estimated parameters are in line with findings in previous studies.
We find that almost 50% of private households do face a collateral constraint that
restricts their optimal borrowing decision.
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4.7 Appendix
Data Source. Our data is obtained from FRED database and includes the fol-
lowing data series
Table 8: Full data sources
Var Definition code Manipulation
y Output GDP Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate in Bil-
lions of Dollars
cn Non durable
consumption
PCND Personal Consumption Expenditures: nondurable goods, season-
ally adjusted annual rate in Billions of Dollars
PCESV Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services, Seasonally Ad-
justed Annual Rate in Billions of Dollars
cd Durable pur-
chases
PCDG Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods, Seasonally
Adjusted Annual Rate in Billions of Dollars
h Hours
worked
h Product of hours per worker and civilian non-farm employment
divided by population combined with Francis and Ramey (2009)
hours worked series, see Mertens and Ravn (2013), extended.
d total private
debt
CMDEBT Households and Nonprofit Organizations; Credit Market Instru-
ments; Liability, Level, seasonally adjusted in Billions of Dollars
N Population POP Civilian Non institutional Population, Not Seasonally Adjusted,
Thousands of Persons
Robustness checks
tb t-bill TB3MS 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate, Not Seasonally
Adjusted, Percent
g government
consumption
GCEC96 Real Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Invest-
ment, Seasonally Adjusted Annual rate in Billions of Dollars
Price Deflators
GDP defla-
tor
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator, Index 2009=100
non durables
deflator
DNDGRG3
Q086SBEA
Personal consumption expenditures: Nondurable goods, Index
2009=100
DSERRG3
Q086SBEA
Personal consumption expenditures: Services, Index 2009=100
Durables de-
flator
DDURRG3
Q086SBEA
Personal consumption expenditures: Durable goods, Index
2009=100
Investment
deflator
GPDICTPI Gross Private Domestic Investment: Chain-type Price Index, In-
dex 2009=100
B798RG3
Q086SBEA
Government gross investment: Federal: Non-defense (chain-type
price index), Index 2009=100
CPI deflator CPIAUCSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
Notes: This table gives FRED codes for the variables used in our estimation.
In addition to the FRED data series, we include the Romer and Romer (Romer
and Romer, 2010) tax series as τ , available at eml.berkeley.edu/ dromer/. In total,
this includes 54 observations of quarterly tax changes.
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Figure 28: IR robustness monetary policy vs. baseline
(a) TFP Shock (b) Tax Shock
Notes: SVAR impulse responses (black like=baseline) to a one percent increase in TFP (a) and a
one percentage point decrease of tax revenues over GDP along with 68% (dark grey) bootstrapped
centered confidence intervals with 10.000 replications. The dotted line denotes the impulse re-
sponses when controlling for monetary policy (federal funds rate ordered second last).
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Figure 29: IR robustness lag length 3 lags vs. baseline
(a) TFP Shock (b) Tax Shock
Notes: SVAR impulse responses (black like=baseline) to a one percent increase in TFP (a) and a
one percentage point decrease of tax revenues over GDP along with 68% (dark grey) bootstrapped
centered confidence intervals with 10.000 replications. The dotted line denotes the impulse re-
sponses when the lag length is reduced to 3.
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Figure 30: IR robustness lag length 5 lags vs. baseline
(a) TFP Shock (b) Tax Shock
Notes: SVAR impulse responses (black like=baseline) to a one percent increase in TFP (a) and a
one percentage point decrease of tax revenues over GDP along with 68% (dark grey) bootstrapped
centered confidence intervals with 10.000 replications. The dotted line denotes the impulse re-
sponses when the lag length is set to 5.
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Figure 31: IR robustness gov’t debt vs. baseline
(a) TFP Shock (b) Tax Shock
Notes: SVAR impulse responses (black like=baseline) to a one percent increase in TFP (a) and a
one percentage point decrease of tax revenues over GDP along with 68% (dark grey) bootstrapped
centered confidence intervals with 10.000 replications. The dotted line denotes the impulse re-
sponses when controlling for government debt (debt-over-GDP) ordered third.
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Figure 32: IR robustness quadratic trend vs. baseline
(a) TFP Shock (b) Tax Shock
Notes: SVAR impulse responses (black like=baseline) to a one percent increase in TFP (a) and a
one percentage point decrease of tax revenues over GDP along with 68% (dark grey) bootstrapped
centered confidence intervals with 10.000 replications. The dotted line denotes the impulse re-
sponses when estimating including a quadratic trend instead of a linear one.
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Figure 33: IR robustness unemployment vs. baseline
(a) TFP Shock (b) Tax Shock
Notes: SVAR impulse responses (black like=baseline) to a one percent increase in TFP (a) and a
one percentage point decrease of tax revenues over GDP along with 68% (dark grey) bootstrapped
centered confidence intervals with 10.000 replications. The dotted line denotes the impulse re-
sponses when estimating controlling for unemployment, ordered third.
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5 Forced deleveraging, fiscal policy rules and the
zero lower bound
5.1 Introduction
The financial crisis was preceded by a housing boom while interest rates remained
low. Miss-incentives to borrow against low values of collateral and seemingly ever-
rising real estate values promised high returns. However, the real estate market in
the U.S. collapsed, causing a severe recession.
In this paper, I extend the Iacoviello (2005) housing sector DSGE model by
a standard fiscal sector and including fiscal rules. I then investigate the impact
of house price shocks at the Zero Lower Bound on interest rates (ZLB) and the
interaction with fiscal policy.
Recent research has underlined the importance of financial frictions for model-
ing this crisis since such declines in house prices are difficult to model and cannot
sufficiently be explained by preference shocks alone, as Iacoviello (2005) and Ia-
coviello and Guerrieri (2015) note. Therefore, a shock that is capable of matching
the empirically marked drop in prices is required, involving housing debt and forced
deleveraging.
I model the starting point of the financial crises as a devaluation of the stock of
housing. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Iacoviello (2015) model this shock
as a deterioration in the ability to borrow. Such a sudden downward revaluation of
real estate leads to a decline in households’ ability to use their housing position as
collateral for borrowing. Since households borrow to fund additional property and
consumption, a devaluation shock causes a recession.
In the literature, the interaction between government debt, devaluation shocks
and fiscal policy has been ignored so far. In reaction to the recent economic down-
turn, governments borrowed to establish stimulus packages, leading to a surge in
public debt. In the U.S., the stimulus package at the end of 2007 caused government
debt to rise from 63% debt-to-GDP to over 100% at the end of 2014. To reduce
public debt, taxes can be increased, or the fiscal authority can lower government
spending. In this paper, I ask which of the two has the milder impact on output.
In a calibrated DSGE model, I combine the housing sector suggested in Iacoviello
(2005) amended for fiscal rules, as indicated in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011),
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to investigate the impact of devaluation shocks on borrowers and lenders. These
rules propose to raise taxes or reduce spending to lower public debt.
I proceed with an economy in which the fiscal authority does not have access
to lump-sum taxes so that it can only levy distortionary taxes on consumption and
labor. I find that when the economy is sufficiently far away from the ZLB, the policy
of how to reduce government debt is irrelevant for the impact on output. Raising
taxes or cutting spending leads to almost the same reduction in output.
I then investigate if this result still holds, when interest rates cannot be lowered
further. I proceed by applying the algorithm suggested by Iacoviello and Guerrieri
(2015) and find that the ZLB acts as an amplifier of the devaluation shock since
the monetary authority is incapable of supporting the process of recovery with con-
ventional monetary policy. In such a situation, cutting spending leads to a more
severe recession, compared to raising taxes. Thus, variation in real estate prices and
households’ ability to borrow has a substantial impact on business cycle dynamics
at the ZLB.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section introduces
the housing literature followed by empirical evidence for house price shocks. Section
3 introduces the model followed by the simulation results abstracting from the ZLB.
I then present the Iacoviello and Guerrieri (2015) algorithm which can be used to
solve the DSGE model with occasionally binding constraints. The next section, then
discusses the results, followed by concluding remarks.
5.2 House prices and devaluation shocks in literature
Residential property in the United States in the late 90s accounted for 25% of house-
hold wealth, about 35% in the United Kingdom and 70% in Germany (Justiniano
et al., 2010). As Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello (2011) show, it is a major compo-
nent of wealth and also positively correlated with consumption.
Owning real estate can be seen as an asset, collateralizable subject to borrowing
constraints. However, owning property is risky, and adverse price changes force
households to rebalance their portfolios, which can cause recessions as Iacoviello
(2015) shows.
The price of housing has been a leading indicator for eight post-WW2 U.S.
recessions since it co-moves with output and consumption (Kydland et al., 2012).
However, shocks to house prices do not simply precede recessions, but can also be
responsible for them, as Leamer (2007) notes. Figure 34 depicts house prices having
increased by 70% between 1990 and 2007. By mid-2009, house prices in the ten
largest cities in the U.S. plummeted by almost 40 percent.
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Figure 34: Case-Shiller Index
40
80
120
160
200
240
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Case/Shiller Index, 10 cities
Notes: Development of house prices between 1987 and 2014 for the Case-Shiller house price
index for ten city homes.
Mortgage contracts make it possible to translate the value of the stock of hous-
ing as collateral into current availability of mortgages for households (Calza et al.,
2013). New debt can then be used to invest in new housing or to consume. Several
authors have argued that collateral constraints amplify the response to aggregate
shocks. For instance, Zeldes (1989) provides panel data evidence for the presence
of liquidity-constrained households. Leamer (2007) regards housing as the primary
source of variation in business cycle dynamics and shows that financial frictions like
borrowing constraints are essential elements to amplify and propagate business cycle
fluctuations. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Hubbard (1998) argue that on firms’
side, investment decisions depend on firms’ measures of their net worth. Therefore,
the impact of devaluation shocks is crucial for investment decisions, which in turn
cause business cycle fluctuations (Iacoviello, 2005). Also, in the previous chapter
it is found that a fraction of households in the economy are borrowing-constrained,
which I follow in this chapter.
After devaluation shocks, the borrowing constraint becomes tighter. Forced
deleveraging then leads to a reduction in wealth and consumption, lower invest-
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ment in housing and eventually to a real estate sell-off that lowers house prices.
In the case of falling asset prices together with collateralized property, devaluation
shocks are not only a consequence of economic downturns but also causal for them
(Iacoviello, 2005). Iacoviello (2015) shows that of the output reduction of 13 percent
during the Great Recession, 2/3 can be explained by a combination of devaluation
shocks, housing preference shocks, and default shocks.
Forced deleveraging has several implications for different types of households,
depending on their time preference. On the one hand, borrowers are forced to
deleverage and hence face a negative wealth effect, though, on the contrary, lending
households benefit from lower house prices and can acquire additional real estate
since they are not borrowing-constrained. Iacoviello (2005) therefore distinguishes
into two types of households, patient and impatient ones.
As a consequence of the downturn at the end of 2007, the Federal Reserve reduced
the nominal interest rate until it hit almost zero by December 2008. An instrument
to react to a recession with lower interest rates to stimulate the economy and en-
courage borrowing was removed. Therefore, the transition of devaluation shocks at
the ZLB and the impact of debt stabilization is crucial. As it is well known, the ZLB
can amplify devaluation shocks, which is also found in this paper. To investigate
business cycle properties at the ZLB, Iacoviello and Guerrieri (2015) introduce an
algorithm to piecewise solve DSGE models with occasionally binding constraints so
that I can investigate the impact of fiscal policy rules at the ZLB.
5.3 Empirical evidence for house price shocks
In this section, I examine the impact of a house price shock in a four variable
vector autoregression. Since devaluation shocks are not directly observable, I use an
orthogonal shock to the Case-Shiller price index as a proxy for house price shocks.
The vector autoregression is ordered as in Iacoviello (2005) and data sources can be
found in the appendix in section 5.7 so that Xt = [i, pi, q, Y ]′t,42 in which i denotes
the level of the Federal Funds rate, pi is the first difference in the log of the CPI index
from the respective quarter one year ago, q denotes the log of the S&P Case-Shiller
home price index for 10 cities and Y is the log of real Gross Domestic Product. The
reduced form equation is given by
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + ut, (48)
42The ordering did only marginally affect the results, and qualitative responses remain similar.
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in which Xt contains the endogenous variables in the order specified above. A(L) is
a lag polynomial of order two and ut denotes reduced form residuals. The estimation
includes two lags, suggested by the Schwarz information criteria (Schwarz, 1978), a
constant term and a linear time trend and is estimated with ordinary least squares.43
Figure 35: VAR evidence on house price shocks
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Notes: This Figure indicates impulse responses conditional on a negative one percent structural
shock to house prices, in a vector autoregression with the following ordering: X = [i, pi, q, Y ]′t.
i denotes the end of quarter Federal Funds rate, pi is the quarter to four quarters ago log
difference in the consumer price index, q denotes the log of the Case-Shiller index, and Y is
real per capita gross domestic output. The reduced form residual variance-covariance matrix is
Cholesky decomposed. The estimation includes a linear time trend and a constant. The shaded
area denotes 68% bootstrapped confidence bands with 10.000 bootstrapped replications.
Since reduced form VARs are known for generating correlated innovations, which
restrict disentangling structural shocks from each other, structural shocks are recov-
ered by Cholesky decomposition to the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced
form residuals in Equation 48, with the order as specified above. The results of a
43Results are robust to including a quadratic trend as well.
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negative structural shock to house prices of the size of one percent are depicted in
Figure 35.
It depicts that a one percent decline in house prices induces a recession in the
economy. All variables react in a hump-shaped manner with a trough at seven quar-
ters after the shock, before returning to pre-shock values. The Federal Funds rate,
inflation and output co-move. Although house prices decline, households cannot
accommodate the reduction in their real estate value by expanding their real estate
position. Lower wealth then causes output to fall by roughly 0.2%. Due to the
recession, house prices continue to fall, with a maximum absolute value of decline
of 3%.
In the next section, I model a decrease to house prices, as a devaluation shock
and compare policy rules of the fiscal authority to stabilize government debt.
5.4 Model
In this section, I present a DSGE model with financial frictions and a fiscal sector.
The model is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households who differ
in their willingness to postpone consumption into the future. It is based on the
model in Iacoviello (2005), extended to include a fiscal sector with policy rules as in
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) and amended for devaluation shocks as suggested
in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Iacoviello (2015). The model is also solved
when the ZLB holds by applying an algorithm suggested by Iacoviello and Guerrieri
(2015)
The fiscal authority has access to distortionary taxes only and uses the generated
funds for fiscal spending. Spending or taxes are adjusted according to a rule while
the other fiscal measure follows an AR(1) process. The government engages in
accumulating debt, which only patient households hold. This debt is safe in the
sense that the government will always repay it in the subsequent period, plus interest.
Calvo price setting based on monopolistic competition at the retailer level creates
sticky prices (Calvo, 1983).
5.4.1 Households
In a discrete-time setup, there exists a continuum of patient and impatient house-
holds with identical utility functions, as well as entrepreneurs. Preferences are sepa-
rable in consumption, real estate and disutility from labor. These different types of
agents differ in their time preference, which generates borrowers and lenders. House-
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holds earn after-tax labor income, consume and may invest or borrow via private
debt.
In contrast to the theoretical model in chapter 4, I build a model with three types
of households so that the private sector and also the firm sector can be indebted.
Impatient households discount future consumption more heavily with their dis-
count factor βb being smaller than the one of the patient households (βl), which
creates borrowers and lenders. Both types of agents invest or borrow in one-period
bonds that pay an interest in the subsequent period. They provide labor services
at their individual real wage rate wt.44 Impatient households maximize utility with
respect to their flow of funds constraint and subject to a borrowing constraint, which
is always binding (see Iacoviello (2005, p 744) on the derivation for this).
Patient households: Patient households (subscripted with l) derive utility
from consumption, real estate, leisure, and supply labor nl,t to entrepreneurs for
which they receive the real wage rate wl,t, subject to a time varying labor tax τnt .
They may invest in three types of assets: physical real estate hl,t at price qt and
financial assets bl,t (private debt) and gbt (government bonds). Patient households
lend to impatient households and entrepreneurs so that their steady-state private
debt position is negative, while it is positive for impatient households. A negative
steady-state bond position can be seen as negative debt, through which this type of
household saves. Lending to the government is solely possible for patient households
as done in, for instance, Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). Private bonds yield a
real return of Rl,t−1bl,t−1
pit
, whereas government bonds yield a return of il,t−1gbt−1
pit
and
pit = PtPt−1 . Both interest rates are interconnected through a no-arbitrage relation.
Consumption cl,t is taxed also at a time-varying tax rate τ ct . Households’ pref-
erences are given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtl
(
ln cl,t + j ln hl,t −
nηl,t
η
+ ϕ lnMl,t
Pt
)
, (49)
where E0 denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available
at t = 0 and j is a preference parameter for housing. η is the weight on labor
disutility and ϕ denotes the weight on utility received from real money holdings Ml,t
Pt
.
44In steady-state, patient labor supply is more productive so that their equilibrium wage is higher
than the one of the impatient labor input as in, for instance, (Justiniano et al., 2015).
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The discount factor of the household is bounded between zero and unity. Patient
households maximize discounted lifetime utility, given their budget constraint
cl,t(1 + τ ct ) + qt∆hl,t +
bl,t−1Rt−1
pit
+ gbt = (1− τnt )wl,tnl,t + bl,t
+ gbt−1it−1
pit
+ Ft − ∆Ml,t
Pt
.
(50)
Lenders receive after-tax labor income (1− τnt )wl,tnl,t, interest from lending, bl,t, to
patient households plus last period’s amount bl,t−1Rt−1
pit
and lending to the government
gbt−1it−1
pit
plus lump-sum profits Ft from owning the retailer, as well as changes in the
real money holdings ∆Ml,t
Pt
. qt is the real price of property.
Note that the interest received for private bonds shows up on the left hand side
of the constraint, is in fact an income since bl,t is negative in steady-state. ∆ is the
difference operator. Patient households do not face a borrowing constraint so they
can choose their optimal lending level, which is negative for both debt positions in
steady-state. First order conditions with respect to cl,t, bl,t, nl,t, hl,t, and gbt are
given by
λl,t =
1
cl,t(1 + τ ct )
(51)
λl,t = βlEtλl,t+1
Rt
pit+1
(52)
wl,t = nη−1t,l cl,t
1 + τ ct
1− τnt
(53)
λl,tqt =
j
hl,t
+ βlEt(λl,t+1qt+1) (54)
λl,t = βlEtλl,t+1
it
pit+1
, (55)
and a standard FOC with respect to real money holdings, which is irrelevant for
the equilibrium since utility is separable in money balances. λl,t is the Lagrangian
multiplier on the budget constraint.
Impatient households: Impatient households face the same additive separable
utility function as patient households with their respective choice variables. They
also maximize utility with variable definition as given for the lender.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
(
ln cb,t + j ln hb,t −
nηb,t
η
+ ϕ lnMb,t
Pt
)
(56)
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with definitions as above, but subscripted with b, for borrowers. They maximize
utility with respect to their budget constraint
cb,t(1 + τ ct ) +
bb,t−1Rt−1
pit
+ qt∆hb,t = bb,t + (1− τnt )wb,tnbt, −∆
Mb,t
Pt
. (57)
Impatient households face a lower discount rate, βb ∈ (0, 1), than patient households,
which makes them borrowers so that their steady-state private debt position is
positive. A borrowing constraint limits the amount households can borrow defined
by
bb,t ≤ Et θtmbqt+1 hb,t pit+1
Rt
. (58)
Equation 58 denotes an upper limit for borrowing, restricted by a fraction mb (loan-
to-value) of the real value of their stock of housing. Setting the value of the discount
factor to be smaller than the one of the patient households, ensures that impatient
households are borrowers in the steady-state and for all shock paths, as shown in
Iacoviello (2005, p. 744). For the simulation below, I assume that the constraint
holds with equality, so that households borrow up to their limit.
θ is the parameter which I will use as the devaluation shock described below. In
steady state, this parameter is set to one.
FOCs with respect to cb,t, bb,t, hb,t and nb,t are given by
λb,t =
1
cb,t(1 + τ c)
(59)
λb,t = βbEtλb,t+1
Rt
pit+1
+ lmb,tRt (60)
λb,tqt =
j
hb,t
+ βbEt(qt+1λb,t+1 + θtlmb,tmb qt+1pit+1) (61)
wb,t = nη−1b,t cb,t
1 + τ ct
1− τnt
(62)
in which lmb,t is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
Entrepreneurs: Entrepreneurs own the capital stock and produce a homoge-
neous intermediate good by combining two types of labor inputs, capital and real
estate. Entrepreneurs are less willing to postpone consumption compared to patient
households, but more ready to do so compared to impatient households, so that
their discount factor γ, is set to lie between the discount factors of the impatient
households and the patient one so that γ ∈ (βb, βl). Entrepreneurs maximize utility
and their production technology is given by
Yt = Atkµt−1hνt−1n
α(1−µ−ν)
l,t n
(1−α)(1−µ−ν)
b,t . (63)
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α, µ and ν (all larger than zero) are the capital share in production and the elastic-
ities of output to real estate, respectively. Capital k depreciates at a constant rate
δ and entrepreneurs also have access to private debt bt with also a positive position
in steady-state. However, entrepreneurs do not receive utility from housing, unlike
the two types of households and use housing instead in producing the intermediate
good. They maximize discounted lifetime utility as
E0
∞∑
t=0
γt ln ct, (64)
subject to their budget constraint
Yt
Xt
+ bt = ct(1 + τ ct ) + qt∆ht +
Rt−1bt−1
pit
+ nb,twb,t + nl,twl,t + It + ξt, (65)
in which ξk,t denotes capital adjustment costs evolving according to ξt = ψk(It/kt−1−
δ)2kt−1/2δ.
Retailers then purchase the intermediate good at the wholesale price Pwt , trans-
form it into final goods and sell it at price Pt so that the markup is given byXt = PtPwt ,
as in Iacoviello (2005).
Entrepreneurs’ ability to accumulate debt is also limited by a borrowing con-
straint reading
bt ≤ Et θt qt+1 ht pit+1m
Rt
. (66)
In this equation, m is the entrepreneur specific loan-to-value parameter. First order
conditions for entrepreneurs with respect to ct, bt, kt+1 and ht are
λt =
1
ct(1 + τ ct )
(67)
λt = γEtλt+1
Rt
pit+1
+ lmtRt (68)
λt(1 +
ψ
δ
( It
kt−1
− δ)) = γEtλt+1( µYt+1
Xt+1kt
+ 1− δ
+ ψ
δ
(It+1
kt
− δ)(1/2(It+1
kt
+ δ) + 1− δ))
(69)
λtqt = γEt(λt+1qt+1 + θt lmtmq+1 pit+1) (70)
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with lmt being the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint for the en-
trepreneur. FOCs with respect to patient and impatient labor inputs are given
by
wl,t =α(1− µ− ν) Yt
Xtnl,t
(71)
wb,t =(1− α)(1− µ− ν) Yt
Xtnb,t
. (72)
5.4.2 Aggregate price level and price dispersion
Prices in this model are sticky, which is introduced through retailers, indexed with
z, following Iacoviello (2005). These represent a continuum normalized to unity,
buy intermediate goods from entrepreneurs at a competitive wholesale price Pwt
and differentiate the goods without costs into Yt(z) selling at price Pt(z). I follow
Iacoviello (2005) so that the retailers choose the sale prices, given the wholesale
price and their demand curve. The Calvo price setting mechanism introduces the
stickiness so that retailers can only re-optimize prices with probability (1 − calvo)
in every period (Calvo, 1983). In contrast, with probability calvo, the retailer has
to stick with its current period price. P ∗t (z) is denoted as the reset price with the
respective demand given by Y ∗t+k(z) =
P ∗t (z)
Pt+k
Yt+k. An optimal reset price then solves
the following equation
∞∑
k=0
calvok Et
{
Λt,k
(
P ∗t (z)
Pt+k
− Xt
Xt+k
)
Y ∗t+k(z)
}
= 0, (73)
in which Λt,k is the patient households’ discount factor, since they own the retailers
and Xt again is the markup. Additionally, as in Iacoviello (2005) and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004) the aggregate price level evolves according to
Pt = ((1− calvo)P ∗1−t + calvo P 1−t−1 )
1
1− , (74)
which is a combination of the optimal reset price P ∗t and the aggregate price level
from the previous period, Pt−1.
5.4.3 The public sector
The government collects distortionary taxes, issues bonds and consumes a fraction
of final output. The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate i according to
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a Taylor rule, targeting the steady state real interest rate (r¯r) and output deviations
as
it = irRt−1
(
pi1+rpit−1
Yt−1
Yt
rY
r¯r
)1−rR
. (75)
rpi, rR and rY are the reaction to the inflation rate, interest rate and output,
from the previous quarter, and r¯r is the steady-state real interest rate. The fiscal
authority collects distortionary labor and consumption taxes, τt. Both types of taxes
are time-varying and deviate from zero in steady-state. The government’s budget
constraint reads as follow
gt +
gbt−1 it−1
pit
= gbt + τ ct (ct + cl,t + cb,t) + τnt (nl,twl,t + nb,twb,t), (76)
in which gt denotes government spending and τ is the respective tax rate. The law
of motion for the devaluation shock is as follows
log θt = (1− ρθ) log θ¯ + ρθ log θt−1 − eθt (77)
and eθt is the devaluation and shock, and an upper bar denotes the steady-state value
of the respective variable. The rules for taxes and spending depend on the fiscal
regime when government debt deviates from its steady state value as described in
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011). Under one, taxes are automatically increased
(TI) and government spending is exogenous, given by
log τt =ρτ log τt−1 + (1− ρτ )log τ¯ + φb,yτ (
gbt−1
Yt−1
− g¯b
Y¯
) + τ (78)
log gt =(1− ρg) log g¯ + ρgt log gt−1 + g. (79)
Under the second regime, spending is cut (SC) according to a fiscal policy rule in
order to lower government so that both tax rates are exogenous, given by
log gt =ρg log gt−1 + (1− ρg)log g¯ + φb,yg (
gbt−1
Yt−1
− g¯b
Y¯
) + g (80)
log τt =(1− ρτ ) log τ¯ + ρτt log τt−1 + τ . (81)
In both regimes, the reaction of spending to deviation from steady state bond-over-
output level is estimated to be negative, as seen below, whereas taxes react positively
to stabilize debt. The estimation of the parameters is given below. I compare both
regimes to investigate, which alternative stabilizes debt with the smaller decrease
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in output. Therefore, either spending is cut (SC) according to Equation 80 or taxes
are increased in accordance with (78).
5.4.4 Equilibrium conditions
The equilibrium is an allocation (hl,t, hb,t, Yt, ct, cl,t, cb,t, bt, bl,t, bb,t, gbt, It, nl,t, nb,t, wl,t,
wb,t, Xt, qt)∞t=0, satisfying the first order conditions above. The following then are
market clearing conditions
0 = bt + bb,t + bl,t (82)
H¯ = ht + hb,t + hl,t (83)
Yt = ct + cl,t + cb,t + It + ψkt + gt (84)
given the sequence of the shocks as specified together with the relevant transversality
conditions. The first equation states that the sum of debt held by entrepreneurs
and borrowers equals the position held by the lender. The stock of housing H¯ is
constant and normalized to one so that no new real estate is created, and real estate
does not depreciate45. Total output is equal to the sum of individual consumption,
investment, government spending and capital adjustment costs. In steady-state,
labor inputs are set to equal.
The next subsection gives the simulation results of the responses given the de-
valuation shock, preceded by the calibration.
5.5 Calibration and results
5.5.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated for quarterly frequencies and parameters are estimated
where possible. A summary and description of the data is given in Table 9 and
data sources can be found in the appendix in Table 12. I follow Iacoviello (2005)
for standard parameters and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) for the coefficients
of the automatic stabilizers.
I set βl, the discount factor of the patient household to 0.993, which matches an
average annual interest rate between 1990 and 2015 of 3%. The value of the discount
factor of the impatient household (βb) is set according to Iacoviello (2005), who
considers a range between 0.91 and 0.98, based on wealth positions of the households.
The discount factor of the entrepreneurs matches then twice the real interest rate
and is hence 0.9802. The labor share is an average of the last 25 years and given as
45Iacoviello (2005) also considers real estate adjustment costs, which he finds to be close to zero.
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Table 9: Calibration of parameters
Param Value Description Target/Description
α 0.640 Wage share patient household Historical labor share
βl 0.993 Discount factor patient hh Match SS annual interest of
3%
βb 0.950 Discount factor impatient hh Iacoviello (2005)
γ 0.980 Discount factor entrepreneurs Iacoviello (2005)
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate Mertens and Ravn (2011)
ν 0.030 Elasticity of output to housing Iacoviello (2005)
µ 0.300 Capital share in production Standard parameter
calvo 0.750 Calvo price parameter Prices constant for one year
on average
X¯ 1.050 Markup 5% markup in steady state
m 0.950 Loan to value entrepreneur 2013 Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency data
mb 0.550 Loan to value borrowers Iacoviello (2005)
η 1.010 Labor disutility Iacoviello (2005)
rR 0.790 Interest rate coef. in TR TR regression coefficient
rpi 0.210 Inflation coef. in TR TR regression coefficient
rY 0.130 Output coef. in TR TR regression coefficient
ψ 2.000 Capital adjustment costs weight Iacoviello (2005)
j 0.100 Housing preference parameter Match 140%residential hous-
ing over output
φK 2.000 Capital adjustment costs. Iacoviello (2005)
ρθ 0.839 AR parameter valuation shock Iacoviello (2015)
σA 0.029 Std of technology shock Std of Basu et al. (2006)
TFP measure
σθ 0.024 Std of θ shock Iacoviello (2015)
τ¯n 0.200 SS labor tax rate Estimate, see below
τ¯ c 0.051 SS consumption tax rate Estimated, see below
ρτn 0.966 AR coefficient fiscal rule τn Estimated with FRED data
ρτc 0.861 AR coefficient fiscal rule τ c Estimated with FRED data
ρg 0.98 AR coefficient fiscal rule Estimated with FRED data
ρg 0.957 AR coefficient AR(1) Estimated with FRED data
φyτn 0.049 Output gap stabilization, τn Estimated with FRED data
φyτc 0.021 Output gap stabilization, τ c Estimated with FRED data
φyg −0.192 Output gap stabilization, g Estimated with FRED data
φbτn 0.089 Debt stabilization, τn Estimated with FRED data
φbτc 0.002 Debt stabilization, τ c Estimated with FRED data
φbg −0.004 Debt stabilization, g Estimated with FRED data
g¯/Y¯ 0.220 SS gov’t spending-to-GDP FRED: GCEC96 / GDPC1
b¯/Y¯ 0.410 SS gov’t debt-to-GDP Estimated with FRED data
Notes: This table denotes the calibration for the parameters of the model. Parameters are
estimated with FRED data. Table 12 gives sources for each of the series used. Tax rates are
constructed as described in Table 13.
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the share of labor compensation in GDP at current prices. The depreciation rate for
capital is set to 0.025, implying an annual steady-state depreciation of 10 percent,
following Mertens and Ravn (2011). The capital share in production, µ, is set to
0.3, which is a standard parameter in real business cycle models and also given in
Iacoviello (2005). Then, the elasticity of output to real estate is set to 0.03 as also
done in Iacoviello (2005). The Calvo parameter is 0.75 so that prices stay constant
on average for one year.
According to Federal Housing Finance Agency data, the average an-to-value
(for borrowers) in 2013 was around 80%. As (Iacoviello, 2011) argues, impatient
households’ borrowing exceeds the average loan-to-value ratio. In 2013, 45% of new
loans exceeded 80% of loan-to-value and 25% exceeded 95%, which is higher than
what Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello (2011) observe for 2004 values. Hence, I set
m, the loan-to-value parameter for the entrepreneur to 0.90, which is in the range of
what Iacoviello (2005) estimates with impulse responses matching. I follow Iacoviello
(2005) and set mb to 0.55, which is not a critical parameter for my results.
I estimate a Taylor rule to find the response of monetary policy to output fluctu-
ations, past inflation and past interest rate. A regression of the Federal Funds rate
on its lag, the output gap and the first lag of inflation from 1980q1 to 2014q4 leads
to coefficients of rR = 0.79, rY = 0.13 and rpi = 0.2146
Capital adjustment costs are set to 2, as in Iacoviello (2005). The housing
preference parameters are fixed to equal 0.1 for all three types of households. η is
fixed to 1.01, which implies a flat labor supply curve as in Iacoviello (2005). The
steady-state markup X equals 5% in steady-state. Government spending is set to
the average between 19980 and 2015 which is equal to 0.22.
Next, I calibrate the autoregressive parameters. The AR parameter of govern-
ment expenditures is estimated using fiscal data taking a value of 0.98. I assume
both AR(1) coefficients of the tax rates to be identical to the ones obtained from
estimating the fiscal rules. These are estimated by regressing the respective tax rate
on deviations from potential output and steady-state government debt, as described
in Equation 78 and 80. I extend the data suggested in Fernández-Villaverde et al.
(2011) so that sample contains data from 1980 to 2015 data. I use real government
consumption expenditures and gross investment, real output and federal debt held
by the public to estimate averages. Table 10 expresses descriptive observations and
46I use yearly quarter-to-quarter log changes in the CPI as inflation measure and the output
gap as linearly detrended output. Using HP-detrended output leads to a coefficient of 0.24 for rY ,
which is double the size of the value by Iacoviello (2005), who does not document the estimation for
the output gap. I hence chose the output gap constructed with a linear trend in GDP as regressor
in the Taylor rule.
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estimation results. Complete sources can be found in the appendix in Table 13,
which also incorporates a subsection on the estimation of average consumption and
labor taxes.
Table 10: Estimation of autoregressive parameters
labor tax consumption tax government spending
Average 20.04% 5.05% 22% (to y)
ρ 0.9662 0.8614 0.9563
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
φy 0.0486 0.0213 -0.1921
(0.006) (0.0070) (0.0000)
φb 0.0031 0.0009 -0.0040
(0.0885) (0.0024) (0.0290)
Notes: Descriptive data for government spending, debt and taxes. Averages of the observa-
tions and regression results from estimating the autoregressive parameters. P-Values are in
parenthesis. U.S. data at quarterly frequencies 1980q1 to 2015q2. Estimating using Equation
80 and 78.
The table shows that government spending averages 22% over output in the
sample, whereas the mean of the labor tax rate 20%, and the one of the sales tax
is 5%, slightly lower compared to estimates in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011).
Moreover, Table 10 depicts the estimates of the reaction function of the two regimes,
spending cuts and tax increases to stabilize government debt. As the table suggests,
all coefficients are significantly different from zero on at least the 5% level.47
5.5.2 Simulation results
I solve the model using first order perturbation around the non-stochastic steady-
state assuming certainty equivalence. I compute impulse responses given a devalu-
ation shock and compare the two different fiscal policy regimes, spending cuts (SC)
or tax increases (TI). I follow Iacoviello (2015) where the standard deviation of the
devaluation shock is estimated to be equal to 0.024.
Figure 36 and 37 depict the simulation of devaluation shocks in period five and
distinguishes between debt stabilization via cutting spending (TC) and increasing
taxes (TI). Impulse responses are in percentage deviations from steady-state.
As is obvious, lending and borrowing households are hit asymmetrically. For
indebted households, the shock acts like a negative preference shock since the bor-
rowing constraint becomes tighter, leading to forced deleveraging so that debt is
47These values above could also be estimated from a VAR approach, as done in the section on
total private debt. However, identification of all parameters becomes difficult, as the dimension of
the system increases.
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Figure 36: Spending cuts and tax increases after devaluation shocks I
Notes: This figure denotes the simulated impulse responses from a one standard deviation shock
to the constrained households ability to borrow (devaluation) shock. The black line denotes the
impulse response when taxes are increased in response to deviations from steady-state debt-over-
output level, whereas the blue line denotes the spending cuts regime. First set of responses,
percentage deviations from steady-state.
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Figure 37: Spending cuts and tax increases and devaluation shocks II
Notes: This figure denotes the simulated impulse responses from a one standard deviation shock
to the constrained households ability to borrow (devaluation) shock. The black line denotes the
impulse response when taxes are increased in response to deviations from steady-state debt-over-
output level, whereas the blue line denotes the spending cuts regime. Second set of responses,
percentage deviations from steady-state.
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reduced by 7%. Consequently, a real estate sell-off leads to a decrease of borrowers’
property position by 6% and 7% for the entrepreneurs. In contrast, patient house-
holds invest in housing, since the real estate price falls and they are not borrowing
constrained so that their real estate position increases by about 4%. Since private
bond trading is reduced, patient households instead invest in government bonds
until interest rates equal out.
Consumption co-moves with housing for indebted agents consistent with Ia-
coviello (2005) and Iacoviello (2011). Forced deleveraging and a lower stock of
housing causes borrowing households to feel poorer so that they reduce their con-
sumption level. This shock has a strong impact on entrepreneurs so that the en-
trepreneur decreases consumption by 18%, whereas the impatient household reduces
consumption by only 1-2%, depending on the regime. The strong reaction observed
for the entrepreneur is due to his production function as he uses housing services
to produce intermediate goods. A deterioration of real estate used in production
and the inability to borrow leads to a reduction in wealth also causing investment
to fall. Since utility for these types of households is drawn from consumption only,
they are hit the hardest compared to the other types of households. This is in line
with Eerola and Määttänen (2012) who suggests that even small shocks can have a
severe impact on the net worth of indebted households.
Since total consumption decreases, consumer prices do so as well. Like in most
low inflation countries, debt is not indexed to inflation so that falling inflation and
sticky prices increases real debt service, which amplifies the negative wealth effect.
The monetary authority responds to lower inflation and a larger output gap
with a lower nominal interest rate. Furthermore, on impact lenders and borrowers
decrease hours (nl,t and nb,t) by 4.5% and 3.8% respectively.
Looking at the difference between the two debt stabilization regimes, there is
only a slight difference between spending cuts (SC) and tax increases (TI). In both
regimes, output decreases by 3% as a consequence of the reduction in consumption
and investment. Therefore, in times when the economy is sufficiently far away from
the ZLB, it is irrelevant if taxes are increased or spending is reduced to stabilize
deviations from steady-state bond-over-output level regarding output reduction.
The results of the theoretical simulation fit to the VAR estimation results, which
also show that house price shocks lead to a reduction in output prices and interest
rates.
Next, I compare both debt stabilization regimes once the economy reaches the
ZLB.
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5.5.3 Binding constraints & the ZLB
The Great Recession led to a period of zero interest rates and high government debt.
In this section, I compare the linear baseline simulation above to a version of the
model, in which the ZLB is binding only when it is reached after a shock.
Iacoviello and Guerrieri (2015) provide an algorithm for a piecewise solution
for dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints. Piecewise, since it links
impulse responses when the ZLB holds to the no-ZLB case when it is slack.
As the authors show, occasionally binding constraints can be seen as two regimes
of the same model. In one regime, the ZLB is slack, while it binds in the second. The
algorithm produces two sets of derivatives used for impulse response calculation and
links them. The solution method links the first-order approximation of the model
around the steady-state for each regime (Iacoviello and Guerrieri, 2015).
In the first regime, which I refer to as R1, conditions for the existence of a
rational expectations solution (Blanchard-Kahn conditions) have to hold, and the
interest rate evolves according to the Taylor rule so that
it = irRt−1(pi1+rpit−1
Yt−1
Y¯
rY
r¯r)1−rR, (85)
holds as specified above. If a shock hits the economy so that they Taylor rule
would suggest to set the interest rate below zero, the algorithm switches to the
ZLB regime. Thus, a shock causing a reduction of the interest rate of more than
its steady state level, would cause the result in a regime-switch. This happens,
when iˆt <= −(1/β − 1), which is equivalent to a reduction of 1/beta − 1 = 0.007
in my model, equivalent to an annualized interest rate reduction of 3 percentage
points, since the model is calibrated for quarterly frequencies. The devaluation
shock described, is large enough in size so that the interest rate reduction after the
shock touches the ZLB.
In the ZLB regime, the interest rate is fixed to 0 (i = 1 for the gross interest
rate) given by
it = 1∀ t ∈ [t, tmax], (86)
in which tmax ensures that the ZLB regime converges back to the baseline regime
(R1) and i is the gross interest rate. In every post shock period, the switching
condition is checked. When output is below trend and inflation remains lower than
steady state, the Taylor rule would suggest to reduce the interest rate. As long as
such a reduction would cause the interest rate to fall by more than its steady level,
the model remains at the fixed interest rate regime. Once output has recovered and
the interest rate reduction would lead to interest rates above the ZLB, the regime
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switches back. Therefore, the algorithm is a guess-and-verify approach with the
assumption of i, being a proxy for the ZLB.
The solution algorithm suggested by Iacoviello and Guerrieri (2015) is as follows
Algorithm 2 (The Iacoviello and Guerrieri (2015) algorithm) 1. Specify
two separate models in Dynare with identical parameters, endogenous and ex-
ogenous variables.
2. In the baseline model, the policy instrument evolves according to a Taylor rule.
In the alternative regime, it is zero.
3. Pick the number of periods, tmax under which the ZLB is assumed to bind.
4. Include a switching condition to indicate that the model needs to move from
baseline to the ZLB case and find a shock that reaches this threshold.
5. Solve the model for baseline (R1) and calculate first order conditions and sim-
ulate a devaluation shock.
6. Solve the model with the binding ZLB and recalculate impulse responses for
devaluation shocks.
7. Link impulse responses of ZLB case to non-ZLB at tmax.
8. Compare both impulse responses.
Solutions are time varying decision rule in a guess and verify approach so that
each period initial conditions are verified, and the regime is updated if necessary.
5.5.4 Valuation shocks at the ZLB
This section presents the results of the devaluation shock at the ZLB and compares
the two debt stabilization policies. Figure 38 and the subsequent one depict impulse
responses for the fiscal policy regime when adjusting taxes (TI). Impulse responses
are given as percentage deviations from steady state.
The figures denote the responses of the non-ZLB case, R1 (black line), and the
ZLB case (blue dashed line). Impulse responses at the ZLB are linked to the non-
ZLB case at tmax. As is visible, the ZLB acts as an amplifier of the devaluation
shock compared to when the ZLB is slack.
The reaction of the interest in the non-ZLB case, shows a reduction of roughly
1% per quarter, larger its steady state level. Hence, the model switches to the ZLB
regime after a devaluation shock so that iˆ is zero, denoting a proxy for the ZLB.
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Figure 38: IR tax increases after devaluation shocks, ZLB vs. no-ZLB I
Notes: Simulated impulse responses after devaluation shock. The solid black line denotes the simu-
lated responses if the ZLB is slack, whereas the dashed blue line is the impulse responses when the
ZLB holds. Impulse responses result from the piecewise solution algorithm suggested by Iacoviello
and Guerrieri (2015). The fiscal authority increases consumption and labor taxes to stabilize debt
(TI), and spending is adjusted according to an AR(1) process. First set of variables, percentage
deviations from steady-state.
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Figure 39: IR tax increases after devaluation shocks, ZLB vs. no-ZLB II
Notes: Simulated impulse responses after devaluation shock. The solid black line denotes the
simulated responses if the ZLB is slack, whereas the dashed blue line is the impulse responses
when the ZLB holds. Impulse responses result from the piecewise solution algorithm suggested by
Iacoviello and Guerrieri (2015). The fiscal authority uses consumption and labor taxes to stabilize
debt, and spending is adjusted according to an AR(1) process. Second set of variables, percentage
deviations from steady-state.
123
Financial assets, fiscal policy, and the macroeconomy
The model switches back in period 13, even though output is below trend since the
reduction of the interest rate according to the Taylor rule would not be lager than
3%. Then, impulse responses are linked.
The negative impact of forced deleveraging has a two times stronger effect on
output compared to the no-ZLB case. Once the regime switches back to the baseline
regime R1, the impulse responses from the ZLB case are linked to the ones in the
non-ZLB case, visible by a kink in the impulse responses in period 13. Thus, the
ZLB holds for eight periods, and the regime returns to steady state thereafter.
Forced deleveraging leads to lower private bond holdings. Real estate then de-
clines by 10% and 8% for entrepreneurs and impatient households, respectively.
House prices decline in a similar way compared to the baseline estimation and pa-
tient households respond by building up their real estate position. As entrepreneurs
are hit through their production function, the drop in investment is amplified when
the ZLB holds. Together with lower consumption, output declines by 5%.
Since the monetary authority is incapable of lowering interest rates until tmax,
falling prices cause the real debt burden to increase by more compared to the situ-
ation when the ZLB is slack, which amplifies the devaluation shock.
Figure 40 depicts simulated impulse responses for devaluation shocks if spending
is cut (SC) at the ZLB after devaluation shocks as deviations from steady-state.
Additionally, Figure 42 in the appendix compares both fiscal rules at the ZLB.
A spending cut causes the recession following devaluation shocks to be more
severe at the ZLB holds compared to when the ZLB does not hold. Borrowers’
and entrepreneurs’ real estate position declines by 30% and 15%, which exceeds the
impact when interest rates can be adjusted by the central bank. In turn, the real
estate price decrease is stronger, and patient households can take more advantage
of lower house prices and increase their position by almost 8%. As in the case of
a slack ZLB, reduced wealth due to a lower value of real estate causes borrowing
households to reduce consumption while the patient household increases it. Output
declines by more than 12% due to the relative sizes of respective households.48
Figure 42 in the appendix compares spending cuts and tax increases at the
ZLB following house price shocks. Using spending cuts to stabilize debt reduces
output by more compared to a non-binding ZLB, since the monetary authority is
incapable of lowering interest rates. Therefore, if a devaluation shock occurs when
debt-over-output deviates from steady-state, tax increases to stabilize debt, rather
than government spending reduction leads to a milder impact on output.
48Assuming that each household is represented by a third of the total number of households.
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Figure 40: IR spending cuts after devaluation shocks, ZLB vs. no-ZLB I
Notes: Simulated impulse responses for devaluation shock. The solid black line denotes the simu-
lated responses if the ZLB is slack, whereas the dashed blue line is the impulse responses when the
ZLB holds. Impulse responses result from the piecewise solution algorithm suggested by Iacoviello
and Guerrieri (2015). The fiscal authority spending cuts (SC) to stabilize government debt and
consumption and labor taxes are adjusted according to an AR(1) process. First set of variables,
percentage deviations from steady-state.
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Figure 41: IR spending cuts after devaluation shocks, ZLB vs.no-ZLB II
Notes: Simulated impulse responses for devaluation shock. The solid line black denotes the sim-
ulated responses if the ZLB is slack, whereas the dashed blue line is the impulse responses when
the ZLB holds. Impulse responses result from the piecewise solution algorithm suggested by Ia-
coviello and Guerrieri (2015). The fiscal authority uses spending cuts (SC) to stabilize government
debt and consumption and labor taxes are adjusted according to an AR(1) process. Second set of
variables, deviations from steady-state.
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Modifying the model to include housing adjustment costs does not alter this
result, as such costs were estimated to be very low Iacoviello (2005).
5.5.5 Discussion and limitations
Devaluation shocks cause a recession in the model economy since some agents are
forced to deleverage in line with the debt-driven slump described by Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012). In a time when government debt is high, the way the fiscal author-
ity responds to stabilize debt by adjusting fiscal policy is irrelevant for the impact
on output only if the ZLB is slack. In contrast, if the ZLB binds, increasing taxes
to stabilize debt-over-GDP to return to steady-state causes a less severe recession
compared to cutting government spending.
However, the nature of devaluation shocks can be questionable, since its source
is not clear cut, as Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) also state. There may be an
underlying mechanism for which the devaluation shock is only a proxy.
Further, assuming risk-free borrowing for private and government debt abstracts
from the current issues of public debt defaults, or private borrowers filing bankruptcy.
In a more sophisticated model, this could be taken into account, and one could in-
vestigate if the results still hold.
Concerning the solution algorithm, Iacoviello and Guerrieri (2015) note that it
does not account for precautionary behavior due to expected switches from one to
the other regime. Households are assumed to either believe R1 will endure forever,
or R2 holds so that a regime change occurs unexpectedly to households. Once a
transition from the reference to the alternative regime has taken place and back to
the reference regime, households to not expect this to happen again. Precautionary
savings due to the possibility of a binding zero lower bound in the future do therefore
not take place since the shocks are not realized yet. Further, the assumption of a
number of periods in which the constraint holds with equality is ad-hoc.
As any linear approximation to the model, the models solution ignores higher
order shocks. Households’ optimal allocation, therefore, does not account for uncer-
tainty on the realization of shocks.
5.6 Conclusion
Households receive utility from owning real estate that co-moves with consumption
and is an asset that can be used as collateral to borrow additional funds. However,
it is also risky.
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In this paper, I investigate the impact of devaluation shocks to households’ ability
to borrow, which have a strong negative effect on consumption, real estate prices
and induce a recession in the model economy since such shocks force constrained
households to deleverage.
The direction of the impact of devaluation shocks on different types households
is asymmetric: They reduce the ability to borrow, which has a severe impact on
borrowing constrained households since they are forced to deleverage by selling real
estate that in turn reduces their wealth and thus consumption. On the other hand,
patient households can take advantage of lower house prices and build up their real
estate position and increase consumption because they feel richer.
Devaluation shocks played a significant role at the end of 2007 when house prices
collapsed in the U.S. leading to a severe recession while government debt surged.
The fiscal authority has taxes and fiscal spending as an instrument lower public
debt. As it turns out, in times, when the economy is sufficiently far away from
the Zero Lower Bound on interest rates, the choice of whether cutting spending or
increasing spending does not have an impact on the severeness of the recession after
devaluation shocks.
I then investigate whether this results holds at the ZLB and find that the ZLB
acts as an additional amplifier for devaluation shocks. When government debt is
high, and a devaluation shock hits, cutting spending to reduce government debt
reduces output by more compared to increasing taxes. If taxes are increased with
interest rates at the ZLB, it causes output to decrease by 4.5% that compares to 3%
if the ZLB is slack. In contrast, if the fiscal authority cuts spending the impact of
devaluation shocks on output is four to five times as strong compared to the no-ZBL
case.
This paper adds to the current literature on devaluation shocks and amends the
Iacoviello (2005) housing sector model with a fiscal sector and the possibility of
different fiscal rules. It then shows that the choice of fiscal instruments to stabilize
debt is irrelevant only if the economy is away from the ZLB.
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5.7 Appendix
Table 11: Data sources for VAR estimation
Variable description source
ffr Federal Funds rate, end of quarter FRED data: FEDFUNDS
pi 4 quarter log differences of CPI FRED data: CPIAUCSL
C-S Index log of 10 city Case-Shiller Index FRED data: SPCS10RSA
y log of real per per capita GDP FRED data: GDPC1/POP
Notes: This Table gives data sources for the VAR estimation using FRED data and available
at research.stlouisfed.org
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Tax rate calculation. For the calculation of the tax rates, I follow Fernández-
Villaverde et al. (2011). Data can be found in NIPA tables and is obtained from
FRED. The average consumption tax is
τc =
TPI − PRT
PCE − (TPI − PRT ) (87)
In which TPI is taxes on production and imports, PRT denotes local property
taxes and PCE are personal consumption expenditures. Additionally, average per-
sonal income taxes taxes τp and labor taxes τn are calculated as follows
τp =
PIT
WSA+ PRI/2 + CI (88)
τn =
τp(WSA+ PRI/2) + CSI
CEM + PRI/2 . (89)
definitions and sources can be taken from Table 13, which also gives FRED data
sources.
Table 13: Details on the estimation of average taxes
Description FRED Source
PIT Fed+local+state taxes on PI A074RC1A027NBEA +
B245RC1Q027SBEA
WSA wage and salary accruals WASCUR
PRI proprietor’s income A043RC1Q027SBEA +
B179RC1A027NBEA
CI capital income = PRI/2+RI+CP+NIS
RI rental income B049RC1A027NBEA
CP corporate profits A551RC1A027NBEA +
A054RC0A144NBEA
NI interest income W255RC1A027NBEA
CSI contributions social sec W780RU1Q027NBEA
CEM compensation of employees W209RC1A027NBEA
TPI taxes on prod and imports B234RC1A027NBEA +
B248RC1Q027SBEA
PCE personal cons expenditures PCE
PRT property tax revenue S210400
g government spending GCECA
Notes: This table gives data definitions and sources for the estmation of fiscal feedback rules.
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Figure 42: Spending vs. tax stabilization of debt after valuation shocks
Notes: This figure denotes the simulated impulse responses from a one standard deviation shock to
the constrained households ability to borrow (devaluation) shock at the ZLB and compares both
fiscal rules: spending reduction (SC), denoted by the black line and tax increases (TI) denoted by
the dashed blue line. First set of responses, percentage deviations from steady-state.
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Figure 43: Spending vs. tax stabilization of debt after valuation shocks
Notes: This figure denotes the simulated impulse responses from a one standard deviation shock to
the constrained households ability to borrow (devaluation) shock at the ZLB and compares both
fiscal rules: spending reduction (SC), denoted by the black line and tax increases (TI) denoted by
the dashed blue line. Second set of responses, percentage deviations from steady-state.
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6 Market inefficiencies and forecastability of spot
rates in the shipping sector
Coauthor: Marcus Eppinger
6.1 Introduction
Market participants can use forward rates to fix today the delivery of an asset,
commodity or service in the future. The price of forwards depends, unlike the spot
(current) price, on expectations on future events until maturity. The Unbiased Esti-
mator Hypothesis (UEH) connects these forwards and spot rates by a no-arbitrage
relationship. The UEH states that the forward rate is a conditionally unbiased pre-
dictor for future spot rates (Engel, 1996; Hodrick, 2014). If the UEH holds, the
best estimate for the spot rate at maturity is the price suggested by the forward
contract today. As maturity of the forward approaches, its price converges towards
the spot price. If this is the case, markets are fully efficient and beating the market
is impossible.
However, this is not the case in the market for cargo shipping. The statistical
properties of cargo spot shipping rates and its derivatives, like forwards, are unique
compared to other asset classes. The shipping asset market is dominated by char-
terers and shipowners who are mainly interested in smooth cash flows rather than
in speculation. In the absence of speculative noise trading, which would provide
additional liquidity, trading can be thin so that prices stay constant for days. Since
the underlying (base value) of shipping rates is a non-storable service, not an as-
set or commodity, rates cannot be short-sold in a secondary market which reduces
liquidity as well and stands in contrast with currency, commodity or other paper
markets.
In this paper, we show that these particular properties lead to inefficient markets
so that forward prices, do not converge towards spot rates at maturity. We provide
evidence that the UEH does not hold, by performing cointegration tests of spot rates
and forwards for the two largest types of vessels using which has not been shown
before. The cointegration relationship between the two rates is only weak so that
the portfolio composition of short and long-run contracts matters for charterers and
ship owners, unlike inefficient markets.
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We empirically take advantage of inefficient markets and find that Forward
Freight Agreements (FFA) have a significant impact on spot prices during the follow-
ing days. The shipping market, therefore, does not process information contained
in forwards quickly enough so that profitable forecasts for the next days can be
generated.
We let ARIMA, VAR, and VECM models compete when creating forecasts, and
compare the models’ forecast errors (RMSE) to those errors resulting from estimat-
ing random walks. The model with the lowest RMSEs is a vector autoregression,
which is then used to create a trading scheme, capable of outperforming a benchmark
index, even after controlling for transaction costs.
In the remainder of the paper, we proceed as follows. We review recent literature
on market efficiency in the shipping sector and the sign of risk premia for holding con-
tracts with long or short maturity in the next chapter. In chapter 6.3 we introduce
the data and estimation methods, which compete for creating forecasts. Chapter 6.4
compares spot rate forecasts in terms of RMSE. The last section presents a trading
scheme based on VAR estimation, which outperforms the benchmark index, and a
final chapter concludes.
6.2 Market properties in the shipping sector
The shipping sector experiences high entry costs, time to build and convex operating
costs of ships with high idiosyncratic risk and high market entry barriers (Kaloupt-
sidi, 2014). The process of cargo shipping is a service rather than a storable product.
Unlike in asset trading, where the underlying value is a physical commodity or share,
short positions of shipping goods cannot be taken. A cost-of-carry (COC) relation-
ship which states that the price of a derivative, like a forward, at t− n for delivery
at t equals the price of the underlying at t−n plus costs associated with purchasing,
storing and holding the asset up to t, does not hold (Kavussanos et al., 2005). 49
Therefore, only supply and demand influence both rates so that the timing structure
of investors’ portfolios matters and speculative trading then does not avoid arbitrage
trades.
Demand for shipping services and hence current spot rates are driven by ag-
gregate seaborne trade and thus subject to world business cycle fluctuations and
seasonal effects (Stopford, 1997; Kavussanos and Alizadeh-M., 2002; Kalouptsidi,
2014). Supply of shipping services in the short-run, on the other hand, is inflex-
ible and determined by the number of voyages carried out by shipowners which
introduces unique characteristics of derivatives on cargo rates (Kalouptsidi, 2014).
49So that the relationship Et (Ft,t−n) = St−n(1 + C) does not hold.
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These rigidities cause shipping rates to be highly volatile so that the price of
renting one of the largest types of vessels decreased from 233.000 USD/day on June
5, 2008, to 2316 USD/day on December 2, 2008. Renting refers the market price to
ship a previously defined quantity of goods on a particular route at a certain point in
time and can be negotiated freely, typically involving three parties; a carrier accepts
to ship the goods and receives the spot rate from the charterer. Then, brokers match
supply and demand for services. Two types of such transactions are common. First,
charterer and shipowners can fix a voyage charter for a certain quantity and route.
The shipowner is then responsible for the port, fuel, crew, brokerage and canal costs.
In contrast, Time Charter (TC) contracts involve the reception a ship for a certain
time, while the carrier sends the charterers’ goods, and Voyage Costs are borne by
the charterer and rates for both obviously differ.
These market participants are interested in estimating future shipping prices to
minimize cash flow volatility and to hedge their portfolios (Kavussanos and Visvikis,
2004). They can either engage in forward and future trading50 or, wait until ma-
turity and purchase the respective spot price. Forward Freight Agreements (FFAs)
replaced futures since trading was too thin and market prices could not be deter-
mined. FFAs, which are principal-to-principal agreements traded over-the-counter,
usually between shipowners and charterers are based on difference payment between
realized spot rates at maturity and rates initially negotiated. In contrast to options
trading, honoring FFA contracts is mandatory. Reliable time series data on FFAs
as an instrument to insure against price shifts is only available from 2004 onwards
so that we take this as a starting point for our estimations.
The decision whether to buy FFA or spot contracts depends on the efficiency
of the market. A market is called efficient if all information is processed instantly
so that forward rates and spot prices co-move, and profitable forecasts cannot be
generated, given by the following
∆St+1 = α + β(Ft − St) + t+1, (90)
in which ∆St+1 is the change in the spot rate from t to t+1, Ft is the forward rate at
t and St is the spot rate. If markets are efficient, the UEH holds so that β = 1 and
α = 0 (Hull, 2006). However, the hypothesis tends to be rejected, in, for instance,
the currency market as Frankel and Poonawala (2010) note. The UEH, which states
that the forward price is equal to its discounted expected future spot price, does not
need to hold here, as Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004) note. FFA prices then do not
50Forwards are traded over-the-counter, whereas futures are standardized contracts that are
exchange-traded and party-to-party negotiation does not take place.
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converge to their cost of carry price as maturity approaches. Short-run forecasts for
spot rates are therefore possible.
6.2.1 Forward freight rates & spot rates
Time series of freight rates exhibit a high degree of autocorrelation, which can be
exploited to create forecasts. Cullinane (1992) shows that short-run forecasts for
spot rates can be constructed using futures. The author uses an ARIMA model
with daily data from 1985 to 1988 to generate estimates for the Baltic Freight Index
(BFI).
Cullinane et al. (1999) confirm the robustness of the earlier results with post-
1993 data after crafts were added to the index. They conclude that the shift in the
index has not caused the quantitative relationships to break down.
Kavussanos and Nomikos (2003), in contrast, also control for long- and short-
run dependencies and produce forecasts for spot rates. In a 1988-1998 sample, the
authors demonstrate futures and spot prices to follow a common trend using vector
error correction models (VECMs). They compare forecasts’ quality in terms of Root
Mean Square Error of VECMs and ARIMA models to a random walk. They then
find that futures Granger cause spot rates, but the vice versa relationship is weak.
Batchelor et al. (2007) explain this evidence with asymmetrical transaction costs.
Such costs in spot markets are typically higher than in future markets because in
the former, transaction costs contain the physical good of shipment at that time,
unlike the forward market that is based on difference payment. Lower transaction
costs in the latter suggest that FFA prices process new information more quickly
than spot markets, and hence have a price finding role.
Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004) test the UEH with VECM models. The authors
demonstrate a cointegration relationship between futures and spot rates for matu-
rities up to two months, which suggests futures at t to be unbiased estimators for
spot rates at maturity with a cointegration vector of (1,−1). Thus, the difference
between the spot and future rate is zero in equilibrium. A deviation in the short-
run from the cointegration relationship may occur, since Future rates contain more
information than spot prices.
Batchelor et al. (2007) compare VARs and ARIMA models for their short-run
forecast performance. VECMs have the lowest RMSE among the models, especially
for long-run forecast, with only half the RMSE of the second best model.
However, it remains unsolved which of the two rates primarily causes a conver-
gence back to the common trend, which we check in the subsequent chapters.
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6.2.2 The timing structure of freight rates
In the market for cargo shipping, the UEH does not need to hold due to the absence
of a COC relation, so that the composition of freight rate portfolio has an impact
on expected profits from holding contracts with different maturities.
Expectations on future freight rates take the term structure of shipping rates
into account. Adland and Cullinane (2005) define freight spreads, or premia, as the
difference between the price for long-run contracts and today’s spot rates.
According to Stopford (1997), today’s supply and demand for shipping goods
primarily have an impact on current spot rate, while forward rates reflect long-
run expectations on future freight rates, interest rates, and risk premia. This has
been called the Expectations Hypothesis of the Term Structure (EHTS) and can be
broken down into two versions, according to, for instance, Glen et al. (1981) and
Strandenes (1984).
The classic EHTS states that risk premia for holding portfolios containing dif-
ferent maturities are time-invariant but different from zero. A violation of the hy-
pothesis could be due to market inefficiencies, irrational expectations of agents or
incorrect underlying models (Kavussanos and Alizadeh-M., 2002). The existence
of a risk premium is crucial when estimating forecasts and investigating market
efficiency.
Future spot rates tend to increase step by step if market participants expect
events which cause the price to ship goods at a future point in time with payment
in that moment to increase. Expectations influencing different maturities might be
asymmetric, and risk premia can be time-varying (Adland and Cullinane, 2005).
Economic expansions mostly cause short-run and long-run rates to rise simultane-
ously, consistent with the classic EHTS. Recessions, however, mainly cause high
maturity rates to decrease, lowering the correlation with short maturity rates so
that the classic EHTS cannot be observed in the data and risk premia can be neg-
ative in downturns. Adland and Cullinane (2005) thus suggest to reject the EHTS,
postulating time-varying risk premia.
The Pure Expectations Hypothesis of the Term Structure (PEHTS), on the other
hand, states that the price of long-run contracts incorporates all alternative invest-
ments, as well. Risk premia for freight rates are then constant and zero.
The validity of these two hypotheses depends on the choice of the market, the
model applied as well on as the sample. Glen et al. (1981) and Strandenes (1984)
show that the PEHTS holds, but their results are rejected by Hale and Vanags
(1989) and Veenstra (1999) for the Dry-Bulk markets. The latter study suggests
that shipowners demand a liquidity premium for long-run freight rates due to the
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non-substitutability of specific routes and the inability to sell charter contracts in a
secondary market (Veenstra, 1999). Such a premium violates the PEHTS, as also
demonstrated for the oil tanker market by Wright (2000) and Adland and Cullinane
(2005).
However, most tests for the PEHTS in Wright (2000) check for short-run relation-
ships, but are incapable of testing the hypothesis for long-run contracts (Kavussanos
and Alizadeh-M., 2002).
Kavussanos and Alizadeh-M. (2002) demonstrate a long run relationship between
spot and Time Charter rates of approximately one to three years. A test for PEHTS
and classical EHTS is rejected at the 5% level.
6.2.3 The sign of risk premia
If the timing structure of cargo rates matters and forecasts can be generated, the
sing of the risk premium is important since market participants would realize profits
for holding the respective contract.
Time series evidence for the sign of the risk premium is mixed, depending on
whether the PEHTS holds so that the premium µt = St − EtβFT can either be
positive, negative or zero.
Volatile voyage costs and the risk of being forced to take ships to different starting
ports in the future create negative risk premia. Technology shocks or stricter safety
laws lower the value of vessels, which are assigned to specific routes in long-run
contracts, also postulating a negative risk premium which is shown by Kavussanos
and Alizadeh-M. (2002) in EGARCH models controlling for cycles in a 1988 to 1997
sample.
Adland and Cullinane (2005) demonstrate spot rate volatility to be higher than
forward rates’ volatility so that risk-averse ship owners may be willing to sell long-
run contracts with a discount to reduce portfolio variance which causes risk premia
to be negative.
In contrast, long-run contracts can be less risky than short-run contracts since
they keep income and costs for shipowner and charterers constant and predictable.
Such security postulates positive risk premia according to Tashman (1996). More-
over, securing shipment for some routes can be difficult for charterers in expansions
when excess demand exist. Charterers then would be willing to pay a positive risk
premium to secure their shipments. Finally, there is an exit risk of the charterer.
The higher the maturity of the contract negotiated, the higher the exit risk, leading
to an increase with t in the risk premium of the shipowner.
139
Financial assets, fiscal policy, and the macroeconomy
In conclusion, risk premia can be time-varying with evidence for positive or
negative estimates. In the subsequent sections, we investigate the sign of the risk
premium by performing cointegration tests.
6.3 Data and estimation
This section describes our data and estimation models that compete in terms of
forecastability of future sport rates, based on FFA and Time Charter rates.
6.3.1 Data
Our sample contains daily data from 1 October 2004 to 9 December 2008, the
maximum of continuously available data. We exclude the crisis data because we are
interested in within-cycle dynamics, as shipping cycles reoccur approximately every
six to nine years (Kalouptsidi, 2014).
FFAs reflect daily closing values from Baltic Exchange and are based on individ-
ual routes or on route baskets. Spot and Time Charter rates are based on Clarksons
data51. Spot rates are daily-recorded, whereas Time Charter rates are published
weekly only.
Capsize and Panamax ships have the highest trading volume and most contracts
are sold on the 4TC route52. Panamax (Capesize) routes account for 50% (35%)
of total FFA volume. Panamax ships are those, still capable to transversing the
Panama canal, whereas Capesize ships are to large to do so.
FFA contracts for the Capesize Index (BCI) or Panamax Index (BPI) are based
on weighted averages of the preceding seven business days each respective month,
to avoid a thin trading bias (Dimson and Marsh, 1983).
Because FFAs on baskets of routes (for instance 4TC) are used to hedge monthly
income, these are calculated as averages of the month to make sure monthly costs
and revenues can be hedged.
FFA+1Q, FFA+2Q and FFA+1A are FFA contracts, maturing at the end of the
next quarter, two quarters and at the end of next year. We create first log differences
of FFAs to avoids jumps resulting from rollovers from one to the next day, as the
last day before maturity of the contract approaches. Until the penultimate trading
day, we use changes of the FFAs+1Q. On the last trading day, we use the difference
51www.clarksons.net/ created from shipping brokers surveys for the rate on a specific route for
the respective contract. If there was no sealing of a contract due to thin trading, estimated values
of the brokers are used.
52Weighted average of the busiest four routes of the respective index.
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between the FFA+1Q on the last trading day and the FFA+2Q on the penultimate
trading day so that only differences of contracts with the same maturity are used.
Time Charter rates are grouped according to ship sizes and are averages of
particular routes, with Capesize and Panamax showing the highest trading volume
and with maturities of six months, one year and two years.
Finally, we use 4TC spot rates in the BPI and BCI, so that the underlying non-
storable service is identical to the ones in the FFA contracts. All data is in USD/day
or month or year for Time Charter and USD/ton for spot and FFA contracts. Figure
44 depicts FFA and spot rates on Panamax routes. As is visible, both rates seem to
co-move, which we are testing for. Descriptive data can be found in the appendix
in Table 18.
Figure 44: Comovement spot and FFA contracts on panamax routes
Notes: This figure shows the comovement of spot and FFA contracts on Panamax routes. The
black solid line denotes the log of spot rates and the dashed line is the log of FFA+2Q contract.
Both time series are missing some observations due to thin trading.
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6.4 Estimation methods
We compare forecasting models to a random walk that postulates tomorrow’s spot
rate to be the sum of the value of yesterday and white noise, , given an autoregres-
sive parameter ρ of unity, given by Equation 91
EtSt+1 = ρSt + t+1. (91)
Estimating future spot rates based on this equation should produce the highest
forecast error compared to the other models.
Additionally, we test if the UEH holds so that forward prices are unbiased esti-
mators for future spot rates. We do this by performing cointegration tests for the
FFA rates and spot rates so that St = α+ βFt,t−n + t with Ft−n being the forward
rate at t− n maturing at t, t is white noise and α = 0 and β = 1.
Stationarity tests suggest Ft and St to be non-stationary.53 FFA and spot rates
are cointegrated, if there exists a vector V so that V = [S F ]′ is I(d− b) and b > 0.
According to Engle and Granger (1987), Error Correction models (VECMs) exist
for every cointegration model. Equation 92 denotes the reduced form VECM
∆Xt = ΠXt−p + Γp∆Xt−p + ut. (92)
VECMs describe changes in the logs of spot and forward rates by own and the other
variable’s past observations. Xt is a column vector with X = [S F ]′t and ut a two-
dimensional reduced form white noise term with a time-invariant covariance matrix
Σu. Γp are square coefficient matrices of dimensions 2 for short-run adjustments. Π
is the long run effect with Π = α× β′. α is known as the loading coefficients and β
as the cointegrating vector capturing the speed of convergence to the common trend
after shocks. Each of the right-hand side Γs are error correction terms, restoring
equilibrium after stochastic disturbances by restricting the variables to converge to
the pre-shock path. The system is estimated by OLS and also includes a constant.
If the UEH holds, the cointegrating vector V is equal to [1,−1]′ so that the
difference between FFAs and spot rates is zero in the long run. In this case, markets
would be efficient, and the UEH would hold.
We also estimate VAR models, ignoring the cointegration relationship as follows
∆Xt = A(L)∆Xt−1 + ut, (93)
53Using an Augmented Dicky Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), the Kwiatkowski - Phillips -
Schmidt - Shin - Test (KPSS-Test) and the Phillip-Perron-Test Phillips and Perron (1988).
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with identical variable definitions as in Equation 92 and A(L) is a lag polynomial
of order two and the estimation includes a constant. We additionally estimate an
univariate ARIMA process as
∆St =
p∑
i=1
αp∆St−p +
q∑
j=1
βqt−q + t. (94)
Equation 94 predicts future values for the spot rate as a linear combination of past
residuals and past changes in the spot rate. We also extend the ARIMA model to
include Time Charter rates and refer to this model as ARIMA-TC, as described in
Equation 95
∆St =
p∑
i=1
αp∆St−p +
q∑
j=1
βqt−q +
r∑
k=1
γr∆TCt−r + t. (95)
∆TCt−q denotes change in the Time Charter rate from q Fridays ago.
We document the quality of forecasts as RMSE as
√
(Sˆt+1 − St+1)2, which is the
difference between the fitted value and the actual spot rate. Determining the order of
the system is essential since spot rates experience a high degree of autocorrelation.
SC and AIC (Schwarz, 1978; Akaike, 1974) suggest an ARIMA(2,1,0), VAR(2),
VECM(2) and ARIMA-TC(2,1,0,1).
We divide the full sample into an estimation and a forecast period, following
Tashman (2000). We then estimate constant rolling windows by estimating one-
day-ahead forecasts for the spot rate (Sˆt+1) with information known at t. The
estimation window is then pushed one day ahead, and the oldest observation drops
out since otherwise new observation weights would decline and forecast errors would
not be comparable. The next one-day-ahead forecast is then produced using the
updated, rolled estimation window with slightly new regression coefficients. This
procedure is repeated until the window reaches the last observation of the sample
and one-day-ahead forecasts are produced at every point in time, depicted in Figure
45.
To produce two-day out-of-sample forecasts for the spot rate Sˆt+2, we rely on
one-day-ahead forecasts and proceed as follows:
1. Produce one-day-ahead forecasts for spot and FFA rates for t + 1, according
to the procedure described above in Figure 45.
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2. Use these one-day-ahead forecasts to create a forecast for the next day with
an updated estimation regression which includes Fˆt+1 and Sˆt+1. This, then, is
the two-day forecast as depicted in Figure 46
Alternatively to letting the window move one step ahead, we could also let the
window roll for two periods, which would create non-overlapping forecast intervals.
Such procedure, however, would result in a smaller number of forecasts. We, there-
fore, move the estimation window only by one step and create overlapping forecast
intervals for t+ 2.
The procedure is repeated recursively to create forecasts for t + n, requiring
forecasts for spot and FFA rates up to t + n − 1. In conclusion, we have nine
forecasts for every observation point in our sample, excluding the final 9 ones.
We then take Time Charter rates into account and extend the ARIMA model
to provide evidence if TC rates carry additional information into the market. Time
Figure 45: One day ahead forecasts St+1
Notes: One day ahead forecasts of spot price St+1, using realized information available up to
t. Values of spot and FFA rates are known up to t.
Figure 46: Two-day forecasts, using Sˆt+1
Notes: Two-day forecasts for t + 2 with overlapping forecast intervals. For VARs, ARIMA
models and VECMs, we also require forecasted values for St+1. After each prediction, the
window moves one period ahead and we create the next two-day forecast.
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Charter contracts are negotiated for maturing with six months, one, three or five
years.
6.4.1 Descriptive data & hypotheses
We test the data for stationarity using following hypothesis with an Augmented
Dicky Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979).
H1: Spot rates, FFA rates, and TC rates are integrated of order 1.
If rates are non-stationary, we test for cointegration of spot and FFA rates to find
the cointegration vector, which provides the second hypothesis.
H2: Spot rates and FFA rates are cointegrated with a cointegration vector of
(1,−1).
If the cointegration vector holds, the UEH holds and markets are efficient.
Forecasts based on random walks have low predictive power and are expected
to have the highest RMSE. We expect the ARIMA-TC model to outperform the
ARIMA model, which in turn are expected to produce higher forecast errors than
the VAR models which take multivariate relationships into account. Finally, if the
rates are cointegrated, we expect the VECMs to create the highest quality forecast,
which is our last hypothesis.
H3: RMSE(RW-Walk) > RMSE(ARIMA) > RMSE(ARIMA-TC) > RMSE(VAR)
> RMSE(VECM)
Table 18 in the appendix reports descriptive data for Panamax and Capesize con-
tracts. Standard deviations for spot and FFA rates for Panamax and Capesize
contracts are similar. Observations are varying because of missing observations due
to thin trading. The unit root can be rejected for the return series of all contracts.
Logs are I(1), except for the Capesize TC + 6M contracts54. We, therefore, cannot
reject H1, and consequently we use log returns in our estimations.
To investigate whether H2 can be rejected, we also test the data for a cointegra-
tion relationship, following Engle and Granger (1987) before estimating VECMs.
By doing so, we test the UEH and Table 20 and 21 report test results, which
show that evidence for cointegration and therefore market efficiency is mixed and
route-depending. The strength of the relationships also depends on the maturity of
54For which the Null can be rejected at the 10% level. The KPSS and Phillips-Peron test confirms
the results.
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the FFA contracts. For the FFA Panamax rates, the null hypothesis is rejected,55
whereas it cannot be rejected for both Time Charter rates.
Hence, evidence for Hypothesis 2 is thus mixed. We do not expect VECMs
to outperform forecasts from VAR models for all markets, so we correct H3 to
acknowledge the results of the cointegration analysis as
H3′: RMSE(RW-Walk) > RMSE(ARIMA) > RMSE(ARIMA-TC) >
RMSE(VECM) > RMSE(VAR).
In the next section, we report results for the forecastability of future spot rates to
check whether H3 holds.
6.5 Estimation results
The estimation window contains data from October 1, 2004, to December 12, 2007,
comprising of 800 observations which creates stable coefficients when moving win-
dows ahead as suggested in Tashman (2000). The results of the ARIMA, VAR,
VECM and ARIMA-TC estimations are as follows, and regression outputs are de-
picted in the appendix. All models are estimated for Capesize and Panamax mar-
kets.
6.5.1 ARIMA estimation
We estimate ARIMA(2,1,0) models so that no moving average part is included in the
estimation, as suggested by information criteria. Results for spot rates on Panamax
routes suggest an adjusted R2 of 0.75 as depicted in Table 22 in the appendix.
Both AR coefficients are significant on the 1% level. Results for Capesize contracts
are presented in the appendix from Table 23. The explained variance here is less
compared to Panamax routes, taking a value of 0.65. Both AR coefficients are
significant and compare to the ones from the Panamax routes. The Durbin-Watson
statistic suggests that the AR(2) sufficiently controls for autocorrelation as the value
is close to 2.
6.5.2 VAR estimation
VAR estimation results are given in the appendix in Table 24, estimated by OLS
for FFA and spot contracts.
Adjusted R2s for the different contracts on Panamax routes are around 0.80 for
the spot rates. The coefficients for the first two lags of the spot rates and the first
55For FFA+1Q the 5% level, for the FFA+2Q and FFA+1A on the 10% level.
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lag of the FFAs are significant at least at the 5% level. The evidence for the impact
of the second lag for the FFAs is mixed. Therefore, only the first lag of the FFA
seem to have a significant impact on current spot rates. The information contained
in FFAs is hence processed within a day. FFA+1A have the weakest impact on
future spot rates.
The explanatory power of the FFA regression is low and between 3-10%, so less
of the variance is explained compared to the spot regressions. Therefore, FFA lags
have a price finding role for spot rates, but the vice versa effect seems weak.
Results for the Capesize contracts for the spot rate estimation suggest adjusted
R2s around 0.67, being slightly lower compared to Panamax contracts, as in the
ARIMA estimation. Coefficients for all spot rates FFAs are significant on the 1%
level. The FFA regressions again explain less of the variance of the regression model.
Using the VAR, significant coefficients and high R2s point towards the forecasta-
bility of future spot rates. FFA rates do not seem to be forecastable, and Granger
causality tests point towards forecastability of future spot rates only so that FFAs
are not Granger caused by spot rates.
6.5.3 VECM estimation
VECM estimates are reported in Table 36, which can be found in the appendix.
Significance and explained variances are similar to the VAR estimation results.
The error correction terms show that the spot rate is responsible for adjustments
back to common trend after disturbances, and coefficients take a significant negative
sign. Disequilibrium is corrected the fastest in the most liquid forward (FFA+1Q) so
that roughly 2% are corrected for Capesize contracts and 1% for Panamax contracts.
The error correction term of the FFAs, however, is insignificant, so mainly exogenous
events have an impact on the forward rate and not on the spot rate. The effects of
the lags of spot rates on FFA rates is only partly significant, depending on the route
and FFA contract type.
The coefficients for the long-run impact, the cointegration relationship, are all
significant on the 1% level so that the cointegration vector causes short-run devia-
tions from the common trend to die out over time. However, this vector deviates
from the cointegration vector of (1,−1). Therefore, both rates do not need to con-
verge as maturity approaches. We can, therefore, reject the UEH. However, a risk
premium of zero which as suggest by the PEHTS can only be rejected for some of
the constants in the VAR estimation, whereas it cannot be rejected for the VECM
estimation (Veenstra and Franses, 1997). The constants suggest that evidence for
risk premia is mixed. For some of the contracts, holding FFA contracts yield a
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positive risk premium, whereas it is the opposite for other contracts. The EHTS
can therefor neither be confirmed nor rejected. Investigating the stability of the risk
premium, however, would require to a time-varying model structure.
6.5.4 ARIMA-TC estimation
We now extend the ARIMA spot rate model for the last known TC rate which
could provide additional explanatory power. Results can be found in Table 42 in
the appendix.
We estimate ARIMA-TC(2,1,0; 1), suggested by AIC and SC information crite-
rion so that only the last value of the Time Charter rate is added to the ARIMA
estimation. Only one TC lag is added, because the lag two Fridays ago has low
explanatory power since information had already been processed by the market
through the spot rates, which are on daily basis.
The adjusted R2s for the ARIMA-TC estimation for both routes, and all con-
tracts compare to the ARIMA models, but the TC coefficients are insignificant for
all contracts. Moreover, model selection criteria recommend to prefer the ARIMA
over the ARIMA-TC model. Our results hence show that TC rates do not add
significant explanatory power to forecast spot rates.
In conclusion, VAR estimations seem suited to create forecasts for future spot
rates since the cointegration relationship is ambiguous. Therefore, markets are
partly inefficient so that we reject the UEH since the cointegration vector of (1,−1)
could not be confirmed for all contracts and FFA maturities.
6.5.5 Impulse responses
VAR models are capable of capturing the relationship between spot and FFA rates.
We consequently create orthogonalized56 impulse responses for the most liquid mar-
ket, Panamax FFA+1Q contracts, to investigate the impact of shocks on the two
rates, ordering spot rates first.57 Results of the Capesize contracts are almost iden-
tical. Figure 47 displays impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to
both rates.
Figure 47 suggests that the impact of spot rate shocks on FFAs is as weak as
suggested by the low explanatory ability of the regression. An increase in spot rates
does not necessarily induce FFA rates to rise as well since FFAs mature at least one
quarter in the future. As is evident, the influence of spot rate shock on the FFAs
56Cholesky decomposed variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals while the order
of the variables being relatively robust for the qualitative response direction.
57The effects of shocks is robustness to reversing the order.
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Figure 47: Orthogonalized impulse responses VAR estimation
Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses for VAR estimation on Panamax contracts, FFA+1Q.
Impulse responses are orthogonalized with Cholesky decomposition, data is in growth rates,
Xt = (St, FFAt). The estimation includes two lags and a constant. Impulse responses display
daily changes in the rates. 0.02 hence denotes a 2 percentage point increase.
dies out already after three days with a maximum response of a one percentage point
increase.
In contrast, a shock to FFAs is more persistent, causing spot rates to increase in
a hump-shaped manner, peaking at a 0.5 percentage point increase per day. Spot
rates converge to pre-shock levels after seven days.
6.5.6 Forecasts and RMSE
We compare the quality of forecasts to pick a model that can be exploited to create
a trading scheme. We compare forecasts regarding RMSE in Table 14 (Panamax)
and Table 15 (Capesize) for different FFA maturities and forecast horizons, as well
as an improvement in RMSE when switching forecast models.
Negative signs denote a decrease of RMSE, equivalent to an improvement in the
accuracy of the forecast.
The random walk has the highest RMSE while increasing as the forecast horizon
is extended. It is outperformed by all other models in Panamax and Capesize
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markets. Improvements by switching from ARIMA to VECM/VAR also increases
the accuracy of the predictions. Forecasts for more than one day require the forecast
for the previous days, which cause RMSEs to grow in the long-run since forecast
errors are transmitted.
ARIMA vs. random walk: ARIMA models, generate lower forecast errors
compared to the random walk. The model is capable of forecasting short-run changes
the spot rates while accuracy decreases as the forecasting horizon is extended, in-
dicated by only a small improvement in the RMSE compared to the random walk.
For nine-day forecasts, the improvement in RMSE is only 1.9% (Capesize) and 6.1%
(Panamax).
VAR vs. ARIMA: Since we showed that FFAs have predictive power for
future spot rates, we prefer a multivariate model over an univariate one. VARs
outperform ARIMA models for all three types of FFA maturities on Capesize and
Panamax markets. FFA+1Q generates forecasts with the smallest RMSE. A decline
in RMSE can be observed for short-run forecasts and decrease as the forecast horizon
is extended.
VECM vs. VAR: VECMs marginally outperform forecasts generated from
VARs in the short-run, but with an increase in RMSE for extended forecast periods,
owed to the weak cointegration relationship.
ARIMA vs. ARIMA-TC: Adding TC rates to ARIMAs marginally de-
creases RMSE for Panamax contracts. Nevertheless, ARIMA models outperform
the ARIMA-TC for the Capesize routes for the majority of the contracts, while
TC + 2Q and TC + 1A are similar in terms of accuracy. Therefore, Time Char-
ter rates cannot add explanatory power to producing spot rate forecasts which can
result from a misalignment between TC and the underlying routes. These routes
are not substitutable, so rates do follow a common trend.58 Moreover, TC rates are
weekly-reported each Friday so that spot rates can process this information directly.
Therefore, changes in the TC rates on Friday have an impact on the spot rates the
following Monday. Furthermore, in ARIMA-TC models we assume an even impact
of TC rates on all daily spot rates and not only on Monday’s rate. This assump-
tion may be too simplistic and a reason TC are incapable of enhancing the ARIMA
estimation to reduce RMSE.
Figure 48 graphically summarizes improvements and deteriorations in RMSE by
switching models for the two most liquid contracts. As is obvious, the strongest
decrease in RMSE is archived by switching from the RW to the ARIMA models and
then to the VAR. Figures for less liquid markets can be found in the appendix in
58However, we minimize this effect by selecting similar routes.
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Figure 51, for which results are similar. As obivous, the strongest decrease in RMSE
can be archived in during the first days of forecast, while the pattern is similar for
Capesize and Panamax markets.
Figure 48: RMSE change when switching models
(a) Panamax
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Notes: The figure reports improvement of RMSE by switching from a random walk to the respec-
tive model using FFA+1Q, for different forecast horizons and Capesize and Panamax markets.
Negative figures denote a decrease of RMSE error when switching to the respective model. VAR
vs. ARIMA denotes, therefore, the change in RMSE for each forecast horizon when switching from
ARIMA model to a VAR model. Percentage improvementin RMSE.
In conclusion, VAR models are best suited for generating spot rate forecasts.
ARIMA-TC do not to outperform ARIMA models in terms of RMSE. Therefore,
we cannot reject Hypothesis 3.
6.6 Robustness and trading scheme
In this section, we use VAR estimates to create a trading scheme. A profit can
be generated since the UEH does not hold so that the timing structure of cargo
shipping contracts matters. Nevertheless, long-short strategies are not possible due
to the inability to short-sell contracts in a secondary market.
Shipowners’ and charterers’ interests do not align; shipowners are interested in
higher future prices while charterers reduce costs if prices decrease. Since market
entry barriers are high in the shipping sector, we assume that intermediates or
brokers exist matching supply and demand.
If the estimated models are known to such intermediates who are capable of
estimating tomorrow’s spot rate, they can apply this information to create short-
run forwards with the charterers and shipowners. However, forecasting spot rates
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to match the maturity of the FFAs is impossible since this would imply estimating
a forecast for 90 days. As seen, VAR-generated forecasts become unreliable after
5-6 days, and the reduction in RMSE decreases compared to the random walk.
Therefore, we create short-run forecasts for up to 9 days as described in earlier
sections.
6.6.1 Trading scheme
We create signals for a market-maker to create an excess return. This market-
maker then engages in fixing a forward agreement for the next days and matches
both parties by engaging in over-the-counter trading.
We assume that neither charterers nor shipowners have market power so that
they do not influence the current or future spot and FFA rate by engaging in more
or less trading. Moreover, for charterers it is assumed that shipping on a particular
day is necessary so that a wait-and-see strategy is undesirable.
The decision to engage in trading, then, is only determined by the model, so
the intermediate cannot deviate from this strategy because he believes he has prime
knowledge of the market compared to other market participants.
In detail, we proceed as follows:
1. Estimate VARs for Capesize and Panamax markets, using FFA+1Q, FFA+2Q
and FFA+1A from 6 June 2004 to 12 December 2007.
2. Create forecasts of the spot rate for one to nine days with constant rolling
windows.
3. If the estimated change in the spot rate is negative (decline in spot rates),
offer the charterer an one to nine days FFA contract to ship at today’s rate St.
Evenly share the profit with the owner, charterer, and broker. At maturity,
buy shipping service at ST from owners and receive profit 13(St − ST ).
4. If the estimated change in the spot rate is positive (increase in prices), offer
shipowners an one to nine days FFA contract to find a charterer at T at price
St. At maturity, find charterers that ships at market price ST and receive a
profit of one-third of the increase in S as the profit is evenly shared.
5. Estimate forecast until the rolling window reaches the final data point.
6. Create an index with December 2007 = 100 for each of the FFAs on both
markets for one to nine days.
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7. Finally, compare trading scheme to MSCI world index as benchmark indicator.
Note that we assume that a bid/ask spread exists. The broker receives only 1/3
of the profit so that the owner and the charterer both have an incentive to engage in
forward trading. Otherwise, the market participants would be indifferent. Table 16
denotes the results from this strategy, as it compares mean and aggregated returns
using daily data for both markets, all three FFA maturities and one to nine-day
forecasts.
Table 16: Returns for Panamax and Capesize trading scheme
+1d +2d +3d +4d +5d +6d +7d +8d +9d
Capesize Market
Mean +1Q 0.8190% 0.4734% 0.1310% -0.0410% -0.0538% -0.0440% -0.2342% -0.0850% -0.2250
Std 1.0580% 1.2652% 1.3737% 1.3989% 1.4053% 1.4076% 1.3919% 1.4068% 1.3783
correct 82.8402% 65.0888% 49.7041% 47.3373% 44.9704% 49.1124% 44.9704% 45.5621% 42.0118
Mean +2Q 0.8218% 0.4734% 0.1239% -0.0337% -0.0751% -0.0018% -0.1530% -0.0615% -0.1806
Std 1.0558% 1.2651% 1.3744% 1.3991% 1.4043% 1.4083% 1.4032% 1.4081% 1.3848
correct 83.4320% 65.6805% 50.8876% 47.9290% 44.9704% 52.0710% 45.5621% 43.7870% 43.1953
Mean +1A 0.8071% 0.2706% 0.2690% 0.4548% 0.1386% -0.0254% -0.0832% -0.0869% -0.0856
Std 1.0672% 0.3562% 0.3557% 1.2720% 1.3730% 1.3993% 1.4038% 1.4056% 1.4090
correct 84.0237% 84.0237% 84.0237% 65.0888% 49.1124% 47.3373% 44.9704% 47.9290% 44.3787
Panamax Market
Mean +1Q 0.5575% 0.4056% 0.2397% 0.1122% 0.0461% 0.0261% -0.0405% 0.0006% -0.0642
Std 0.5172% 0.6439% 0.7212% 0.7521% 0.7580% 0.7624% 0.7759% 0.7910% 0.7897
correct 88.1657% 76.9231% 64.4970% 57.3964% 54.4379% 50.2959% 44.3787% 53.2544% 44.9704
Mean +2Q 0.5503% 0.4074% 0.2750% 0.1089% 0.0347% 0.0166% -0.0275% 0.0175% -0.0429
Std 0.5249% 0.6428% 0.7084% 0.7526% 0.7586% 0.7626% 0.7765% 0.7908% 0.7912
correct 87.5740% 77.5148% 66.8639% 57.3964% 53.8462% 50.2959% 46.1538% 54.4379% 44.9704
Mean +1A% 0.5489% 0.3971% 0.2688% 0.1032% 0.0293% -0.0021% -0.0014% 0.0086% -0.0133
Std 0.5263% 0.6492% 0.7108% 0.7534% 0.7588% 0.7628% 0.7770% 0.7910% 0.7922
correct 87.5740% 76.9231% 67.4556% 57.3964% 52.6627% 50.2959% 46.1538% 53.2544% 46.7456
Sum MSCI W -0.1021%
Std MSCI W 1.0163%
Notes: The table shows mean, standard deviation and ratio of correctly estimated forecasts
of the intermediation strategy described above, for Capesize markets (upper) and Panamax
markets (lower), for forecasts for one day (+1d) for up to nine days (+9d) and using FFA
maturities for the respective market ranging from one quarter (+1Q) to one year (+1A). The
last two lines denote the mean return and standard deviation of the MSCI World index (a
market equity-weighted benchmark of world-wide stock-performances), during the same time
frame (13 December 2007 to 1 August 2008). Mean refers to the arithmetic mean of the log
returns.
Table 16 implies that the trading strategy for the Capesize markets outper-
forms, in the absence of trading costs, the ones on Panamax routes using one-day
forecasts. The choice of maturity for the type of FFA contracts is not essential
for the profit that can be generated following the trading scheme, although short
maturities (FFA+1A) generate slightly higher returns.
Capesize trading schemes for the sample period would have created a mean
return of 0.82% per day for one-day forecasts. In aggregation, this strategy would
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have led to an almost quadrupling of the value invested, which compares to an
almost tripling for the Panamax routes. The profit from following this strategy
decreases as the forecast horizon is extended. For Capesize contracts, the mean
return becomes negative after the third/fourth forecast day, suggesting that only
short-run forecasts are capable of generating excess returns which overlap with our
results in the estimation section. In contrast, using Panamax contracts, it is possible
to generate profits for up to six days, while following the nine-day strategy leads to
a loss. In addition to looking at mean returns, we calculate Sharpe ratios (Sharpe,
1966) that link risk and return as follows.
SRi =
r¯i − r¯msci
σi
(96)
in which r¯i denotes the mean return generated by the respective strategy i, r¯msci
denotes the mean return by the benchmark and σi is the standard deviation of the
respective strategy. Table 17 gives the results.
Table 17: Sharpe ratios for trading scheme
+1d +2d +3d +4d +5d +6d +7d +8d +9d
Capesize Market
FFA+1q 0.871 0.455 0.170 0.044 0.034 0.041 -0.095 0.012 -0.089
FFA+2q 0.875 0.455 0.164 0.049 0.019 0.071 -0.036 0.029 -0.057
FFA+1a 0.852 1.046 1.043 0.438 0.175 0.055 0.013 0.011 0.012
Panamax Market
FFA+1q 1.275 0.788 0.474 0.285 0.196 0.168 0.079 0.130 0.048
FFA+2q 1.243 0.793 0.532 0.280 0.180 0.156 0.096 0.151 0.075
FFA+1a 1.237 0.769 0.522 0.272 0.173 0.131 0.130 0.140 0.112
Notes: This table gives Sharpe ratios for the individual trading schemes for one to nine days
for FFAs with three different maturities for the estimation. The Sharpe ratio is calculated as
SRi = r¯i−r¯
msci
σi
.
As Table 17 shows, the Sharpe ratios are higher for Panamax markets compared
to Capesize markets so that an investor may choose this market since returns given
a unit of risk is higher.
Using the signals we have generated from our VAR estimations, we create an
index for each respective contract, which we compare with the benchmark which we
rescale to 12 December 2007 = 100. Figure 49 compares the MSCI world index to
the ones generated by the two trading scheme.
Figure 49 depicts that using one-day forecasts in Panamax and Capesize mar-
kets would have outperformed the benchmark, which decreased by 18% during the
observation period.
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Figure 49: Trading scheme returns for both contracts
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Notes: Development of index created by trading scheme on Capesize and Panamax routes. The
benchmark index is the MSCI world index.
Creating FFAs, however, requires negotiation with the counter-party, which is
costly. We assume that such negotiations account for approximately 1% as trans-
action costs. Therefore, any profit generated by the broker is reduced by 1% per
trade. Again, using the VAR above, we estimate rolling windows and perform fore-
casts for up to nine and compare the development with the index, now containing
the transaction costs. Figure 50 depicts the development of the indices created over
time if we account for trading costs59.
Incorporating transaction costs reduce the excess return that can be generated
from the trading strategies. Profits, using the one-day strategy is reduced to the
double (1.4 fold) in Capesize (Panamax) markets of the investment. When estimat-
ing forecasts and following the trading strategy for up to nine days, the value of the
amount invested is reduced by half for Panamax contracts and reduced to 40% of
the original quantity in the case of the Capesize contracts.
In conclusion, the short-run forecasts are capable of generating an excess profit
over the market return. However, these strategies might be limited since trading
can be thin at times so that the broker would not be able to find counterparts
which reduce excess returns. Therefore, it is unlikely that the maximum profit can
be generated. However, since the majority of the forecasts is correct, the informa-
tion embedded in the VAR model should be taken into account by charterers and
shipowners alike when deciding on engaging in an over-the-counter business with a
counterpart.
59For simplicity reasons, we ignore tax issues.
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Figure 50: Trading scheme returns for both contracts incl. transaction
costs
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Notes: Development of index created by trading scheme Capesize routes, assuming transaction
costs of 1% per trade. The benchmark index is the MSCI world index.
6.7 Conclusion
This paper finds that spot and future markets in the cargo shipping sector are inef-
ficient due to a physical restriction on short sales and the lack of speculative trading
in the market. Unlike in paper or commodity markets, rates are not connected
through a Cost-Of-Carry relationship.
In this paper, we use data on Panamax and Capesize shipping vessels on the
most trafficked routes. We investigate the relationship between spot and Forward
Freight Agreement rates (FFA). The evidence for cointegration between both rates is
mixed: Results show that cointegration depends on the specific contract and route.
We can empirically reject the theoretical cointegration vector (1,-1) using a VEC
model for most markets and contracts so that the forward price is not an unbiased
estimator for future spot rates so that the UEH does not hold. Charterers and
shipowners, therefore, have to take the timing structure of freight rates into account
when deciding on their rate portfolio. The evidence for the EHTS is mixed so that
we cannot demonstrate if holding spot rates or FFA rates is more profitable. Since
we do not build a model with a time-varying structure, we cannot determine the
time-varying structure of the risk premium, while the PEHTS for a zero risk premia
can be rejected for some markets in the VAR estimation.
We, therefore, we benefit from inefficient markets and compare the quality of
forecasts for spot rates in the shipping sector, by using current spot and FFA rates.
We proceed to compare RSME of forecasts derived from five different models: A
158
Financial assets, fiscal policy, and the macroeconomy
VAR VEC ARIMA, ARIMA-TC, and random walk model. We find that FFA rates
Granger cause spot rates with only a weak vice versa relationship.
VARs outperform ARIMA and random walk in terms of RMSE. High-quality
forecasts of rates with different maturities in the freight market are only observable
in the short-run and models are incapable of producing long-run forecasts for spot
rates.
The comparison of RMSE shows that VARs can be used to explain future spot
rates. We, therefore, use these models to create signals for brokers who match supply
and demand to create excess returns. After controlling for transaction costs, our
trading scheme would have created a return within one year, equivalent to roughly
40% for Capesize markets and a more than double return on Panamax routes.
Our results take a look at within-cycle dynamics because cycles in the shipping
sector tend to reoccur approximately every six to nine years. Therefore, our find-
ings are limited to within-cycle inferences. As soon as additional non-crisis data is
available, the sample should be extended to include shipping cycles.
Finally, for future projects we suggest an EGARCH model to generate forecasts
of future spot rates accounting for time-variable risk premia.
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6.8 Appendix
Table 18: Descriptive data Panamax contract
Panamax Spot FFA+1Q FFA+2Q FFA+1A TC 6M TC 1A
Std deviation 0.0305 0.0426 0.0363 0.0309 0.0925 0.0706
Skewness -0.5306 0.0058 -0.7065 -0.9204 -0.5847 -2.1081
Kurtosis 9.4431 9.8549 7.2469 11.922 11.182 16.918
Jarque-Bera 2121.292*** 2349.474*** 969.905*** 4149.714*** 722.987*** 2238.225***
ADF (Level) -1.8687 -1.3754 -0.9282 -0.8506 -2.2827 -2.0488
ADF (Diff) -6.7696*** -18.496*** -16.232*** -16.010*** -4.6324*** -4.1507***
PP (Level) -1.5148 -0.9636 -0.6880 -0.5722 -1.7351 -1.4697
PP (Diff) -10.073*** -23.891*** -23.745*** -22.886*** -12.425*** -14.131***
KPSS (Level) 0.4900** 0.6166** 0.7264** 0.7543*** 0.2380 0.2752
KPSS (Diff) 0.1054 0.1712 0.2347 0.2675 0.0881 0.1266
Q 1541.09*** 161.96*** 186.23*** 199.89*** 81.95*** 82.57***
Notes: Descriptive data on Panamax contracts, all in log. Spot and FFA rates are daily data,
and TC rates are on a weekly basis (Friday). The table also denotes the Jarque Bera statistic
for normality and the Dicky Fuller statistic with respective significance (∗ denotes significance
on 10%, ∗∗ on the 5% and ∗ ∗ ∗ on the 1% level), as well as the Phillips-Peron and KPSS test
statistic. Ljung/Box test statistic for autocorrelation is also presented.
Table 19: Descriptive data Capesize contract
Capesize Spot FFA+1Q FFA+2Q FFA+1A TC 6M TC 1A
Std deviation 0.0415 0.0486 0.0409 0.0370 0.1236 0.1050
Skewness 0.2255 -0.4782 -0.6953 -3.2035 -0.7976 -0.9699
Kurtosis 13.871 8.8989 9.6780 44.9197 13.8851 14.1280
Jarque-Bera 5919.413*** 1776.631*** 2272.221*** 89873.670*** 1280.900*** 1350.394***
ADF (Level) 0.03704 -1.1541 -0.7968 -1.1537 -2.6138* -2.4428
ADF (Diff) -6.3909*** -5.8113*** -6.0546*** -5.5513*** -5.3261*** -4.8318***
PP (Level) -1.9115 -1.2240 -0.9828 -0.8123 -2.0849 -1.8348
PP (Diff) -11.934*** -23.7029*** -23.5087*** -23.6411*** -14.1397*** -15.4428***
KPSS (Level) 0.3920* 0.5491** 0.6470** 0.6672** 0.2250 0.2597
KPSS (Diff) 0.0737 0.1391 0.1925 0.1815 0.0627 0.0928
Q 1400.20*** 254.86*** 234.73*** 240.77*** 66.67*** 49.92*
Notes: Descriptive data on Capesize contracts, all in logs. Spot and FFA rates are daily data,
and TC rates are on a weekly basis (Friday). The table also denotes the Jarque Bera statistic
for normality and the Dicky Fuller statistic with respective significance (∗ denotes significance
on 10%, ∗∗ on the 5% and ∗ ∗ ∗ on the 1% level), as well as the Phillips-Peron and KPSS test
statistic. Ljung/Box test statistic for autocorrelation is also presented.
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Table 20: Cointegration in Panamax market
FFA+1Q FFA+2Q FFA+1A TC 6M TC 1A
C -1.105325*** -1.167736*** -1.585646*** -1.221835*** -1.431696***
Ln(FFA / TC) 1.104891*** 1.116421*** 1.170882*** 1.106553*** 1.134231***
Adj. R2 0.892014 0.832096 0.779608 0.966652 0.883485
ADF p-value 0.0402 0.0794 0.0701 0.7970 0.7480
ADF p-value (1, -1) 0.0422 0.0930 0.1312 0.8880 0.7480
Notes: Cointegration relationship between FFAs and Time Charter rates of logs of Panamax
data and results of the Augmented Dicky Fuller test (ADF). ∗ denotes significance on 10%, ∗∗
on the 5% and ∗ ∗ ∗ on the 1% level.
Table 21: Cointegration in Capesize market
Capesize FFA+1Q FFA+2Q FFA+1A TC 6M TC 1A
C -1.413937*** -1.591170*** -2.150650*** -1.454579*** -2.164821***
Ln(FFA / TC) 1.130967*** 1.153516*** 1.219452*** 1.123540*** 1.193952***
Adj. R2 0.906328 0.832255 0.774076 0.933550 0.864065
ADF p-value 0.1420 0.0411 0.0537 0.9775 0.0102
ADF p-value (1, -1) 0.0973 0.0760 0.1205 0.3463 0.0077
Notes: Cointegration relationship between FFAs Time Charter rates and Spot rates of logs of
Capesize data and results of the Augmented Dicky Fuller test (ADF). ∗ denotes significance
on 10%, ∗∗ on the 5% and ∗ ∗ ∗ on the 1% level.
Table 22: ARIMA(2,1,0) estimation, Capesize market
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 1.024 0.0333 30.199 0.0000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.293 0.0338 -8.686 0.0000
R-squared 0.657 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.657 S.D. dependent var 0.024
S.E. of regression 0.014 Akaike info criterion -5.695
Sum squared resid 0.156 Schwarz criterion -5.683
Log likelihood 22271.432 Durbin-Watson stat 2.04 0
Notes: Results for ARIMA(2,1,0) estimation for Capesize spot rates as univariate setup
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Table 23: ARIMA(2,1,0) estimation, Panamax market
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 1.191 0.032 37.000 0.0000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.420 0.032 -13.048 0.0000
R-squared 0.755 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.755 S.D. dependent var 0.019
S.E. of regression 0.009 Akaike info criterion -6.478
Sum squared resid 0.071 Schwarz criterion -6.466
Log likelihood 2583.549 Durbin-Watson stat 1.985
Notes:Results from ARIMA(2,1,0) estimation on Panamax spot rates as univariate setup
Table 24: VAR estimation for spot rate, Panamax (+1Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.944 0.0.039 24.508 0.000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.232 0.034 -6.806 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.132 0.011 11.580 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) 0.026 0.012 2.242 0.025
c 0.002 0.001 2.166 0.030
R2 0.792 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.791 S.D. dependent var 0.0191
S.E. of regression 0.009 Akaike info criterion -6.634
Sum squared resid 0.061 Schwarz criterion -6.605
Log likelihood 2648.797 Durbin-Watson stat 2.013
F-stat 753.352
Notes: VAR estimation results for Panamax using the spot rate and FFA+1Q. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the spot rate.
Table 25: VAR estimation for FFA rate, Panamax (+1Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(FFARATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.049 0.134 0.361 0.3270
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.190 0.119 -1.596 0.0.111
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.255 0.039 6.402 0.0000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) 0.0239 0.041 0.0579 0.0364
c 0.000 0.001 0.908 0.364
R-squared 0.080 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 S.D. dependent var 0.032
S.E. of regression 0.030 Akaike info criterion -4.134
Sum squared resid 0.738 Schwarz criterion -4.105
Log likelihood 1652.471 Durbin-Watson stat 2.012
F-stat 17.126
Notes: VAR estimation results for Panamax using the spot rate and FFA+1Q. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the FFA.
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Table 26: VAR estimation for spot rate, Panamax (+2Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 752 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.975 0.0.039 25.166 0.0000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.255 0.0.035 -7.365 0.0000
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.145 0.0.013 11.200 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) 0.025 0.0.014 1.866 0.062
c 0.000 0.003 0.333 0.740
R-squared 0.800 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.799 S.D. dependent var 0.019
S.E. of regression 0.009 Akaike info criterion -6.665
Sum squared resid 0.055 Schwarz criterion -6.624
Log likelihood 2510.975 Durbin-Watson stat 1.992
F-stat 746.656
Notes: VAR estimation results for Panamax using the spot rate and FFA+2Q. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the spot rate.
Table 27: VAR estimation for FFA rate, Panamax (+2Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 752 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(FFARATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.164 0.120 1.368 0.171
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.315 0.107 -2.936 0.003
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.264 0.040 6.574 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) 0.036 0.042 0.851 0.395
c -0.006 0.001 -4.307 0.000
R-squared 0.108 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.103 S.D. dependent var 0.028
S.E. of regression 0.027 Akaike info criterion -4.401
Sum squared resid 0.532 Schwarz criterion -4.371
Log likelihood 1659.9428 Durbin-Watson stat 1.967
F-stat 746.656
Notes: VAR estimation results for Panamax using the spot rate and FFA+2Q. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the FFA+2q.
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Table 28: VAR estimation for spot rate, Panamax (+1A)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 1.031 0.037 30.089 0.000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.349 0.034 -10.184 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.069 0.012 5.668 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) -0.001 0.012 -0.019 0.969
c 0.000 0.003 0.538 0.591
R-squared 0.765 Mean dependent var 0.0011
Adjusted R-squared 0.763 S.D. dependent var 0.019
S.E. of regression 0.009 Akaike info criterion -6.511
Sum squared resid 0.069 Schwarz criterion -6.482
Log likelihood 2599.660 Durbin-Watson stat 2.011
F-stat 642.989
Notes: VAR estimation results for Panamax using the spot rate and FFA+1A. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the spot rate.
Table 29: VAR estimation results for FFA rate, Panamax (+1A)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(FFARATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.201 0.117 1.723 0.085
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.257 0.109 -2.345 0.019
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.142 0.039 3.675 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) -0.029 0.038 -0.752 0.452
c 0.001 0.001 1.742 0.082
R-squared 0.036 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 S.D. dependent var 0.030
S.E. of regression 0.030 Akaike info criterion -4.192
Sum squared resid 0.069 Schwarz criterion -4.163
Log likelihood 1675.656 Durbin-Watson stat 1.831
F-stat 7.367
Notes: VAR estimation results for Panamax using the spot rate and FFA+1A. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the FFA+1A.
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Table 30: VAR estimation results for spot rates, Capesize (+1Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007)
Included observations: 787 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.821 0.040 20.300 0.001
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.192 0.035 -5.485 0.000
DLOG(FFA KURS(-1)) 0.146 0.017 8.211 0.000
DLOG(FFA KURS(-2)) 0.047 0.018 2.618 0.327
c 0.000 0.000 0.392 0.401
R-squared 0.687 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.685 S.D. dependent var 0.024
S.E. of regression 0.013 Akaike info criterion -4.111
Sum squared resid 0.141 Schwarz criterion -4.081
Log likelihood 2275.503 Durbin-Watson stat 2.059
F-stat 428.417
Notes: VAR estimation results for Capesize using the spot rate and FFA+1Q. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the spot rate
Table 31: VAR estimation for FFA, Capesize (+1Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007)
Included observations: 787 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(FFARATE)
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.308 0.092 3.321 0.001
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.309 0.080 -3.833 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.169 0.041 4.132 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) 0.040 0.981 0.001 0.327
c 0.000 0.001 0.839 0.401
R-squared 0.080 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.076 S.D. dependent var 0.032
S.E. of regression 0.030 Akaike info criterion -4.111
Sum squared resid 0.746 Schwarz criterion -4.081
Log likelihood 1662.795 Durbin-Watson stat 2.018
F-stat 17.179
Notes: VAR estimation results for Capesize using the spot rate and FFA+1Q. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the FFA+1Q.
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Table 32: VAR estimation for spot rates, Capesize (+2Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 766 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.846 0.040 21.168 0.000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.210 0.036 -5.938 0.000
DLOG(FFA KURS(-1)) 0.161 0.021 7.461 0.000
DLOG(FFA KURS(-2)) 0.042 0.021 1.962 0.050
c 0.000 0.000 0.513 0.608
R-squared 0.679 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.677 S.D. dependent var 0.024
S.E. of regression 0.013 Akaike info criterion -5.768
Sum squared resid 0.138 Schwarz criterion -5.738
Log likelihood 2214.309 Durbin-Watson stat 2.027
Notes: VAR estimation results for Capesize using the spot rate and FFA+2Q. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the spot rate.
Table 33: VAR estimation for FFA, Capesize (+2Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 766 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(FFARATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.227 0.074 3.030 0.002
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.282 -0.282 -4.247 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.241 0.241 5.077 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) 0.064 0.030 1.589 0.112
c -0.001 0.000 -1.568 0.117
R-squared 0.120 Mean dependent var 0.120
Adjusted R-squared 0.116 S.D. dependent var 0.116
S.E. of regression 0.025 Akaike info criterion -4.516
Sum squared resid 0.484 Schwarz criterion -4.458
Log likelihood 1734.437 Durbin-Watson stat 2.012
F-stat 26.044
Notes: VAR estimation results for Capesize using the spot rate and FFA+2Q. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the FFA+2Q.
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Table 34: VAR estimation for spot rate, Capesize (+1A)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.931 0.037 25.400 0.000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.251 0.034 -7.329 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.086 0.017 5.137 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) 0.043 0.017 2.577 0.010
c 0.000 0.001 0.520 0.682
R-squared 0.672 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.670 S.D. dependent var 0.024
S.E. of regression 0.013 Akaike info criterion -5.732
Sum squared resid 0.149 Schwarz criterion -5.702
Log likelihood 2289.109 Durbin-Watson stat 2.046
F-stat 405.723
Notes: VAR estimation results for Capesize using the spot rate and FFA+1A. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the spot rate.
Table 35: VAR estimation results for FFA, Capesize (+1A)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(FFARATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 0.331 0.083 4.015 0.000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.343 0.077 -4.446 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-1)) 0.129 0.038 3.427 0.000
DLOG(FFARATE(-2)) 0.041 0.038 1.111 0.266
c 0.001 0.001 0.301
R-squared 0.062 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.057 S.D. dependent var 0.032
S.E. of regression 0.031 Akaike info criterion -4.109
Sum squared resid 0.757 Schwarz criterion -4.079
Log likelihood 1642.523 Durbin-Watson stat 1.909
F-stat 13.059
Notes: VAR estimation results for Capesize using the spot rate and FFA+1A. The table depicts
the line-wise OLS results for the FFA+1A.
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Table 36: VECM estimation results, Panamax (+1Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Cointegration Equation
coefficient SE t-value
spot 1.000
FFA -1.038 0.061 -16.786
c 0.349 0.638 0.549
Variable DLOG(spot) t-value dlog(FFA) t-value.
DLOG(spot(-1)) 0.933 24.318 0.049 0.362
DLOG(spot(-2)) -0.229 -6.751 -0.187 -1.570
DLOG(FFA(-1)) 0.123 10.871 0.257 6.338
DLOG(FFA(-2)) 0.021 1.774 0.249 0.598
EC -0.009 -3.32 0.001 0.104
R-squared 0.795 0.0789
Adjusted R-squared 0.793 0.0740
S.E. of regression 0.009 0.030
Sum squared resid 0.598 0.739
Log likelihood 2654.162 1652.061
Mean dependent var 0.001 0.001
S.D. dependent var 0.019 0.032
Akaike info criterion -6.648 -4.133
Schwarz criterion -6.618 -4.104
F-stat 766.245 1652.061
Notes: Estimation results for VECM for Panamax and Xt = [St, FFA+ 1Qt]′. the upper part
denotes the cointegration vector and the lower part the short run adjustments including the
error correction term (EC) for which the left part denotes the regression results for the spot
regression and the right part the results of the FFA regression, including the respective t-value.
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Table 37: VECM estimation results, Panamax (+2Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Cointegration Equation
coefficient SE t-value
spot 1.000
FFA -1.041 0.068 -15.037
c 0.0212 0699 0.303
Variable DLOG(spot) t-value dlog(FFA) t-value.
DLOG(spot(-1)) 0.965 24.945 0.169 1.403
DLOG(spot(-2)) -0.247 -7.162 -0.316 -2.936
DLOG(FFA(-1)) 0.140 10.761 0.269 6.628
DLOG(FFA(-2)) 0.020 1.153 0.039 0.932
EC -0.008 -2.945 0.005 0.604
R-squared 0.802 0.108
Adjusted R-squared 0.801 0.103
S.E. of regression 0.009 0.027
Sum squared resid 0.055 0.533
Log likelihood 2515.339 1659.168
Mean dependent var 0.001 0.001
S.D. dependent var 0.019 0.028
Akaike info criterion -6.676 -4.301
Schwarz criterion -6.646 -4.340
F-stat 757.553 22.494
Notes: Estimation results for VECM for Panamax and Xt = [spott, FFA + 2Qt]′. the upper
part denotes the co integration vector and the lower part the short run adjustments including
the error correction term (EC) for which the left part denotes the regression results for the spot
regression and the right part the results of the FFA regression, including the respective t-value.
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Table 38: VECM estimation results, Panamax (+1A)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Cointegration Equation
coefficient SE t-value
spot 1.000
FFA -1.05 0.102 -10.199
c 0.194 1.033 0.190
Variable DLOG(spot) t-value dlog(FFA) t-value.
DLOG(spot(-1)) 1.095 29.873 0.210 1.792
DLOG(spot(-2)) -0.340 -9.939 -0.262 -2.393
DLOG(FFA(-1)) 0.0664 5.442 0.148 3.3783
DLOG(FFA(-2)) -0.004 -0.292 -0.024 -0.630
EC -0.006 -2.526 0.006 0.945
R-squared 0.766 0.036
Adjusted R-squared 0.765 0.031
S.E. of regression 0.009 0.029
Sum squared resid 0.068 0.696
Log likelihood 2602.452 1675.559
Mean dependent var 0.002 0.002
S.D. dependent var 0.019 0.030
Akaike info criterion -6.519 -4.192
Schwarz criterion -6.489 -4.162
F-stat 649.451 1675.559
Notes: Estimation results for VECM for Panamax and Xt = [spott, FFA + 1At]′. the upper
part denotes the co integration vector and the lower part the short run adjustments including
the error correction term (EC) for which the left part denotes the regression results for the spot
regression and the right part the results of the FFA regression, including the respective t-value.
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Table 39: VECM estimation results, Capesize (+1Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Cointegration Equation
coefficient SE t-value
spot 1.000
FFA -1.057 0.049 -21.581
c 0.542 0.536 1.010
Variable DLOG(spot) t-value dlog(FFA) t-value.
DLOG(spot(-1)) 0.818 20.256 0.302 3.250
DLOG(spot(-2)) -0.188 -5.439 -0.304 -3.787
DLOG(FFA(-1)) 0.130 7.198 0.160 3.825
DLOG(FFA(-2)) 0.034 1.883 0.033 0.790
EC -0.019 -4.326 -0.011 -1.100
R-squared 0.693 0.081
Adjusted R-squared 0.139 0.077
S.E. of regression 0.013 0.030
Sum squared resid 0.598 0.745
Log likelihood 2284.731 1623.048
Mean dependent var 0.001 0.001
S.D. dependent var 0.024 0.032
Akaike info criterion -5.793 -4.112
Schwarz criterion -6.763 -4.082
F-stat 445.221 1623.048
Notes: Estimation results for VECM for Capesize and Xt = [spott, FFA + 1Qt]′. the upper
part denotes the co integration vector and the lower part the short run adjustments including
the error correction term (EC) for which the left part denotes the regression results for the spot
regression and the right part the results of the FFA regression, including the respective t-value.
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Table 40: VECM estimation results, Capesize (+2Q)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 766 after adjustments
Cointegration Equation
coefficient SE t-value
spot 1.000
FFA -1.060 0.082 -12.964
c 0.483 0.888 0.545
Variable DLOG(spot) t-value dlog(FFA) t-value.
DLOG(spot(-1)) 0.083 21.114 0.226 3.015
DLOG(spot(-2)) -0.201 -6.697 -0.279 -4.187
DLOG(FFA(-1)) 0.153 7.068 0.243 5.5952
DLOG(FFA(-2)) 0.034 1.568 0.065 1.582
EC -0.011 -2.945 -0.000 -0.063
R-squared 0.683 0.118
Adjusted R-squared 0.681 0.114
S.E. of regression 0.013 0.025
Sum squared resid 0.136 0.485
Log likelihood 2219.143 1733.753
Mean dependent var 0.002 0.001
S.D. dependent var 0.023 0.026
Akaike info criterion -5.781 -4.513
Schwarz criterion -5.750 -4.483
F-stat 410.332 25.658
Notes: Estimation results for VECM for Capesize and Xt = [spott, FFA+2qt]′. the upper part
denotes the co integration vector and the lower part the short run adjustments including the
error correction term (EC) for which the left part denotes the regression results for the spot
regression and the right part the results of the FFA regression, including the respective t-value.
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Table 41: VECM estimation results, Capesize (+1A)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Cointegration Equation
coefficient SE t-value
spot 1.000
FFA -1.063 0.016 -10.015
c 0.392 0.344 1.135
Variable DLOG(spot) t-value dlog(FFA) t-value.
DLOG(spot(-1)) 0.925 25.290 0.336 4.060
DLOG(spot(-2)) -0.243 -7.098 -0.346 -4.472
DLOG(FFA(-1)) 0.080 4.808 0.134 3.534
DLOG(FFA(-2)) 0.037 2.237 0.046 1.225
EC -0.008 -2.526 0.006 0.850
R-squared 0.675 0.061
Adjusted R-squared 0.673 0.056
S.E. of regression 0.013 0.030
Sum squared resid 0.147 0.757
Log likelihood 2293.155 1642.349
Mean dependent var 0.001 0.001
S.D. dependent var 0.024 0.032
Akaike info criterion -5.741 -4.108
Schwarz criterion -5.712 -4.079
F-stat 411.883 12.967
Notes: Estimation results for VECM for Capesize and Xt = [spott, FFA + 1At]′. the upper
part denotes the co integration vector and the lower part the short run adjustments including
the error correction term (EC) for which the left part denotes the regression results for the spot
regression and the right part the results of the FFA regression, including the respective t-value.
Table 42: ARIMA TC, Panamax (+6M)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 1.206 0.034 35.055 0.000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.428 0.037 -11.395 0.000
DLOG TC 6M(-1) -0.000 0.006 -0.062 0.949
R-squared 0.769 Mean dependent var 0.000
Adjusted R-squared 0.769 S.D. dependent var 0.019
S.E. of regression 0.009 Akaike info criterion -6.532
Sum squared resid 0.061 Schwarz criterion -6.513
Log likelihood 2380.862 Durbin-Watson stat 1.992
Notes: Results for ARIMA-TC(2,1,0;1) estimation on Panamax +6 Month.
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Table 43: ARIMA TC, Panamax (+12M)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007
Included observations: 797 after adjustments
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 1.201453 0.034284 35.04413 0.0000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.419791 0.036968 -11.35565 0.0000
DLOG TC 1A(-1) -0.005088 0.008137 -0.625267 0.5320
R-squared 0.770080 Mean dependent var 0.000987
Adjusted R-squared 0.769445 S.D. dependent var 0.019179
S.E. of regression 0.009209 Akaike info criterion -6.533122
Sum squared resid 0.061486 Schwarz criterion -6.514206
Log likelihood 2381.056 Durbin-Watson stat 1.983124
Notes: Results for ARIMA-TC(2,1,0;1) estimation on Panamax +12 Months.
Table 44: ARIMA TC, Capesize (+6M)
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 11/23/2007)
Included observations: 728 after adjustments)
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 1.036 0.034 29.786 0.000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.319 0.036 -8.807 0.000
DLOG TC 6M(-1) 0.005 0.007 0.789 0.430
R-squared 0.666 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.665 S.D. dependent var 0.026
S.E. of regression 0.013 Akaike info criterion -5.701
Sum squared resid 0.142 Schwarz criterion -5.682
Log likelihood 2100.994 Durbin-Watson stat 2.073
Notes: Results for ARIMA-TC(2,1,0;1) estimation, Capesize +6 Months.
Table 45: ARIMA TC, Capesize (+12M)
Sample (adjusted): 10/06/2004 12/12/2007)
Included observations: 797 after adjustments)
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPOTRATE)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-1)) 1.034 0.034838 29.691 0.000
DLOG(SPOTRATE(-2)) -0.311 0.035928 -8.674 0.000
DLOG TC 1A(-1) 0.000 0.008404 0.081 0.935
R-squared 0.665 Mean dependent var 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.664 S.D. dependent var 0.024
S.E. of regression 0.013 Akaike info criterion -5.700
Sum squared resid 0.142 Schwarz criterion -5.681
Log likelihood 2100.685 Durbin-Watson stat 2.066
Notes: Results for ARIMA-TC(2,1,0;1) estimation, Capesize +12 Months.
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Figure 51: Improvement of RMSE compared to random walk
(a) Panamax, FFA+2Q
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(b) Panamax, FFA+2A
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(c) Capesize, FFA+2Q
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(d) Capesize, FFA+1A
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Notes: Improvement in RMSE by switching from the random walk model to the respective models
on Capesize and Panamax contracts.
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7 Conclusion
In my dissertation, I present five essays on the impact of fiscal policy on the macroe-
conomy while investigating the interaction with financial assets.
In chapter 2, I create a novel measure to capture future military spending changes
based on stock market returns of military contractors, based on Fisher and Peters
(2010). By relying on defense spending and the stock market measure, I solve the
endogeneity problem and foresight issue when estimating fiscal VARs. However, the
externally specified shock of Fisher and Peters (2010) has some drawbacks so that
I modify the shock to be free of known market anomalies as shown in Fama and
French (1993). The spending shock is then measured as abnormal returns in a SLB
market model regression.
I then estimate fiscal VARs and derive the fiscal multiplier. When using my
new shock and ordering it last in a recursive VAR setup, I can show that the fiscal
multiplier takes a value of 1.2. However, when extending the sample to include
financial crisis data, the impact of military spending decreases and is only half as
strong as in the limited sample.
The next chapter investigates, the second side of fiscal policy, taxes. In a vector
autoregression setup, the impact of tax cuts and TFP innovations as suggested by
Romer and Romer (2010) and Basu et al. (2006) on consumer credit is investigated.
The paper compares estimates from exogenous VARs and standard VARs since the
strict exogeneity of these two shocks is debatable. Granger causality tests suggest
that both shocks are Granger caused by the other variables in the system. The
paper hence suggests estimating the less restrictive method, a standard VAR rather
than an exogenous VAR.
Both shocks trigger an expansion in the economy. The paper finds a positive
comovement between output, private consumption, hours, and consumer credit con-
ditional on both shocks. Such comovement refutes standard consumption arguments.
Thus, households do not save in good times to buffer negative shocks. The initiated
boom in the economy after the two shocks is thus partly debt-financed.
Because that chapter provides insight into the interaction between tax cuts, TFP
shocks and unsecured consumer credit, the next chapter estimates the impact of TFP
innovations and tax cuts on total household debt, which includes also collateralized
debt. That paper is able to find the same comovement as in the case of consumer
credit. Since this result is robust to a number of modifications, a DSGE model
with financial frictions is constructed bring the model to the data and hence to
match empirical impulse responses. The resulting parameters are in line with earlier
estimates so that parts of the households in the economy are borrowing-constrained.
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The model is capable of matching the hump-shaped responses in all variables in the
system.
In the fourth essay, I investigate the interaction between house price shocks and
fiscal policy rules, if the economy is distant or at the Zero Lower Bound on interest
rates (ZLB). A shock to house prices has contributed to starting the financial crisis,
as Iacoviello (2015) notes. I can show that house price shocks which I model as
devaluation of the stock of housing have a severe negative impact on the economy
since borrowing households are forced to quickly deleverage by selling off property
and decrease consumption.
In response to the crisis, government debt has surged in many countries. To
reduce government debt, taxes can be increased, or spending can be cut. I can show
that in times when the economy is distant to the ZLB, it is irrelevant if taxes or
spending is used to reduce government debt. However, if the economy is at the
ZLB, cutting spending amplifies the recession in contrast to increasing taxes when
a deleveraging shock hits. Therefore, in a situation with high government debt,
cutting spending has a severe negative impact on output compared to increasing
taxes.
Finally, in contrast to the assumption in the chapter on the fiscal multiplier,
the last chapter investigates how asset returns are influenced by inefficient markets.
I choose the market for shipping goods across oceans which has unique statistical
characteristics compared to other asset classes with high data frequency and quality.
Due to high-frequency data and availability, the paper then takes advantage of
inefficient asset markets in the shipping sector and compares forecasting models in
terms of RMSE. As it turns out, vector autoregression outperforms all other models.
With this information, a trading scheme is created which would have outperformed
the market, even after controlling for transaction costs.
In conclusion, these five chapters contribute to shed light on the interaction
between financial assets, fiscal policy and the macroeconomy using empirical models
and also theoretical ones.
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